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This thesis will demonstrate how prosopographical methods can be used to provide a 
narrative of social change for the Quraysh tribe of Late Antiquity. By applying these 
methods to records of their marriage behaviour, it will be shown that the pre-Islamic 
Quraysh led a far more marginal existence than is widely thought, and that in the post-
Islamic period they were surprisingly flexible with regard to their marriage practices and 
ideas on group membership.  
 
The first three chapters focus on historiography and methodology. Chapter One 
introduces the methodological preliminaries that lie at the heart of this research; these 
concern the nature of the data, the manner in which it is extracted and the way it will be 
structured within databases. Issues regarding the quality and reliability of the marital 
records as preserved in the nasab (tr: genealogical) literary tradition are also discussed in 
this section. Chapter Two provides a historiography of the nasab tradition, paying 
particular attention to the nature of its emergence and the possible effects of social and 
cultural contexts on the quality of the marriage data. This provides the groundwork for 
Chapter Three which focuses more narrowly on the work from which most of our data 
are extracted – the Nasab Quraysh of al-Zubayrī (d. 851).  
 
The remaining five chapters outline how the data within the nasab tradition can be 
analysed and incorporated into existing secondary scholarship. Chapters Four and Five 
establish that the data show a rapid rise in concubinage at the same time as the Arab 
military conquests of the seventh century. This has implications for our current consensus 
on the nature of marriage and identity in the seventh and eighth centuries. Chapters Six 
to Eight investigate the marriages made by the Quraysh to Arab women in the sixth to 
eighth centuries, and will show how practice adapted to context.  
 
To conclude, it will be argued that this investigation not only establishes the high quality 
of the marriage data as preserved in the nasab tradition, but also the enormous potential 
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Notes on Citations and Transliterations 
  
The Arabic transliteration in this thesis follows a modified version of the system 
advocated by the International Journal of Middle East Studies. Arabic nouns commonly 
found in the English language are not transliterated; e.g. caliph, harem, Mecca, Medina 
etc. Transliterated Arabic book titles have the first letter of the first word capitalised only 
unless this word is kitāb in which case it is the following word with the only capitalised 
initial letter. 
  
The nature of the research means that there is a great deal of reliance placed on computer 
software, most of which has not been designed to handle Arabic grammatical 
conventions. This has led to a minor modification to standard transliteration, namely the  
‘al-’ prefix in initial will in general be avoided. This is in order to make it easier for 
computer programs to quickly sort names into an alphabetical list. Occasionally this leads 
to minor inconsistencies when dealing with familiar characters; so Ibn al-Zubayr (the 
commonly used version of his name) is the son of Zubayr b. ʿ Awwām. Additionally, most 
authors’ and caliphs’ names that begin with ‘al-’ will remain in this format as they are not 
being entered into the database (e.g. al-Ṭabarī, al-Balādhurī); again, this is because they 
are more familiar in this configuration and they are normally not subjected to database 
analysis.  
  
Numbers from one to ten will be written out; numbers above this will be provided in 
numerical form. Exceptions to this are numbers as they appear in lists, and also when 
used to refer to generations; this is to account for the negative numbers that occasionally 
appear. Decimals will be given to two places. All dates are Common Era unless otherwise 
stated though ‘CE’ will be written after dates in instances where clarity is needed (for 




References will be provided in full form in a footnote in the first instance, and afterwards 
consist of author surname followed by an abridged title and page reference. 
Encyclopaedia articles will take the form Name [or abridged name] of Encyclopaedia,  
s.v. ‘Title of Article’ (Name of Author); e.g. EQ, s.v. ‘Tribes and Clans’ (Ella 
LandauTasseron).  
  
Best efforts have been made to render this work accessible to the non-Arabic reader. To 
this end, references to translations have been provided where available and plural forms 
of Arabic words are avoided where practicable.  





This thesis will demonstrate how prosopographical approaches can be used to turn the 
Arab genealogical literary tradition (Ar: nasab) into a social history of Muḥammad’s tribe 
for the period 500-750 CE. These approaches will primarily involve tracking the origins 
and statuses of the mothers of Qurashī tribespeople over time. Through this our study will 
confirm some elements of the existing historical narrative for the period while contesting 
others. The investigation will also tell us a great deal about the historiography of the nasab 
tradition in general, and the Nasab Quraysh of al-Zubayrī in particular.  
  
In terms of concurrence, statistical analyses of our database will show that the first 
Muslims married fewer Qurashī women than the non-Muslims of their fathers’ 
generation, and instead turned to brides taken from a much wider geographical range. 
This correlates with elements of the traditional narrative such as the ostracisation of the 
early Muslims, their anti-tribal ideology and their conquest of the Arabian Peninsula. In 
the Umayyad era we see a further correlation between the results of our analysis and the 
traditional narratives; this is in the form of an increase in the numbers of children born to 
foreign slave women. The timing of this change matches exactly the period of the military 
conquests which brought with them an influx of captive women.  
  
These concurrences are welcome because they tend to support the conclusion (arrived at 
separately, on the basis of internal evidence and anthropological parallels) that our 
methodology is a sound means of extracting, structuring and interpreting the data. This 
means that where we find divergences between the prosopography and the traditional 
narratives we must explain them convincingly.   
  
One of the most significant of these divergences concerns the pre-Islamic Quraysh, whose 
marriage behaviour as revealed by quantitative analysis does not correlate with that of the 
Quraysh as they exist in many of our most familiar primary and secondary sources. It will 
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be shown that the marriages made by the Quraysh in this period are not characteristic of 
a tribe at the heart of a far-flung trading empire, or even that of a tribe that enjoyed 
eminence in the Ḥijāz; in fact, our analysis highlights the parochiality of the Quraysh as 
they existed before and during Muḥammad’s lifetime.   
  
Additionally, the data also reveal that concubinage was enthusiastically taken up by all 
sections of the Quraysh as soon as slave women became available; this was not a gradual 
change in behaviour that only became prevalent in the ʿAbbāsid era (as argued in the 
primary sources and secondary literature). The data also go some way in showing that 
there is little evidence that the children of concubine unions were treated as being of lower 
status than their full-born siblings. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that the Umayyad 
caliphs exhibited remarkable dynamism and creativity when it came to changing their 
marriage practices. Overall, it will repeatedly be shown that the prosopographical 
approach has the capacity to suggest a number of new avenues of inquiry unavailable to 
us had we relied solely on more traditional methodologies.  
  
The structure of this research is shaped entirely by the nature of the sources. The Quraysh 
of the sixth to mid-eighth centuries have been chosen because the genealogical data 
available on this cohort in this time period enjoy a unique amount of detail – indeed, it 
will be argued that in terms of volume and nature these data are without comparison in 
all pre-modern human historiography. The Arabic historical sources record the names of 
approximately 3,000 Qurashīs of this period for whom we know the names of their fathers 
and at least the status of their mothers; no other society known to this researcher preserved 
this level of genealogical information in anything like the same fashion.  
  
The choice of marriages – specifically child-bearing marriages – as our principal data 
category is also closely related to the nature of the sources. Genealogical memory can be 
very accurate and consistent in some respects, but it can also be highly divergent and 
contradictory in others. By drawing on anthropological studies of tribally organised 
societies we will show that there are good grounds for believing that the child-bearing 
13  
  
marriage data for this period fall into the accurate and consistent category of genealogical 
memory. This will be further supported by a study on the internal and external consistency 
of the nasab data itself.   
  
Finally, the nature of the data has led us to use prosopography as the primary 
methodological school of approaches. While the genealogical marriage data are extensive 
and arguably very accurate in general terms, it does not mean that we can be sure that any 
individual record is true. The quantitative approaches familiar to prosopographers can 
overcome this problem as they mitigate the effects of small numbers of erroneous 
accounts. Prosopography is also useful because it can turn genealogy into a collection of 
individual choices (the decision to have children with a concubine rather than a wife, for 
example) which can then be studied in terms of different sub-groups and how these 
choices change over time. Through this we can understand how Qurashīs modified their 
marriage behaviour in response to the events of a particularly dramatic two and a half 
centuries of their history.  
  
Prosopography and early Islamic history  
  
Prosopography is taken here to mean the collective study of a group of historical actors.2  
The methodological approaches of most concern in this thesis are those that employ 
quantitative analysis to uncover changes in the social structure of a status group.3   
  
The idea that these sorts of prosopographical techniques could be useful to historians of 
pre-modern Islam has over four decades of heritage. An early pioneer whose work led to 
                                                 
2 For good general introductions to prosopography as well as some case studies, see Lawrence Stone,  
“Prosopography,” Daedalus 100, no.1 (1971): 46–79 and Katherine Keats-Rohan, Prosopography  
Approaches and Applications: a Handbook (Oxford: Linacre College Unit for Prosopographical 
Research, 2007). For a discussion related more specifically to Islamic Studies, see Asad Ahmed, The 
Religious Elite of the Early Islamic Hijaz: Five Prosopographical Case Studies (Oxford: Linacre College 
Unit for Prosopographical Research, 2010), 1-12.  
3 There is another type of prosopography that uses statistics to a far lesser extent as it is interested in 




published output was Richard Bulliet who published “A Quantitative Approach to 
Medieval Muslim Biographical Dictionaries” in 1970;4 he followed this with the 1972 
work The Patricians of Nishapur5 and then Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period,6 
published in 1979. In all cases he applied quantitative techniques to biographical 
dictionaries of medieval Islamic ʿulamā. Some of the conclusions he drew based on this 
data analysis were bold – perhaps too bold – but the influence of the works is undeniable.7  
  
The timing of the publication of these studies was in part related to the emergence of 
computers as research tools, but Bulliet’s work was also part of a wider debate on how 
Islamic historical sources can be used in reconstructing Islamic social history. His starting 
point was that, although the content of the biographies of the Muslim scholarly class was 
not particularly good evidence for contemporary social practice in itself, the entries did 
contain small amounts of stable information such as marriage behaviour and genealogy. 
By mining this information, the resulting database could then be used to construct a social 
history of medieval Islamic societies. Like the work in this thesis, his research approach 
was shaped by the sources.   
                                                  
The methodologies used by Bulliet were not only of interest to social historians of the 
medieval era; those with interests in earlier times could also see the appeal of the 
quantitative approach. In 1980, Patricia Crone published her own prosopography of 
                                                 
4 Richard W. Bulliet, “A Quantitative Approach to Medieval Muslim Biographical Dictionaries,” Journal 
of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 13, no. 2 (1970): 195-211. 
5 Richard W. Bulliet, The Patricians of Nishapur: a Study in Medieval Islamic Social History (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972). 
6 Richard W. Bulliet, Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period: An Essay in Quantitative History 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
7 As can be seen in recent works looking in more detail at conversion in the Balkans (Evgeni Radushev, 
“The Spread of Islam in the Ottoman Balkans: Revisiting Bulliet’s Method on Religious Conversion,” 
Archiv Orientalni 78, no. 4 (2010): 368-384) and Spain (Alwyn Harrison, “Behind the Curve: Bulliet and 
Conversion to Islam in al-Andalus Revisited,” Al-Masaq: Islam & the Medieval Mediterranean 24, no. 1 
(2012): 35-51). The appeal of computing as a means of handling the vast amounts of data preserved in the 
Islamic sources is a recurring one; for instance Lecker’s comments on how “Prosopographies and other 
computerized tools will reduce the time consumed by the arduous task of unearthing the relevant source 
material; all this could lead to a comeback of the primary sources.” (Michael Lecker, People, Tribes and 
Society in Arabia Around the Time of Muhammad, ed. Michael Lecker (Aldershot: Ashgate, s005), vii). 
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Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid governors in Slaves on Horses, declaring in the opening pages 
that “early Islamic history has to be almost exclusively prosopographical” (emphasis 
hers). 8  Again, this declaration and the prosopographical study were shaped by the 
sources; in this case the governor lists which were extensive and (according to Crone) 
accurate, but limited in terms of what each individual piece of information could tell the 
historian. Crone’s use of prosopography was designed to turn this ‘shallow’ data into 
something more useable by giving it breadth.  
  
In the background loomed larger but less successful projects. The 1960s saw the birth of 
the computerised (using punch cards) Onomasticon Arabicum which was based on the 
vast collection of biographical data that had been collected by Giuseppe Gabrieli and 
Leone Caetani in the first 14 years of the twentieth century. This project gathered pace in 
the 1970s, but constant changes to computing technologies (from the punch cards, to 
magnetic tapes, to Microsoft Access and to the website that exists today) along with the 
difficulties of getting early computer programmes to handle Arabic script has meant that 
the project has been perpetually beset by problems.9 We should also mention Charles 
Pellat’s “Peut-on connaître le taux de natalité au temps du Prophète? A la recherche d'une 
méthode” (published 1971) which was an ambitious but unconvincing attempt to calculate 
Prophetic-era birth rates using the Nasab Quraysh of al-Zubayrī.10  
   
But neither Bulliet’s work nor Crone’s Slaves on Horses, or even the Onomasticon 
Arabicum led to a glut of prosopographical works concerned with Late Antique11 or Early 
Medieval Islam. The Onomasticon ultimately yielded very little in terms of published 
                                                 
8 Patricia Crone, Slaves on Horses: the Evolution of the Islamic Polity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980), 17.  
9 This synopsis is based on Charles Müller, Onomasticon Arabicum-online: a Historical Suvey, 2012, 
http://onomasticon.irht.cnrs.fr/OA_ProjectHistory.pdf. Accessed 21/03/2013.   
10 The problem with the premise of the approach that it asks far too much of the source data for the 
conclusions to be meaningful. Charles Pellat, “Peut-on connaître le taux de natalité au temps du Prophète? 
A la recherche d’une méthode,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 14, no. 2 
(1971): 107-135.  
11 For the purposes of this thesis the end point of Late Antiquity is taken to be 750 CE following Peter 
Brown, The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150-750 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971).  
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output; it serves as a cautionary tale for the prospective prosopographer when one 
considers the enormous amount of effort that it has consumed. At the same time, Crone’s 
own prosopographical work did not extend far beyond Slaves on Horses, and very few 
scholars have followed Bulliet’s lead and taken a long-term commitment to 
prosopographical or statistical methods for this historical period (in this category we can 
only really point to Michael Lecker).12 As for the successful use of these methodologies 
when occasionally deployed by established academics there are few other than Harald 
Motzki’s “The Role of non-Arab Converts in the Development of Early Islamic Law”13 
and Fred Donner’s “Tribal Settlement in Basra During the First Century A.H.”14  
  
As for less well-known scholars, the only substantive works devoted to the prosopography 
of the Late Antique era have been published relatively recently; Fuʾad Jabali’s The 
Companions of the Prophet: A Study of Geographical Distribution and Political 
Alignments (from 2003) and Asad Ahmed’s The Religious Elite of the Early Islamic Ḥijāz 
(from 2011).15 Both are problematic in that they do not address the problems with the 
source material adequately and as a result arrive at conclusions unsupported by the 
evidence (this will be discussed in greater detail below); besides this, Ahmed’s work is 
not concerned with statistics. More convincing academic studies for the Late Antique 
period include Salih Said Agha’s Revolution Which Toppled the Umayyads (from 2003)16 
and Michael Ebstein’s “Shurṭa Chiefs in Baṣra in the Umayyad Period: A 
Prosopographical Study” (from 2010).17 This latter paper drew on data gathered and 
structured by the Jerusalem Prosopography Project run by Michael Lecker, but sadly is 
                                                 
12 Carl Petry and John Nawas have also done statistical work for pre-modern Islamic history but this is 
largely for the later Medieval period for which we have much better resources (particularly for Egypt). 
Indicative works of all these scholars are listed in the bibliography.  
13 Harald Motzki, “The Role of Non-Arab Converts in the Development of Early Islamic Law,” Islamic 
Law and Society 6, no. 3 (1999): 293–317.  
14 Fred Donner, “Tribal Settlement in Basra during the First Century A.H.,” in Land Tenure and Social 
Transformation in the Middle East, ed.T. Khalidi, 97-120 (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984).  
15 Fuad Jabali, The Companions of the Prophet: a Study of Geographical Distribution and Political 
Alignments (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003). 
16 Salih Said Agha, The Revolution Which Toppled the Umayyads: Neither Arab nor ʻAbbāsid (Leiden; 
Boston: Brill, 2003).  
17 Michael Ebstein, “Shurṭa Chiefs in Baṣra in the Umayyad Period: A Prosopographical Study” 
AlQantara 31, no. 1 (2010): 103–147.  
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one of very few published works to have used this resource as a means for quantitative 
study.   
 
The aspiring prosopographer therefore faces two problems. The first is that many scholars 
of pre-modern Islamic history are unfamiliar with quantitative or prosopographical 
approaches. This means that explanations and justifications cannot consist solely of 
references to other works and a brief synopsis in an introduction; they have to be handled 
in a detailed way throughout the investigation. The second problem is that there are very 
few established methodologies to build on. While the works of Bulliet et al. mentioned 
in the section above are undoubtedly prosopographical studies of pre-modern Islam, there 
is little of their methodology that can be directly borrowed and applied to other sources 
describing different categories of people. For similar reasons, prosopographical studies 
of non-Islamic cultures are also of limited use. The tools of this trade have to be fashioned 
en route; again, this requires careful explanation and justification at every stage.  
  
In order for readers to be able to critically engage with the conclusions drawn from any 
novel research methods, the workings of these methods must first be shown and its tools 
fully understood. It is for these reasons that methodology and related issues account for 
almost half the word count of this thesis. While the conclusions drawn from this research 
on the subjects of marriage and identity are substantive, the methodology is at least as 
important; without detailing its underpinnings we are denying scholars the ability to easily 
replicate this research in the future.   
  
The sources of early Islamic history  
  
A convincing prosopographical methodology rests on the appropriateness of its source 
material and, as anyone with a degree of familiarity with the historiography of early 
Islamic history will know, this source material is very complicated. These issues have 
been discussed extensively in the secondary literature, but in essence the debate centres 
on what can be considered as primary evidence. Much of our extant historiographical data 
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are presented in a primary, or even a documentary fashion (e.g. eyewitness statements, 
participant accounts, letters and contracts) but not only was the bulk of this information 
preserved centuries after the events described, they also bear the marks of repeated 
retellings and reformulations.18   
  
The scholarly responses to this are typically schematised as falling into two broad 
categories. On the one side, some historians of the early Islamic period have seen enough 
of the contradictions and anachronisms of the traditional historical narrative to convince 
themselves that none of the information contained within it can begin to be considered 
akin to a primary source. As a result, they have turned to non-narrative historical sources 
(principally archaeology, architecture, numismatics and papyrology) or narrative sources 
from outside the Islamic tradition for answers. Against this group are those who believe 
that the criticisms of the source material are over-stated; with experience and careful 
analysis, a scholar can discern the fabricated account from the one with a more solid 
historical basis.  
  
This is of course a gross over-simplification as most credible work on Islamic history 
cannot be said to fall decisively in either one camp or the other. This thesis is a case in 
point. The author’s choice of a non-standard methodology is a result of his conviction 
that the source materials are deeply problematic and cannot be read in a straightforward 
fashion; at the same time, the data that form the prosopography is preserved in this very 
same source material. And while part of the argument for the high quality of this particular 
type of genealogical data is found in evidence from outside the traditional historical 
narratives (principally anthropological observation), another set of arguments comes from 
                                                 
18 For relatively recent synopses of the processes by which history became historiography see Chase  
Robinson’s Islamic Historiography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Gregor 
Schoeler’s The Genesis of Literature in Islam: From the Aural to the Read, trans. S.M Toorawa  
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). Slightly older but still relevant is Stefan Leder’s “The 
literary use of the khabar: a basic form of historical writing,” in The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near 
East vol. 1, eds. Averil Cameron and Lawrence Conrad (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1992): 277-316.  
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within (namely the high degree of internal correlation between the genealogies and the 
clear links between the trend analysis and the main events of the historical narrative).  
 
Nonetheless, the scholarly caricatures remain useful because they provide a framework 
for inquiry, and as long as a scholar aims to please both camps then he or she does not 
have to worry whereabouts on the spectrum his or her research fits. In terms of this thesis, 
it is hoped that those who think criticism of the historical sources is over-stated will 
welcome it as a means of incorporating the under-studied and challenging genre of Arab 
genealogical literature into wider scholarship. On the other side, scholars of the sceptical 
persuasion will hopefully consider this work as an academic approach to early Islamic 
history that fully takes into account their concerns, and is analogous to the more familiar 
uses of non-narrative sources such as archaeology or numismatics.  
  
Marriage and concubinage  
  
The prosopographical methodologies and the genealogical data have been directed 
towards uncovering changing patterns of marriage amongst the Quraysh. This is thanks 
to the genealogies’ recording of maternal data which can then be turned into a study of 
marriage decisions.  
  
The simplicity of the intent belies the difficulty in carrying out the investigation. The 
marriages of the Quraysh are scattered across dozens of works written in a variety of 
contexts and exhibiting varying degrees of consistency. As a result, this research has 
primarily used one source for data extraction – the Nasab Quraysh (tr: Genealogy of the 
Quraysh) of al-Zubayrī.19 By comparing it to some rival historical and genealogical works 
it will be shown that the Nasab Quraysh is the best possible candidate for this sort of data 
extraction; it is consistent, comprehensive and conveniently structured.  
 
                                                 
19 Musʿab b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Zubayrī, Kitāb Nasab Quraysh, ed. E. Levi-Provencal (Cairo: Dar al-Maʿārif 
lil-Tibāʿa wa-al-Nashr, 1953).  
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The next problem is one of dating. None of the historical works pay any particular 
attention to the dates of marriages, or the dates of the births of children (which could 
otherwise be used to indicate when a marriage was contracted). Other contextual data 
(such as death dates and battle participation) are of lower quality than genealogical data, 
and can only provide broad indications of when a person (or his parents) may have 
married. Because of this, marriages will instead be categorised according to the number 
of generations separating the husband from Quṣayy b. Kilāb – the person whom tradition 
reports as having instigated the unification of the Quraysh and their subsequent settlement 
at Mecca. Constructing a genealogical framework along these lines is made possible 
because all the Quraysh were (by definition) connected to him.  
  
Using this generational organisation system, it will be shown that the origins of Qurashī 
wives change dramatically over the 250 years in question. In the generation prior to the 
revelation of Islam, the Quraysh predominantly took wives from other Quraysh; where 
they did not, the women came almost entirely from the tribes of the central Ḥijāz. But 
Muḥammad and his close companions behave very differently. The number of wives of  
Qurashī origin for this group is significantly lower and their place is taken by nonQurashī 
Arab women from all over the Arabian Peninsula. Ultimately though, this did not become 
an established pattern of behaviour for all Muslims. Following Muḥammad’s death, the 
nature of Qurashī marriage changed once more – the Quraysh began eschewing Arab 
women in favour of foreign slave women. But at the same time as they were making more 
and more of these highly exogamous unions with slave women, at least one branch of the 
Quraysh (the Umayyad caliphs and their sons) were becoming increasingly endogamous 
by marrying their cousins with greater frequency.  
  
These findings confirm some elements of the traditional narrative yet refute others. The 
rise in concubinage coincides with the conquests, which would have given the Quraysh 
access to large numbers of slave women. Here the prosopography and the traditional 
narrative concur. But where they diverge is in the timing of this change in marriage 
behaviour and also in the treatment of the slave women and their children by the Arab 
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elites. The traditional sources have so far been interpreted as saying the concubine was a 
widespread phenomenon of the ʿAbbāsid era and not the Umayyad; they also claim that 
Umayyad society treated the concubine and her child relatively poorly. Neither argument 
can be sustained in the light of our prosopographical analysis.  
  
Similar divergence can be found in the pre-conquest marriage behaviour. The high degree 
of exogamy exhibited by the early Muslims relative to the non-Muslims of their fathers’ 
generation concurs with a number of elements of the traditional narrative such as the 
estrangement of the early Muslims from the rest of the Quraysh, the anti-tribal ideology 
of the umma and the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula. But the traditional historical 
narrative is not as good at explaining the marriage behaviour of the pre-Islamic Quraysh 
- most of these marriages took place with tribes situated within 200 miles of Mecca. The 
parochiality of the jāhiliyya Quraysh jars with the historical sources that say they enjoyed 
a pre-eminence recognised by all Arabs.  
  
Data collection and analysis is a time-consuming business, meaning that there is a cost in 
terms of how long it is feasible to spend applying the findings to the narrative sources in 
a comprehensive fashion. This is felt particularly acutely in the time-frame of a PhD, 
especially since the early stages of data extraction consist of numerous false starts. 
Because of this, attempts at explaining the data trends and the conflicts with the narrative 
sources will be drawn predominantly from secondary studies as well as the most familiar 
traditional narrative sources. While a full-scale literature review based on these tentative 
conclusions is clearly desirable, this will have to be carried out in a future study. At this 
stage, it is hoped that enough argumentation has been provided to at least indicate future 







Structure of the thesis  
  
The eight chapters of this thesis have been grouped into two parts. The first part – 
consisting of Chapters One, Two and Three – is concerned with the methodology and the 
historiography of the source material. The framework for this has been built up largely ex 
nihilo; neither the source material nor the methodology have attracted a great deal of 
attention in modern scholarship so we must first patiently make the case that these are 
suitable bases for an academic study of this sort. The second part of the thesis – Chapters 
Four to Eight – makes use of the methodology to carry out investigations into the 
changing nature of Qurashī marriage as the tribe responded to the arrival of Islam and the 
upheavals of the conquest period. In these chapters, the data will be used as a springboard 
for a wider discussion of the impact these findings may have on existing scholarship.  
  
Chapter One on methodology will begin by considering the claims for and against the 
accuracy of the nasab tradition with reference to anthropological studies and 
psychological research into the nature of memory. This is then followed by an explanation 
of the way in which the investigation will be carried out. The remainder of the chapter is 
devoted to the issue of comprehensiveness; the database at the heart of this research relies 
largely on the work of one author – the Nasab Quraysh of al-Zubayrī – and as such a case 
must be made that the conclusions drawn from the data analysis will not be overturned 
simply by including more sources.  
  
While the chapter on methodology will establish that human societies can accurately 
remember their genealogies and that the Nasab Quraysh is our most comprehensive 
source for the period in question, the following two chapters will consider the degree to 
which al-Zubayrī’s work was shaped by the author’s context. A number of approaches 
will be taken. In Chapter Two, the nasab genre will be considered as a whole and 
particular attention will be paid to the different sub-genres of nasab. This will lead to 
some suggested reasons as to why the Arabs created this unique body of work where other 
tribal peoples did not. It will also consider the effects of politics and social circumstances 
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in shaping these works. Following this, Chapter Three will analyse the life and work of 
al-Zubayrī himself. Using our database and comparisons with other works it will be 
shown that the author’s context did indeed influence the contents and structure of the 
Nasab Quraysh, but that the alterations he makes are predictable and small-scale. The 
existence of these alterations should not therefore undermine our overall approach.   
  
The fourth and fifth chapters will look at the rise in numbers of Qurashī children born to 
concubines. Chapter Four is centred on a number of analyses drawn from our database 
which are illustrated in both tabular and graphical form. It will be shown that there are 
almost no children born to concubines before the Islamic conquests but after this point 
they become increasingly common and by the middle of the Umayyad period they account 
for a third of all births. This finding has implications for prior narratives of the emergence 
of concubine-born children; it can no longer be assumed that they arrived gradually and 
were heavily discriminated against until the ʿAbbāsid caliphate had securely established 
itself. In Chapter Five we go further and consider what implications the rapid adoption of 
concubinage has for our understanding of the emergence of this practice in its normative 
Islamic form. It will be argued that the Islamic concubine and her child were quite unlike 
their pre-Islamic precursors and as such represent a unique cultural development.  
  
The treatment of concubines in these chapters allows us to consider the marriages between 
Qurashī men and Arab women in terms of exogamy and endogamy. From the outset it 
will be apparent that these relationships are more complex than those between Arabs and 
slaves; defining a particular tribal relationship as ‘exogamous’ is deceptively challenging 
as people belong to various overlapping groups which change over time. In order to 
mitigate any confusion that may arise we will proceed at this stage by carefully laying out 
our databases for reader scrutiny. To this end, Chapter Six consists of three databases of 
marriage behaviour, each belonging to a single cohort: first the generation that came 
directly before the early Muslims; then the early Muslims; then the Umayyad caliphs and 
their sons. These tables will provide details on the multiple tribal affiliations of the non-
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Qurashī wives in order to allow the reader to check the methodology and reformulate the 
data for their own uses if they so desire.  
  
Chapter Seven will compare the marriages of the pre-Islamic cohort with that of the first 
Muslims. It will be shown that there are clear contrasts between the rates of endogamy 
and exogamy, and by analysing this from a geographic perspective we get a unique insight 
into the horizons of the world as they existed for the Quraysh in Late Antiquity. The first 
half of this chapter will aim to stay as close to the data as possible; the second section will 
be more discursive in that we add a layer of secondary sources to the genealogical data in 
order to suggest an alternative narrative of Islamic origins.   
  
In Chapter Eight we will look at the changing nature of marriage in the post-conquest 
milieu. It will be shown that the Umayyad caliphs and their sons rapidly changed their 
marriage behaviour in line with the evolving nature of the Arab polity of the first century 
of Islam. Like the chapter that came before it, this chapter will also feature a more 
discursive second section where it will be suggested that some of the questions raised in 
Chapters Four and Five on concubinage can be resolved through a discussion of the 
evolution of the caliphal state’s structures as seen in terms of marriage.  
  
The application of prosopographical approaches to early Islamic history can sometimes 
seem demanding. The sub-discipline of prosopography does not have established 
methodologies and even once these are developed the subsequent data gathering is 
timeconsuming. Despite this, it is hoped that the reader will conclude that the potential of 
prosopography – when carefully applied – far outweighs these costs. It is also hoped that 
this appeal should be universal. For the positivist historian there is the potential to analyse 
social change in a very obscure historical period; as for those more inclined to treat nasab 
as historiography, the quantitative approach can provide them with a means to manage 
the vast amount of information contained within these works. Ultimately, the aim of this 
thesis is to establish that just by counting certain words in certain books, we can read old 
sources in new and stimulating ways.   
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 Part One - Data, methods and historiography 
  




The methodology in this thesis is premised on the claim that the maternal and paternal 
genealogies of the Quraysh in the period 500-750 CE as recorded in the nasab tradition 
are largely accurate. Two elements of this can be queried. First, from a historical point of 
view, the problematic nature of our sources means that we cannot accept that any 
information category as dispersed and diverse as parental information should be 
considered as authentic without considerable argumentation in its favour. Second, from a 
prosopographical perspective, we would want to know what is meant by ‘largely 
accurate.’ In other words, can the data do what we are asking of them? Answering this 
question is the subject of this chapter and the two that follow.  
  
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first will lay out the current arguments for 
and against the accuracy of the Arab genealogical records. It will be shown that the current 
arguments for genealogical accuracy are not supported by a great deal of convincing 
evidence, and they certainly have not decisively rebutted those who argue that genealogy 
is not very different to myth-making. This is particularly problematic when we see that 
the genealogists themselves admit to lying.  
  
But not all genealogical data are equal. While there is certainly a lot of scope for creativity 
in genealogical memory, at the same time there are certain rules that genealogists do not 
appear to break. It will be shown through reference to anthropological observations of 
genealogically-organised societies that memory of the more recent generations of 
ancestors is often accurate and stable; reasons for this will be found in studies of legal 
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psychology and scientific studies of memory. This will establish that we have a good 
basis for believing that the Arabs were capable of recording much of their genealogical 
history in a comprehensive and accurate fashion and that there are sufficient grounds for 
believing that maternal data recorded in the period 500-750 CE may be a usable dataset.   
  
The second section of this chapter will demonstrate the process of extraction. This will 
include a translation of a typical passage of the Nasab Quraysh followed by a datasheet 
which will show how the information has been reformulated. The generational dating 
scheme will also be explained in greater detail.  
  
The final section of the chapter will address the concern that the Nasab Quraysh is too 
narrow a source for us to claim it is representative of the Quraysh as they exist in all 
historiography. We will address this by taking a sample of the data from the Nasab 
Quraysh and comparing it to equivalent samples taken from outside historical and 
genealogical works. This will conclusively show that there is no better source for creating 
a database of Quraysh marriage than al-Zubayrī’s work.  
   
Section One: Accuracy of the kinship reports  
  
There are two types of data we are primarily concerned with in this thesis – paternal 
lineage and maternal origin. The former is important as it can be used to create cohorts – 
the descendants of a certain founder-figure for instance, or a particular generation of 
Qurashīs. This is especially useful for the many individuals for whom we have no other 
contextual data (e.g. offices held or geographical origins). The second type of data (the 
status or tribal affiliation of the mother) is important for the reasons outlined in the 
introduction, namely that by analysing them we can confirm or refute the hypothesis that 
the marriage behaviour as recorded in Arab historical literature can be used to elucidate 




The main repository of this type of data is found within the nasab tradition. As the name 
implies, works in this tradition are ones that owe their internal structure to the 
genealogical links between their historical subjects. This provides us with the paternal 
lineage network data we require. In addition to this, many genealogists were interested in 
the marital connections between their subjects; this provides us with the marriage records.  
  
Our first task is to establish a degree of confidence in the accuracy of these two types of 
data. This in itself is a challenge; arguments in favour of the accuracy of the nasab 
tradition are not particularly strong while the counter-arguments in both the primary and 
secondary sources are vigorous and in many cases compelling.   
  
The accuracy of nasab data: causes for concern  
  
Arguments in favour of the general accuracy of the genealogical tradition are limited both 
in terms of sophistication and number. One argument is given by Hoyland, where the 
corroboration of a 360 CE South Arabian king’s name preserved in epigraphic form with 
a name in the late eighth/early ninth century nasab work of Ibn al-Kalbī constitutes a 
“stunning” extent of recollection.20 But the problem here is that one link – or even a few 
links – between Ibn al-Kalbī and the epigraphy cannot be used as a sound argument that 
all the records of Ibn al-Kalbī are remotely representative of Arabian genealogy. After 
all, although Ibn al-Kalbī’s book on the religions of pre-Islamic Arabia (the Kitāb al-
Aṣnām) does find some corroboration in the epigraphy and archaeology of the period it 
purports to describe, it fails to mention the most significant deities of the jāhiliyya. As 
Robin puts it, “[Ibn al-Kalbī] is more concerned with providing details of the idols 
mentioned in the Qurʾān or tradition rather than researching first-hand information.”21  
                                                 
20 Robert Hoyland, “New Documentary Texts and the Early Islamic State,” Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies 69, no. 3 (2006): 410. Connections between historiography and South 
Arabian names have also been made by Robin Christian, “Les inscriptions de l’arabie antique et les 
etudes arabes,” Arabica 48 (2001): 509-577. 
21 EQ, s.v. “South Arabia, Religions in Pre-Islamic” (Christian Robin); Gerald Hawting, The Idea of 
Idolatry and the Emergence of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 111-139.  
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Similarly, Ibn al-Kalbī’s king lists of Aksum have little correlation with what is known 
from the epigraphic sources.22 The same could easily be true of his genealogical work; 
pace Hoyland, a single piece of epigraphic evidence is not enough to conclude otherwise.  
  
Even Asad Ahmed – who in his Religious Elite uses the nasab sources to a greater extent 
than almost any other modern scholar – has worryingly little to say about the accuracy of 
the genealogical data with the issue of forgery is limited to just two pages in the 
introduction.23 Even here, one of the arguments is not as secure as Ahmed thinks it is.24 
Matters are not much improved when we consider prosopographical approaches more 
widely; for instance the basis of Crone’s argument for the accuracy of governor lists in 
Slaves on Horses is also surprisingly weak given their centrality to this work. In this 
instance, her case rests on the observation that two obscure government figures and a 
general appear in both Muslim and non-Muslim sources. Based on this, she argues that 
the governor lists enjoy “unshakeable, surprising and impressive agreement” in the 
nontraditional historical sources.25   
  
If prosopography based on data extracted from the nasab tradition wants to be taken as 
the basis for a serious academic study, we first need to provide better evidence for trusting 
                                                 
22 Retsö, Arabs in Antiquity: Their History From the Assyrians to the Umayyads (London; New York:  
Roudledge, 2003), 121.  
23 Ahmed, The Religious Elite, 10-11.  
24 Ahmed posits that the existence of names of individuals of whom we are specifically told produced no 
descendants and for whom there are no further records (called NFRs in genealogical literature) indicates 
that the records are accurate. This is because he can think of no reason for the invention of this 
information, hence “such records should probably be taken at face value” (The Religious Elite, 11, note 
30). There is however a good reason why these records exist – they are evidence that the Quraysh were 
defending themselves against ‘false’ membership of their tribe. These NFRs are ‘prunings’ of the family 
tree, and it is impossible for anyone to say whether or not the stumps left behind are the results of a 
tradition preventing false claimants from grafting themselves onto the tree, or the result of genealogists 
removing those who actually had legitimate claims. While this thesis argues that Ahmed is in fact right, 
the lack of discussion of the sources in his work is a concern.  
25 Crone, Slaves on Horses, 17. Even in this limited range of examples there is room for dispute; the 
identification of ʿAmru b. Saʿd (as he appears in the 12th C Chronicle of Michael the Syrian) with ʿUmayr 
b. Saʿd al-Anṣārī (who appears in al-Ṭabarī) needs more backing than the amount provided in Hagarism 
before we can agree with the authors that “there is little doubt” in the connection. Patricia Crone and 
Michael Cook, Hagarism: the Making of the Islamic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), 162, note 11.  
29  
  
the prosopographical data than has hitherto been provided. Most importantly, we need to 
address the widespread and long-standing concerns regarding the capacity for 
genealogists to fabricate lineages. Amidst an abundance of examples, we will refer here 
to the example of Alex Haley’s 1976 bestseller Roots on his genealogy as a descendant 
of North American plantation slaves.26   
  
In Roots, Haley claimed that he had made contact with a West-African griot (a type of 
genealogist) who recalled the name of Haley’s ancestor who had been exported as a slave 
to the Americas in the eighteenth century. Later researchers established that Haley’s 
contact was not a griot at all, and even if he had been there is no evidence that griots 
retain any historically usable genealogy from before the nineteenth century.27 Haley was 
revealed to have prompted the local informant with the name of the ancestor, who in 
response incorporated the person into the genealogy. The importance of this story is not 
so much that Haley’s evident need to find an origin story got the better of his judgement, 
but the fact that he knowingly wrote Roots for a literate, investigative culture where there 
was a serious chance he would get caught and be publicly discredited.  
  
Given this, it is unsurprising that anthropologists have repeatedly observed similar 
creative tendencies in the genealogists of non-literate tribally organised societies. 
Although genealogy is presented by these societies as the explanation for current inter- 
and intra-tribal relationships, it is often the other way round – when the nature of the 
relationships between competing groups changes, the genealogy changes accordingly. 
For instance, the creation myth of the Gonja kingdom of Northern Ghana in the early 
twentieth century involved a founder and his seven sons – the sons corresponding to the 
seven tribal divisions of the Gonja of the time.  By 1960 however, two of the tribes had 
disappeared, and the creation myth accordingly mentioned only five sons.28    
                                                 
26 Alex Haley, Roots (New York: Doubleday, 1976).  
27 Elizabeth and Gary Mills, “The Genealogist’s Assessment of Alex Haley’s Roots,” National 
Genealogical Society Quarterly 72, no.1 (1984): 39-40.  
28 Ruth Finnegan, “A Note on Oral Tradition and Historical Evidence,” History and Theory 9, no.2 
(1970): 201.   
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In addition to this, the names of ancestors can be used not just to explain tribal dynamics, 
but also to settle legal matters and to prevent conflicts escalating. An example of this 
latter case was observed amongst the Tiv people of Northern Nigeria where the elders of 
the village prevented their excitable young men from getting involved in a border dispute 
by saying “We will not fight the Uge nor will they come to fight us, for we are both sons 
of Ikor.” This calmed the younger men down, but upon later probing by the anthropologist 
it became clear that these men had no idea who Ikor was. Rather than ask the elders, they 
worked it out for themselves; Ikor must have been the father of Tiv and Uge, the two 
founder-figures of the respective peoples.29 Genealogy here is used as a third party agent, 
and instead of the elders telling their sons what to do (which could possibly have raised 
intergenerational conflict within the tribe) their commands are expressed in terms of 
‘immutable’ genealogical networks. As a result, Tiv gained a brother and a father.  
  
It is no surprise therefore to find that tribally organised Arabian societies subjected to 
anthropological investigation exhibit exactly the same characteristics when it comes to 
genealogical manipulation. Emrys Peters investigated the question of genealogy and 
tribal dynamics in great detail amongst the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and demonstrated that 
their genealogy was similarly flexible. This flexibility was necessary because of the 
tribes’ relationship with the environment; the land could only support a limited number 
of inhabitants, so if a tribe got too large it would have to break apart. Conversely, when 
there was a downward pressure on population growth (normally in the form of disease), 
one tribe tended to be affected disproportionately harder than its neighbours (this was due 
to the large geographical distances between the groups which checked the spread of 
infections). In these circumstances, the survivors of a depleted group would join another 
tribe, and their genealogy would be grafted accordingly. The tribes retained a surprising 
capacity to absorb new members (in one case an Italian man) who would begin by living 
in the same encampment, then be married into the tribe and eventually become fully 
integrated into the genealogy. The only barrier to joining a tribe seemed to be the capacity 
                                                 
29 Laura Bohannan, “A Genealogical Charter,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 22, 
no. 4 (1952): 306-308.  
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of the environment to support them; should the pressure on resources become too great 
the newest recruits would be the first to be jettisoned.30 The genealogies therefore had to 
be highly mutable in order to accomodate these changes.  
  
The fact that the genealogists in the early Islamic period are frequently characterised as 
being dishonest is a good indication that they were operating in much the same manner 
as the genealogists observed by twentieth century anthropologists. Ibn al-Kalbī himself 
admits to lying in genealogical matters and the pressures that led him to do so,31 while his 
father claimed to have had a dream where the Prophet Muḥammad said he would go to 
hell if he kept on compiling genealogies he did not really know.32   
  
In the secondary scholarship, the critique of the reliability of the nasab tradition has been 
led by Zoltan Szombathy who has argued that the genealogical tradition and the historical 
tradition are indistinguishable – both are examples of an “easily conceivable and flexible 
discourse adaptable to meet a multitude of social needs that arise in various groups.”33 
The evidence he provides for this position is overwhelming, and – when combined with 
the anthropological findings above – we can say that the criticisms of genealogy as being 
a useable historical source cross temporal, geographic and societal boundaries.  
  
  
                                                 
30 Emrys Peters, “The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica,” Journal 
of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 90, no.1 (1960): 29-53.  
31 From the Kitāb al-Aghānī: “And Ibn al-Kalbī said: “The first lie I told in genealogy was this: Khālid 
b. ʿAbd Allāh asked me about his grandmother, Umm Kurayz. She was a slave woman (baghī) of the 
Banū Asad who they called Zaynab. I told him she was Zaynab bt. ʿArʿara b. Jadhīma b. Naṣr b. 
Quʿayn. He was pleased with this and gave me gifts”” (al-Iṣbahānī, Kitāb al-Aghānī (Cairo: Būlāq, 
1867), 19:58).  Goldziher translates baghī as “ordinary prostitute,” which is indeed an alternative 
meaning of the word, but Ibn al-Kalbī’s fabrication of a lineage implies that the problem here was her 
deracination, not her vocation (Muslim Studies, trans. C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern (Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing Company, 1966), 1:188). 
32 Meir Kister and M. Plessner, “Notes on Caskel’s Ǧamharat An-nasab,” Oriens 25/26 (1976), 53, 
referring to the manuscript Taʿbīr al-ruʾyā of Ibn Qutayba (d. 889)  
33 Zoltan Szombathy, “Genealogy in Medieval Muslim Societies,” Studia Islamica 95 (2002): 11.   
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The accuracy of the nasab data: reasons to be optimistic  
  
The idea that genealogists are generally dishonest is a widely held one (nowhere more so 
than in tribal societies themselves) but this idea has subtleties. If genealogy was 
constantly reformulated on the whim of whatever genealogist was tasked with recording 
it, the network of relationships it purported to describe would be completely meaningless. 
Genealogy is certainly a game, but the game has rules.34  
  
The most significant of these rules is the point at which genealogical manipulation can 
take place; it is very rare to find manipulation taking place at the level of parents for 
example. In the case of the early Muslims there is Qurʾānic acknowledgement of fosterage 
(which is a way of changing one’s parents), which Muslims later argued meant it had 
been forbidden at an early stage.35 This passage is supported by a ḥadīth which states 
“whoever knowingly claims descent from some other than his father is an infidel.”36 The 
question of fosterage in early Islam is a complicated one, but we can at least say that the 
Muslims and non-Muslims of the period recognised that the issue of changing one’s 
parents was a serious matter.  
  
As for generations beyond one’s parents, the anthropological evidence indicates that 
genealogies delivered by different informants drawn from tribally organised societies 
deliver consistent lineages going back three to five generations from the oldest generation 
of informants.37 Peters found this amongst the Bedouin of Cyrenaica; he recorded the 
genealogies of four tribes in extensive detail, and in each case it was at the fifth ascending 
                                                 
34 As Lecker puts it: “Genealogies are not correct or incorrect; genealogical claims reflect the situation at 
a certain point in time, or attempts to transform it.” Michael Lecker, “Tribes in pre- and early Islamic 
Arabia,” in People, Tribes and Society in Arabia Around the Time of Muḥammad, ed. Michael Lecker 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), chapter 11, page 2.  
35 Q 33:4-5; though there are complications as to how this and the ḥadīth should be interpreted. See David 
Powers, Muhammad is not the Father of Any of Your Men (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2009) and discussion in Chapter Five below.  
36 Ella Landau-Tasseron, “Adoption, Acknowledgement of Paternity and False Genealogical Claims in 
Arabian and Islamic Societies”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 66, no.2 (2003):  
37 Michael Erben, “Genealogy and Sociology: A Preliminary Set of Statements and Speculations,” 
Sociology 25, no.2 (1991): 278.  
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generation that “arguments would flare up” between informants as to who should or 
should not be included. 38  His discovery was pre-empted by that of Musil’s 
anthropological work with the Rwāla Bedouins from the first part of the twentieth 
century, who at that time could comfortably recount the connections of their tribal group 
– this group constituting the descendants of a common great-grandfather. Beyond this 
third generation however matters become vague and debatable. 39  This “area of 
ambiguity” (as Peters termed it) was critically necessary for the survival of genealogy as 
an ideology of organization as it was here that tribal segments would manipulate the past 
in order to explain the present. Beyond this area of ambiguity, the genealogy would re-
stabilise into a mutually agreed lineage going back to the founder figures that linked all 
the tribes.40    
  
The explanation for this contrast between contentious and non-contentious genealogies 
lies in the way the genealogies are learnt. Below a certain level of ancestry, the 
genealogical memory of a group consists of people whom the genealogist has actually 
met and in some cases lived alongside for extensive periods of time. In terms of the extent 
of this memory amongst the living it probably extends to the limits of the local tribal 
grouping, which varies in number but is normally between 100 and 150 names.41 The 
limits of genealogical memory are therefore the limits of direct personal contact and 
                                                 
38 Peters, “Bedouin of Cyrenaica,” 40-41.  
39 Alois Musil, The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins (New York: American Geographical 
Society, 1928), 48, which concurs with what William Lancaster found when studying the same tribe some 
seven decades later (The Rwala Bedouin Today. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 32). 
Both are discussed in Hugh Kennedy, “From Oral tradition to Written Record in Arabic Genealogy,” 
Arabica 44, no.4 (1997): 532-533.  
40 This is also discussed in William Lancaster, Rwala Bedouin Today, 24–42.  
41 In a paper on Arabic genealogy, Kennedy argues for the upper limit for name memorisation amongst  
Arabs to be 110 names based on Von Oppenheim’s Die Beduinen, Leipzig, 1939, 1:154 (Kennedy, “From 
Oral Tradition to Written Record in Arabic Genealogy,” 541) while Peters observed that small residential 
groups of Bedouin numbered between 150 and 200 individuals (Peters, “Bedouins of Cyrenaica,” 32). 
The size of these groups may be biologically determined; Robin Dunbar has suggested that the optimum 
size for a human group is 147.8 members, a figure he generated by establishing a ratio of neocortex size 
to group size amongst primates (Robin Dunbar, “Co-evolution of Neocortex Size, Group Size and 
Language in Humans,” Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16, no.4 (1993): 681-735).  He goes on to argue 
that human groups of around 150 members appear repeatedly in anthropological and historical studies of 
human societies.  
34  
  
knowledge of connections that go beyond groups of this size requires memory of 
ancestors in a distant past to which the living have no direct experience; this part of the 
genealogical memory is more malleable and is where the disputes happen.   
  
The connection between genealogical memory and the way this memory is acquired 
reflects an important distinction between the ultimate sources of Arab genealogical 
literature and the rest of the Islamic historical corpus. In psychological terms, knowledge 
of relatives you have frequently met (i.e. your genealogical knowledge) falls into the 
category of ‘semantic memory’ which are memories not tied to a specific context; these 
include the name of a neighbouring tribe for instance, or the name of your grandfather.42 
This sort of memory is highly stable and explains why anthropologists have observed so 
much agreement between their tribal informants as long as the subjects are asked about 
people they have been in contact with, rather than those they have only heard of.   
  
The anecdotal historical literature43 on the other hand relies on ‘episodic memory’ – 
events and speeches remembered by contemporary informants and passed on to others. 
Experiments in the field of legal psychology have repeatedly shown the inability of 
humans to consistently recall events they have observed in controlled conditions, and 
humans have no capacity at all for remembering speech word-for-word following a single 
hearing.44 From the moment an event or speech has concluded, memory of it has the 
                                                 
42 See MIT Encyclopaedia of the Cognitivie Sciences, s.v. “Episodic vs. Semantic Memory” (Endel 
Tulving). 
43 This is often referred to as the akhbār (from the plural of khabar, meaning ‘report’ or ‘anecdote’) 
corpus and is distinct from the nasab literature. The differences are discussed in greater detail below. 
44 An insightful investigation of this is Ulric Neisser “John Dean’s Memory: a Case Study,” in Memory  
Observed: Remembering in Natural Contexts, ed. Ulric Neisser (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and  
Company, 1982), 102-115. This focuses on the testimony of John Dean, a counsel to President Richard  
Nixon and a prosecution witness in the Watergate trial.  Dean began his testimony with the production of 
a 245 page statement describing dozens of meetings and reports of the conversations – all produced from 
memory.  When challenged as to how he could perform these feats, he claimed that he had a good 
memory; he immersed himself in the press reporting of the events; and he also emphasised that meeting 
the President in the Oval Office was an uncommon and momentous occasion – one a staff-member would 
recall.  He did not realise that some of these conversations were recorded however, and in the two 
instances when they could be compared there was almost no correlation between what he reported people 
as saying and the transcripts of the tapes.  His descriptions of meetings read more like the descriptions of 
scenes in films, and almost none of the things he described the President as saying were actually said by 
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capacity to be bitterly contested and constantly reformulated (this has also been studied 
in controlled conditions)45 – which is exactly what we find in the traditional historical 
sources.  
  
The comparison between memory types does not automatically mean that the nasab 
literature is true just because it can be preserved as semantic memory; the nasab works 
extend far further than five generations into the past and the authors must have relied on 
chains of informants rather than personal memories. But the point here is that humans can 
remember extended genealogical relationships, which means they can potentially 
preserve these for later generations by writing them down. Humans are therefore 
biologically capable of creating the nasab tradition. This is in sharp contrast to the 
speeches and events that constitute the traditional historical narrative of early Islam, the 
preservation of which would require capacities for memorisation and observation that 
have never been performed by any non-savant individual. It is therefore biologically 
impossible for the vast majority of ḥadīths and khabars to be considered accurate 
reflections of past events in anything but the broadest of terms.46  
  
Despite his intense scepticism towards the nasab tradition, Szombathy accepts this. He 
admits that genealogical knowledge up to 100 years before the time of Muḥammad is 
more reliable than the older material and that the closer relations of the Prophet are less 
“rudimentary, confused and fragmentary” in nature. His doubts with regard to the veracity 
of the nasab tradition are directed at the ancient ancestral connections that purported to 
                                                 
him. What is problematic is that despite this, in general thematic terms, everything he said was true – and 
Nixon was of course found guilty. 
45 For an overview with case studies see Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1996) particularly pages 3, 5-6, 59 and 63. 
46 This, incidentally, is good evidence for the argument that the Qurʾān was preserved orally in its extant 
wording (though not structure) during the lifetime of Muḥammad. The fact that there are not a large 
number of divergent Qurʾāns today is an occurrence that could have only have resulted from it being 
preserved by people who went to great lengths to memorise what was revealed as it was revealed and 
periodically checked these memorised passages amongst each other and Muḥammad himself. Had they 
not done this, it is unlikely that the actions of the early caliphs could have prevented the Qurʾān turning 
into something that looked a lot more like the ḥadīth corpus. That the Muslims of Muḥammad’s time 
went to these lengths also indicates that they appreciated that these words were not the same as their 
Prophet’s quotidian announcements but had a far greater significance.   
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bind together the Arab tribes, not the more recent generations or the close relations of 
Muḥammad.47   
  
From oral to written: the preservation of the genealogy of the Quraysh  
  
It is with a degree of confidence that we can say that Arabian tribes of the seventh century 
Ḥijāz recalled their near-term genealogy (i.e. going back three to five generations) with a 
similar degree of consistency as has been observed in tribally organised societies in the 
twentieth century. The question remains as to whether it is this knowledge that is recorded 
in the nasab works of the late eighth and early ninth centuries and not the products of the 
imagination of later genealogists.  
  
At this point however we enter our own area of ambiguity. The reason for confidence in 
the accuracy of near-term genealogy as remembered by tribal societies is the consistency 
observed by anthropologists amongst multiple independent informants; this can only be 
the case if the genealogies were based on kinships that actually existed. Although we can 
demonstrate a degree of consistency amongst the different sources that constitute the 
nasab tradition, this certainty is not at the same level as that shown by the anthropologists. 
Many (if not most) of the personages featured in al-Zubayrī’s Nasab Quraysh or Ibn al-
Kalbī’s Jamharat al-nasab do not appear in any other works, and in these instances we 
have no means of checking for consistency. In addition to this, where there is consistency 
we cannot always be sure that we are looking at independent informants because the 
sources of information frequently go uncredited; hence one work may be derived from 
the other, or both works could be derived from a common third source.  
  
                                                 
47 Zoltan Szombathy, The Roots of Arabic Genealogy: a Study in Historical Anthropology (Piliscsaba: 
The Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003), 42, 96. This is presumably why the works of 
neither al-Zubayrī nor Zubayr b. Bakkār (who both focus on the Quraysh tribe) appear in the bibliography 
of this book.  
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Other obvious means of corroborating the genealogical data are closed off to us. Al-
Zubayrī provides us with almost no chains of transmission for the genealogical material 
in his work, and while Ibn al-Kalbī occasionally provides references to the use of tribal 
informants and archaeology to support his research, these references are unverifiable and 
are possibly a literary trope.48 Both men fall well outside the three to five generation span 
of genealogical memory for many of their subjects and - unlike the genealogists who 
appear in the anthropological literature - could not have met the vast majority of people 
they write about.   
  
The nature of the link between the oral genealogical culture and the written nasab 
literature is therefore of critical importance, and we will return to this subject in the next 
chapter on historiography. Our primary concerns in this chapter are on methodology and 
specifically centre on the accuracy and usability of the Nasab Quraysh as a data source.  
It is to these themes that we now turn.  
  
Section Two: Data extraction and database creation  
  
Data extraction  
  
The above has outlined that our current state of research is in a stalemate; there are good 
arguments to show that tribal peoples can preserve accurate genealogies, but also equally 
good arguments that show that those tasked with recording it often lie.   
  
One way of resolving this impasse is by going deeper into the records and creating a 
database comprised of genealogical information whose accuracy is then tested against 
outside sources. This cross-checking is a theme that runs throughout the entire thesis; in 
this chapter these tests include checks on the consistency and comprehensiveness of the 
nasab literature while in later chapters it is the correlation between the trend analysis and 
                                                 
48 Szombathy, The Roots of Arabic Genealogy, 127-128.   
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the non-genealogical historical sources. But before this can begin, we must first introduce 
our principal source and the ways in which we intend to extract its data.  
  
The database at the heart of this thesis consists of every reference to a child-bearing union 
carried out by a Qurashī man recorded in the Nasab Quraysh. The vast majority of these 
unions appear in passages like the following, which details the descendants of a distant 
relative of the Zubayrids. The translation is literal in order to give a flavour of the passage, 
words in parentheses are supplementary notes (when not italicised) or transliterations of 
the Arabic (when italicised). Punctuation and paragraph divisions are mine or derived 
from the critical edition:  
  
And of the children of Zamʿa b. al-Aswad: ʿAbd Allāh al-Akbar (the older) b. 
Wahb b. Zamʿa, he was killed at the battle of Camel or the battle of Dār, and his 
mother (was): Bint Shayba b. Rabīʿa b. ʿAbd Shams.   
  
And the descendants (walad) of ʿAbd Allāh al-Akbar b. Wahb b. Zamʿa died 
without issue (inqaraḍa), apart from girls; and his son Yazīd b. ʿAbd Allāh 
alAkbar, he was killed in Africa, and his mother (was): Bint al-Ḥārith b. ʿĀmir b.  
Rabīʿa, of the Banu Firās.  
   
And ʿAbd Allāh al-Aṣghar (the younger) b. Wahb b. Zamʿa, he was born to a 
concubine (umm walad), and there are many descendants of his. And his wife:  
Karīma bt. al-Miqdād b. ʿAmr al-Bahrānī, and her mother: Ḍubāʿa bt. Zubayr b. 
ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib. She (Karīma) gave birth to al-Miqdād b. ʿAbd Allāh, he had no 
descendants, he was killed at the battle of Ḥīra, and Wahb b. ʿAbd Allāh, he had 
no descendants, he was killed at the battle of Ḥīra; and Yaʿqūb, and Abū al- 
Ḥārith, and Yazīd, and Zubayr, sons of ʿAbd Allāh al-Aṣghar b. Wahb.49  
  
                                                 
49 Al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 228.  
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The preliminary observation to be made here is the sheer quantity of information in such 
a small amount of space. There are references to battles, there is an NFR (a person with 
no further records), a concubine, a maternal lineage, naming patterns and the myriad of 
connections between the families of wives and husbands. To record every piece of this 
information over the 400-plus pages of the edited version of the book would represent an 
enormous undertaking; the limitation of the investigation to marriage data is hence a 
necessity.  
  
Our first task in creating the database is therefore to record all the marriages that took 
place and provide a reference as to where these marriages are recorded. Concubines and 
wives are recorded separately as we have reasons to believe that these change by cohort 
and time period. The result looks like the following:  
  
  Table 1.1: First-stage data extraction  
  
Name  Wahb b. Zamʿa  ʿAbd Allāh al-Akbar  ʿAbd Allāh al-Asghar  
Number of wives  1 1 1 
Number of 
concubines  
1   
Page reference  228 228 228 
  
  
This works well in this instance, but we have a potential problem. Although it is clear that 
there was one child-bearing union with one concubine in the example above, we 
frequently find in other entries that a list of children is given and their mothers are referred 
to simply as ‘concubines’ with no indication of the number of women that this could 
represent. We resolve this in two ways. First, whenever the plural of ‘concubine’ appears, 
it will be marked in its own column and this is taken to indicate ‘two concubines’ when 
we compile the data later on. ‘Two’ is the minimum number of women the term could 
refer to (we cannot be sure that the Arabic dual form is being consistently applied) as 
opposed to the maximum, which would be to say that there were as many concubine 
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women as there were children. This is important from a statistical perspective; as we are 
later going to try to prove the existence of an increasing number of concubines over time, 
it is best practice to take the option that is least likely to flatter our results.   
  
The second way of resolving the issue is to record the number of children by each type of 
union. This has the added benefit of producing data that is focused on relationships that 
produced children, meaning we do not have to concern ourselves with marriages that were 
brief or those of men who were reported to have had large numbers of concubines but 
only produced children from a fraction of them. It is also the case that marriages that 
produce children are more likely to be accurately remembered (for the reasons discussed 
above) than unions that remain childless. Additionally, the gender of the children has been 
recorded as it requires little extra work in the inputting stage and may yield interesting 
results later on.  
  
Expanding the table to take in these concerns results in the following:  
  
  Table 1.2: Advanced data extraction  
  






No. of wives  1 1 1 
No. of sons born to free wives  1 1 6 
No. of daughters born to free 
wives  
   
No. of concubines (singular)  1   
No. of concubines (plural)     
No. of sons born to concubines  1   
No. of daughters born to 
concubines  
   
Page ref.  228 228 228 
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Generational structuring  
  
There is one further task and that is to locate the men temporally. There are almost no 
dates at all in the Nasab Quraysh for either births or deaths, nor can this information be 
recovered from outside sources in the vast majority of cases. To resolve this issue we 
have taken the somewhat novel approach of organising individuals generationally.50  
  
All individuals for whom we have lineages will be assigned a number indicating the 
number of generations that separate them from the generation of Quṣayy (who is 
Generation 0). Muḥammad, for example, is Generation 5 (five generations after Quṣayy) 
while the putative founder of the Quraysh, Fihr b. Mālik, is Generation -6 (six generations 
before Quṣayy). The advantage of having a Generation 0 is that we can easily calculate 
genealogical separation by subtracting the earlier generation from the later; Muḥammad 
therefore comes eleven generations after Fihr. 51 Of course, any generation could have 
been selected as our ‘zero’ generation, but Quṣayy is both widely known and 
convenient.52  
  
This generational structuring works surprisingly well in terms of consistency as the 
following example illustrates. The brothers Saʿd and Usāma, sons of ʿAbd Allāh b. Qays, 
were both killed at the battle of al-Ḥarra in 683.53 These men were very distant and 
                                                 
50 Somewhat similar generational approaches have been used by Caskel to structure his family tree 
diagrams (Werner Caskel, Ǧamharat An-nasab: Das Genealogische Werk Des Hišam Ibn Muḥammad 
alKalbī (Leiden: Brill, 1966))  and to a lesser extent by  Bernheimer in her prosopography of the ʿAlid 
family (Teresa Bernheimer, “Genealogy, Marriage and the Drawing of Boundaries,” in Sayyids and 
Sharifs in Muslim Societies: The Living Links to the Prophet, ed. Kazuo Morimoto (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2012), 75-91).  
51 Generations are given as numbers rather than written out to make negative generations appear more 
clearly.  
52 Muḥammad may seem a logical centre point for the genealogical ordering, but this would result in us 
having to refer to negative generations relatively frequently. This is an issue because it reduces clarity in 
instances when we are frequently referring to Generation -1 alongside Generation 1 (Muḥammad’s uncles 
alongside his daughters, for instance); the minus sign could be missed or confused with a hyphen.  
53 Al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 436.  
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obscure54 relations of the main protagonists of the battle, Yazīd I and ʿAbd Allāh b. 
Zubayr, connected through Luʾayy b. Ghālib b. Fihr, of the fourth generation before 
Quṣayy. Despite this huge generational gap with their common ancestor, the brothers died 
as members of Generation 8 while Yazīd I and Ibn Zubayr were members of generations 
7 and 6 respectively. This is a completely credible spread of generations to be involved 
in a single battle (the two men killed are not reported to have had children in the Nasab 
Quraysh so were presumably young), and it is another testament to the remarkable 
resilience of the genealogical tradition in that it could connect the four men to an ancestor 
living over 300 years before them55 with a consistent number of generational links. This 
is all the more surprising when we note that the ‘telescoping’ of genealogies (whereby 
they are shortened as members are forgotten) is a common feature of lineages as observed 
by anthropologists.56  
  
Another example demonstrating the working of the generational system uses Muḥammad 
and his Companions. The following table shows a selection of well-known early Muslims, 
the generation they appear in and the number of generations that separate them from their 




                                                 
54 This means they do not appear in the index of the translation of al-Ṭabarī’s Taʾrīkh or the Jerusalem 
Prosopography Project database (accessed August 26, 2013, 
http://micro5.mscc.huji.ac.il:81/JPP/v3/regTou.jsp).   
55 30 years to a generation has been adopted as a rule of thumb in this thesis; this is based on a 
comprehensive recent study of how long a male generation lasts in a society living in largely pre-modern 
conditions (Shuichi Matsumura and Peter Forster, “Generation Time and Effective Population Size in 
Polar Eskimos,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 275, no. 1642 (2008): 1501– 
1508). Other scholars have taken different numbers of years for generational length; Ahmed uses 20 years 
which he takes from the entry for Ṭ-B-Q in Lane (The Religious Elite, page 8, note18), and Bulliet uses 34 
years which is the average number of years between a son’s death and that of his father in his database of 
Nishapurī scholars (Conversion to Islam, 21). Interestingly, when Ibn Khaldūn was investigating the 
veracity of genealogical claims, he said that a credible number of generational links in a lineage was three 
per century which falls between the Matsumura and Forster estimate and that of Bulliet (Ibn Khaldūn, 
Muqaddima, (Cairo: Dār Nahḍat, 1980), 2:547-548).  
56 E. Evans-Pritchard, “Nuer Time-Reckoning,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 12, 
no. 2 (1939), 214.  
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Table 1.3: Comparison of degrees of separation  
  




common ancestor  
Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh  5 NA NA 
Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq  5 7 210 
ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb  6 9 270 
ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān  6 5 150 
ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib  5 2 60 
Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbayd Allāh  5 7 210 
Zubayr b. ʿAwwām  5 5 150 
  
Again, even though the common ancestor is in some cases many generations beyond the 
extent of genealogical memory as observed by anthropologists, there are no wild 
anomalies with regard to the generation the men appear in.  
  
Using generations as our primary dating system in an investigation of social change in 
early Islam is unusual (though used in a broad sense in Bulliet’s Conversion to Islam) and 
as such may ultimately be found wanting as the research progresses. But at the present 
level of study it does not yet seem to have any serious shortcomings, and as the subject 
of this research is an investigation into social trends over the longue durée, the lack of 
dates may be a benefit as it forces us to think in a mindset less focused on a yearby-year 
chronology and more on generational changes.57   
  
Beyond this, it should also be noted that there is a degree of judgement required in 
inputting the data. Not all sections of the Nasab Quraysh are as straightforward as the one 
                                                 
57 It also means we have to think in terms of groups rather than individuals, which should be welcomed as 
it is closer to the way the early Muslims understood themselves. This is evident in the language of the 
Constitution of Medina, as pointed out by Saïd Arjomand in “The Constitution of Medina: A Sociolegal  
Interpretation of Muhammad’s Acts of Foundation of the “Umma”,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 41, no. 4 (2009): 566. Here it is clear that (with the exception of Muḥammad) the relevant legal 
entity is not the individual but the tribe.  
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given above; it is sometimes difficult to establish the gender of a child, or what the status 
of their mother was. In these cases a note has been made and the information excluded 
from the record. There are no absolutes in this sort of database creation, and another 
researcher asking the same questions will undoubtedly disagree with some of the 
decisions that have been made here. The database is in a sense an ‘edition’ of a work – 
one that is not absolute in its rightness or wrongness, but an interpretation that must be 
reworked and adapted as circumstances change.  
  
Section Three: How representative is the Nasab Quraysh of the marriage 
relations of the Quraysh as recorded in the wider literature?  
  
It is clear just from just a cursory reading of the Nasab Quraysh that it contains far more 
marriage information than other genealogical works but given how crucially important 
the issue of representativeness is we must give this issue more thought. If it turns out that 
we get different results when our methodology is applied to other sources of marriage 
information then the research here is not a true prosopography but instead a statistically-
minded insight into historiography. This section will establish that there are no grounds 
for concern in this regard; it will also incorporate a cautionary tale for prosopographers 
who go too far, too fast.  
  
The issue of representativeness will be addressed in two ways. The first is to establish 
how far al-Zubayrī’s genealogical interest ranged when compared to other historians; in 
other words, which named individuals can be found in the Nasab Quraysh that do not 
appear in other works and vice-versa. The second is to investigate more narrowly the 
marriages as recorded in other sources. In both cases (names and marriages) it will be 
shown that the Nasab Quraysh is the work best suited for our investigation, and that future 
research drawing data from other sources will most likely complement and support our 




In terms of the first question, a sample of the Nasab Quraysh will be compared to outside 
sources in order to establish how representative it is of the historical corpus as a whole. 
The section selected will be that detailing the descendants Khalaf b. Wahb b. Khudhāfa 
of the Jumaḥ subdivision of the Quraysh. This descent group has been selected because 
the family is mostly uncontroversial; it did not become a significant religious or political 
scion in later eras (as with the ʿAlids or Umayyads) and, although they allied with some 
tribes against others in the course of their history, this is no different to any other family. 
There is no reason therefore to think that the biases of any of the authors selected for 
comparison would have a significant impact on how the genealogy appears in the sources.  
  
The genealogical works selected for comparison will be the relevant sections of Ibn al- 
Kalbī’s Jamharat al-nasab and al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-ashrāf (the authors died in 819/21 
and 892 respectively).58 These two works have been selected because they are from a 
relatively early era and it is easy to extract descent group data from them due to their 
genealogical structuring. There are of course many other works that could have been 
selected for comparison, but the list of potential candidates is extensive and all we are 
trying to establish here are some grounds for confidence in the approach.59 The results 
will be presented in the form of a table which will clearly illustrate the respective interests 
of each work in terms of which individuals appear as actors (i.e. not names that appear 
only as links in patrilines) within them.   
                                                 
58 Hishām b. Muḥammad al-Kalbī, Jamharat al-nasab, Ed. Nājī Ḥasan (Beirut: ʿĀlim al-Kutub, 2010); 
Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf (Damascus: Dār al-Yaqaẓa, 1997). The literary 
classification of nasab will be discussed further in the following chapter. See also EI2, s.v. “al-Balādhurī” 
(C.H. Becker, Franz Rosenthal) and EI2, s.v. “al-Zubayr b. Bakkār” (S. Leder).  
59 Other works considered and rejected were Ibn Ḥazm’s Jamharat ansāb al-ʿArab (Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī 
Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat ansāb al-ʿArab, ed. E. Levi-Provencal (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif bi Miṣr, 1948)) and 
alSamʿānī’s Kitāb al-Ansāb (ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad al-Samʿānī, Kitāb al-Ansāb, ed. D.S.  
Margoliouth (Ledien; London: Brill, 1912)) as both are late works; Zubayr b. Bakkār’s Nasab Quraysh 
wa akhbārihā (Zubayr b. Bakkār, Nasab Quraysh wa akhbārihā, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir (Cairo: 
Maktabat Dār al-ʿUrūba, 1962)) as it is incomplete and derived from al-Zubayrī’s work; Ibn Saʿd’s al- 
Ṭabaqāt al-kubra (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1985) and al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-ashrāf as both are awkwardly 
structured and very long. Even a cursory look at these works will reveal the same point as made here – 
that the Nasab Quraysh is by far the most useable source of Qurashī marriage and genealogical data 
available to us. An extensive list of other genealogical works (again, mostly derivative or from later 
periods) is provided in Lecker, “Tribes in Pre- and Early Islamic Arabia,” 48, note 37, and also in the 
bibliography of this thesis.  
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The second investigation will be into marriage behaviour as recorded in the 
nongenealogical historical works. This would be an enormous undertaking as it requires 
us to create similar databases from all Arab historiography, so a short-cut will be 
proposed. This short-cut cross-checks the Nasab Quraysh’s marriage data with the 
marriage information as recorded in Asad Ahmed’s recently published The Religious 
Elite, a prosopographical work which draws from a wide range of historical sources 
(including the Nasab Quraysh and other genealogies) in order to detail the marriage 
behaviour of five prominent Qurashī families. This comparison will reveal a high degree 
of correlation between the Nasab Quraysh and the marriages recorded in this 
comprehensive modern source. All of this will establish that we have good grounds for 
believing that the marriage data in the Nasab Quraysh is representative of the data within 
Islamic historiographical tradition as a whole.  
  
Comparison of named individuals with the other Arabic sources  
  
The simpler part of this investigation is finding which names appear in the Nasab Quraysh 
that do not appear in the other sources. The base cohort for comparison is the group 
comprised of all named descendants of Khalaf b. Wahb in the relevant section of the 
Nasab Quraysh (pages 387-393 in the edited version).60 These appear in the first column 
of the table below. References to these names are then sought in the corresponding 
sections of the Jamharat al-nasab (pages 95-97) and the Ansāb al-ashrāf (volume 9, 
pages 6-15). The names are organised according to where they appear in the Nasab 
Quraysh and page numbers are provided referring to significant appearances. If there is 





                                                 
60 These do not include names that appear solely as links in the patrilineal section of name.  
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Table 1.4: Appearances of Khalaf b. Wahb’s descendants in historical literature  
  
Name  NQ JN AA 
(vol.9)  
Khalaf b. Wahb  387  6 
ʿAmr b. Khalaf b. Wahab  387   
ʿĀmir b. Khalaf b. Wahb  387   
Harim b. Khalaf b. Wahb  387   
Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb  387 95 6 
Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb  387 95  
Wahb b. Khalaf b. Wahb  387 95 14 
Kalada b. Khalaf b. Wahb  387 95  
Maʿbad b. Khalaf b. Wahb  387   
ʿAlī b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb  387   
Rabīʿa b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb  387 95 6 
Bathanawnī b. ʿAbd al-Ghaffār b. Yaḥyā 
b. Rabīʿa b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb  
387   
Ṣafwān b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb  388 95 6 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Akbar b. Ṣafwān b. Umayya 
b. Khalaf b. Wahb  
389 95 6 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Akbar b. Ṣafwān b. 
Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb  
389  8 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Asghar (Abū ʿAmr) b. 
Ṣafwān b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb  
390   
Ṣafwān b. Ṣafwān b. Umayya b. Khalaf b.  
Wahb  
390   
Khālid b. Ṣafwān b. Umayya b. Khalaf b.  
Wahb  
390   
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (al-Asghar?) b. Ṣafwān 
b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb  
390   
Ḥakīm b. Ṣafwān b. Umayya b. Khalaf b.  
Wahb  
390   
Yaḥyā b. Ḥakīm b. Ṣafwān b. Umayya b. 
Khalaf b. Wahb  
390  11 
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Ṣafwān b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Akbar b. Ṣafwān 
b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb  
390   
ʿAmr b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Akbar b. Ṣafwān b. 
Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb  
390  7 
Masʿūd b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb  391 95 6 
ʿĀmir b. Masʿūd b. Umayya b. Khalaf b.  391 95 12 
Wahb     
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd 
alRaḥmān al-Ṭawīl b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿĀmir 
b.  
Masʿūd b. Umayya b. Khalaf b. Wahb  
391   
ʿUmayr b. Wahb b. Khalaf b. Wahb  391 96 7, 14 
Wahb b. ʿUmayr b. Wahb b. Khalaf b. 
Wahb  
392 96  
Asīd b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392 95 14 
Wahb b. Asīd b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392   
Kalada b. Asīd b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392 96  
Tawʾama bt. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392   
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Wahb b. Asīd b. 
Khalaf b. Wahb  
392 97 15 
Maryam bt. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Wahb b. 
Asīd b. Khalaf b. Wahb  
392   
ʿĀmir b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392   
ʿAbd Allāh b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392  13 
Wahb b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392   
Hind bt. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392   
Ubayy b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392   
Khalaf b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392   
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. 
Wahb  
392   
Umayya b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392   
Layth b. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392   
Wahba bt. Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392   
ʿUbayd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. Ṣafwān b. 
ʿUbayd Allāh b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Ubayy b.  
Khalaf b. Wahb  
392 95 14 
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Uḥayḥa b. Khalaf b. Wahb  392 95 14 
Usayd b. Uḥayḥa  392   
Zamʿa b. Usayd b. Uḥayḥa  392   
ʿAlī (Abū Rayḥāna) b. Usayd b. Uḥayḥa  392 95  
Abū Dahbal b. Zamʿa b. Usayd b.  
Uḥayḥa61  
393 96 14 
  
These data are then enumerated, and expressed in terms of numbers of appearances. This 
is detailed in the following table:  
 
Table 1.5: Where Khalaf b. Wahb’s descendants appear in select historical 
sources  
  
Name of work  NQ JN AA 
Number of named 
individuals  
50 18 18 
  
  
The Nasab Quraysh contains over twice as many individuals as the other works; it is 
clearly far more comprehensive in this regard.  
  
Names in outside works not in the Nasab Quraysh  
  
Moving on to the second part of this first investigation we perform the reverse procedure 
- finding members of the descent group that appear in the Jamharat al-nasab and the 
Ansāb al-ashrāf that do not appear in the Nasab Quraysh. These are the following, along 




                                                 




Table 1.6: Appearances of Khalaf b. Wahb’s descendants outside the Nasab  
Quraysh  
  
Name  JN AA 
(vol.9) 
Juʿayd b. Umayya b. Khalaf b.  
Wahb  
95 6, 13 
Ḥujayr b. Juʿayd b. Umayya 
b. Khalaf b. Wahb  
95 13 
ʿAttāb b. Asīd   8 
Muḥammad b. Ṣafwān b. 
ʿUbayd Allāh b. ʿAbd Allāh b. 
Ubayy b. Khalaf b. Wahb  
 14 
  
By adding together the names found in all the sources, we find that the three works name 
54 members of this descent group. We can then express the degree to which each work 
represents the total number of names from all three sources in the form of a percentage:  
 
  Table 1.7: Proportions of Khalaf b. Wahb’s descendants in select works  
  




NQ 50 92.59% 
JN 22 40.74% 
AA 20 37.04% 
  
Although this sample is not large it confirms what is obvious to anyone who reads the 
Nasab Quraysh and compares it to that preserved in other works: there is a strong 
likelihood that it contains far more onomastic information on the Quraysh than any other 






Comparison of marriage data with outside sources  
  
The Nasab Quraysh is even more outstanding a source when we consider only the 
marriage data. The Jamharat al-nasab provides no marriage information at all for this 
descent group in the section analysed and the Ansāb al-ashrāf is little better; it provides 
information on mothers only on three occasions. The Nasab Quraysh far outstrips them 
in this regard and names 22 mothers for this group.  
  
This does not necessarily mean that the Nasab Quraysh is a representative source of 
marriage behaviour; it could simply be that the Ansāb al-ashrāf and the Jamharat al-
nasab are uniquely poor. Fortunately, we are able to make a case for the 
representativeness of the Nasab Quraysh thanks to the publication of a recent work that 
looks in detail at the marriage patterns of five Qurashī families. This book – The Religious 
Elite of the Early Islamic Ḥijāz by Asad Ahmed – is drawn from a wide range of Arabic 
historical literature (including nasab works) and is primarily interested in the issue of 
marriage. This offers us another means to evaluate the comprehensiveness of the Nasab 
Quraysh in terms of marriage data when compared to the historical tradition as a whole.  
 
The comparison here will be of the marriages of the five founder figures around whom  
Ahmed structures his work; Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf, Ṭalḥa b. 
ʿUbayd Allāh, ʿUthmān b. ʿ Affān and ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. All are prominent figures in early 
Islamic history, and the marriage behaviour of all of them features in the Nasab Quraysh.  
  
In the following we analyse the numbers of named women that each man is purported to 
have married, and the number of children of each gender he is supposed to have had by 
each of these named women.62 This is slightly problematic as Ahmed’s work is not 
statistical and the data has to be compiled by the reader; additionally where Ahmed does 
                                                 
62 Concubine women and the children born to them are not included as Ahmed does not systematically list 
these. The category of ‘named women’ here includes those for whom at least tribal affiliation is known, 
though in a few cases not necessarily their first name.  
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provide figures these are sometimes wrong.63 While some of these have been detected, 
there may be others that could marginally influence the results of this investigation.  
  
The results are laid out in the table below:  
 
Table 1.8: Comparison of wives and children for an early Islamic cohort as 






named wives in  




in NQ  
Number of 
children from 
named wives in 
The Religious  




wives in NQ 
(sons only)  
Saʿd b. Abī  
Waqqāṣ  
10 3 34 (17) 4 (4) 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 
b. ʿAwf  
13 12 27 (20) 16 (14) 
Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbayd 
Allāh  
6 6 12 (10) 11 (9) 
ʿUthmān b.  
ʿAffān  
7 8 21 (10) 17 (9) 
ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib  7 7 1964 (13) 15 (10) 
  
For most of these results there is a high degree of correlation between the figures as drawn 
from multiple sources (Ahmed’s work) and those from the single work (the Nasab 
Quraysh). Where there are differences, this is in a number of cases where Ahmed has 
uncovered obscure and questionable (by his admission) marriages/maternal links in 
                                                 
63 Fāṭima bt. Muḥammad is described as having three sons and possibly a fourth by ʿAlī (The Religious 
Elite, 139) which is probably a typo; it should of course be two sons and possibly a third (the sources are 
divided on Muḥassin). He also claims that ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān had children through eight named women 
(page 133), but only seven of the eight wives he lists produced children (Umm Kulthūm bt. Muḥammad 
al-Nabī did not, as he states on page 110). There is potentially an eighth child-bearing woman named in 
the chapter, Fākhita bt. Ghazwān (page 110, note 56), but she is not listed amongst the other women and 
Ahmed indicates that he believes her record to be the result of confusion in the sources. She does however 
appear as a mother in the Nasab Quraysh.  
64 Twenty children of ʿAlī by named women are mentioned The Religious Elite, but for one of these 
neither gender nor name is provided (p. 195).  
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isolated references.65 Other instances where there are conflicts are (for our purposes) 
related to minor issues such as the child in question being female, or dying young without 
issue.  
  
There are two areas where the data do not match quite as well. Some of the figures for 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf seem a little skewed; the Nasab Quraysh fails to record one 
marriage and the seven children it produced, although descendants of these children return 
several generations later. This may be a lacunae of the Nasab Quraysh, but we cannot 
exclude the possibility of genealogical forgery; while the children of this union largely 
disappear from the historical record, their later descendants reappear in the early ʿ Abbāsid 
era, which is not a characteristic of many other families (this is also noted by Ahmed).66 
Either way, the quantitative approach used in this thesis ensures that occasional conflicts 
like this one will not make a substantive difference.  
  
The case of Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās is much more serious; there are a full seven wives missing 
from the relevant section in al-Zubayrī’s work and an astonishing 30 missing children. 
This potentially has serious implications for the research in this paper as it diminishes the 
confidence we have in the Nasab Quraysh as being a work representative of the 
genealogical information preserved in Arabic historical literature as a whole.  
 
Fortunately, when we look more closely at the marriages of Saʿd as preserved in the 
historical literature, we find that a reliance on just the Nasab Quraysh actually improves 
the quality of information gathered. Saʿd’s appearances in the outside literature can 
quickly be shown to be confused, contradictory and unreliable.  
  
Ahmed himself raises a number of reasons that ought to make us consider that even Saʿd’s 
own near-term genealogy is suspect, especially with regard to the existence and naming 
of his father. In one particularly intriguing incident, we have a ḥadīth were Saʿd 
                                                 
65 Ahmed, The Religious Elite, 47. 
66 Ahmed, The Religious Elite, 56-57. 
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approaches Muḥammad and asks him “Who am I?” to which the Prophet answers “You 
are Saʿd b. Mālik b. Uhayb...May the curse of God be upon anyone who says otherwise.”67 
Ahmed dates this ḥadīth to the second half of the second Islamic century (his arguments 
for this are not provided), and argues that either this relates to some confusion over Saʿd’s 
father’s name, or that Saʿd was not a Qurashī at all and his inclusion in Qurashī genealogy 
dates to some point between the second half of the first and first half of the second century 
(again, an explanation for this dating is not provided).68 Ahmed also points out that that 
Saʿd made only one Qurashī marriage (which is not recorded in the list of wives in the 
Nasab Quraysh), indicating that the other members of the tribe possibly did not regard 
him as one of their own.  
 
There are additional reasons to believe that Saʿd’s genealogy should be treated with 
caution. The Nasab Quraysh follows quite a strict structure in terms of how generations 
are introduced; maternal information is normally provided for everyone until the 
generation of Muḥammad’s grandchildren (Generation 7), after which many lines become 
patrilines only. Saʿd’s entry is unusual in that the matriline stops two generations before 
him (meaning we are not told who his mother is, or the name of the mother of his father) 
but we are then told who the mothers of Saʿd’s children and grandchildren are. This is 
unusual; also unusual is the fact that his father’s name does not appear in the section 
detailing the grandfather’s wives and children.  
  
The problems continue. According to Ahmed’s reckoning, Saʿd fathered 35 children.69 
This is certainly a large number of offspring – though not in itself implausible. The 
problem is that it means that a man who seems to have faced challenges on the marriage 
market produced more children (including children born through concubines) than 
                                                 
67 Ahmed, The Religious Elite, 28. 
68 Ahmed also notes that suspicions that Saʿd was of actually of South Arabian heritage are recorded in 
Ḥassān b. Thābit’s Dīwān (Ahmed, The Religious Elite, 29).  
69 This is one more than the figure provided in the table above, as previously we were only interested in 
marriages to named women or concubines in order to check correlation; the additional child was born to 
an unnamed woman so only appears here.  
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anyone else recorded in the Nasab Quraysh – more than any caliph, Companion or close 
relative of Muḥammad. Indeed, the second highest number of children is the 33 of ʿAlī b. 
ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbbās, whose own appearances in the historical records may have been 
manipulated as a by-product of the ʿAbbāsid daʿwa and later myth-making. On top of 
this, Ahmed has omitted one of Saʿd’s marriages and the resulting child which is found 
in the Nasab Quraysh (this is presumably a mistake as all other recorded wives are 
included in the chapter), meaning that Saʿd should have had 36 children by 12 wives. The 
12 wives of Saʿd mean he (along with ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf) had more childbearing 
named women than any other Qurashī man.  
  
These problems are compounded when we look at the details of these marriages as 
recorded by Ahmed. The primary sources are a confusing mess, and this is made worse 
by Ahmed’s insistence on taking this information at face value. So we find for instance 
that one marriage to an unnamed woman listed by Ahmed is generated from a record of 
an Andalusian man who claimed he was a seventh generation descendant of Saʿd, and 
who was born in 352 AH (963-4 CE).70 By Ahmed’s own generational distancing of 20 
years, a seventh generation descendant should have been born 140 years after Saʿd’s own 
birth (probably at 600 CE)71 – which would place it at some point in the second half of 
the eighth century. Even applying the more generous 30 year gap used in this thesis brings 
us only to the beginning of the ninth century, still 150 years too early. In another instance 
Ahmed tells us that Saʿd’s son Iṣḥāq was his eldest child,72 where a few pages earlier it 
is ʿĀʾisha.73 Other times the confusion in the marriage data is noted,74 but these poorly 
attested marriages are used alongside those for whom we have far more consistent reports. 
These factors taken together indicate that much of the information we have for Saʿd b. 
                                                 
70 Ahmed, The Religious Elite, 47.  
71 EI2, s.v. “Saʿd b. Abī Waḳḳāṣ” (Gerald Hawting).  
72 Ahmed, The Religious Elite, 46.  
73 Ahmed, The Religious Elite, 43.  
74 Ahmed, The Religious Elite, 41.  
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Abī Waqqāṣ’s marriages as recorded in The Religious Elite (and by extension, the outside 
sources it uses) is deeply problematic.75   
 
All this shows that the Nasab Quraysh is by far the best source of information for Qurashī 
marriage data for the period 500-750 CE. It does not record every marriage, but it does 
contain more Qurashī marriage data than any other single source and, as the case of Saʿd 
b. Abī Waqqās has shown above, it is better to engage with one source in a critical manner 
than to uncritically incorporate many. It will also be shown throughout this thesis that, 
where the Nasab Quraysh contains data that cannot be verified in other sources, these 
data are internally consistent and credible when analysed in terms of wider trends. 
Additionally, while there are certainly erroneous records in the Nasab Quraysh, the 
quantitative approach means that their influence is minimised. In short, we are justified 
in believing that the conclusions drawn from a statistical analysis of this work are unlikely 
to be overturned simply by applying the same analysis to another source or collection of 
sources.  
  
Excursus: critiquing prosopography  
  
There is a wider point to be made here about how prosopographies and statistical studies 
should be read. By their nature, studies like Ahmed’s contain large quantities of 
decontextualised information drawn from multiple sources, and the capacity for mistakes 
to creep in is much greater than a study that uses more familiar comparative literary 
approaches that pay a lot of attention to context. This is not necessarily a problem; given 
that the nature of the work is a quantitative approach, the presence of a few records that 
a later investigator might find questionable will not necessarily undermine the overall 
conclusions.   
  
                                                 
75 Madelung records similar reservations in even more sources (Wilfred Madelung, The Succession to  
Muḥammad: a Study of the Early Caliphate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 95, note 74.  
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A good critique therefore focuses only on the mistakes that make a material impact on the 
conclusions drawn from the data. This is certainly the case with Ahmed as his overall 
argument is to demonstrate that Saʿd’s marriage behaviour betrays his political 
manoeuvrings; by casting doubt on so many of the marriages, and highlighting the lax 
way in which the data have been managed, this argument is fatally undermined. This does 
not invalidate the whole work though; the chapters detailing other Qurashīs appear to be 
built on firmer foundations. It seems that Ahmed would have been better off omitting 
Saʿd altogether.  
  
The mistakes made by Ahmed also highlight the strengths of the methodological approach 
taken in this paper. Quantitative analysis means that the remarkable number of children 
Saʿd produced is shown up for being the oddity it is; because Ahmed’s study did not 
enumerate the children and wives and compare them to other figures of the period he 
missed an important sign that there may be issues with the veracity of this family’s 
genealogical records. Using a single source also means that we are able to develop a far 
better understanding of its structures and styles which helps us identify suspicious 
information; something that is far harder when using the vast array of sources that inform 




At the end of this chapter it is clear that Hoyland was right – the nasab tradition is indeed 
evidence of a stunning degree of historical memory and that it can be shown to extend 
back over three centuries. While we will not go as far as Crone and say the study of early 
Islamic history must as a result be exclusively prosopographical, we have many grounds 
for thinking that it is an approach that can provide compelling additions to the existing 
historical narrative.  
  
But if the argumentation for this has been successful it is only because we have narrowed 
our interests to specific types of genealogical memory and have considered which 
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prosopographical approaches are the most appropriate for the nature of the data. 
Genealogy is almost synonymous with forgery in a wide range of historical and 
anthropological contexts, and in light of this we had to explain how we can expect to use 
it to create a positivist historical narrative. The explanation above has referred largely to 
the anthropological observation that humans are capable of accurately remembering 
genealogical connections going back three to five generations from the eldest members 
of the tribe. How precisely the Arabs came to record this genealogy will be the subject of 
the following chapter on historiography; here it will be sufficient to say that it is possible 
that the Arabs recorded their genealogy accurately, as distinct from the material that went 
into the ḥadīth and khabar corpuses which would have required miraculous degrees of 
information recall in order to be anything more than broadly similar to the events they 
purport to record.  
  
Having argued this case we moved on to our research approach. Prosopographical 
methods can only be as good as the data that inform them, and it was in light of this that 
we chose to focus on marriage behaviour. By converting maternal information into 
marriage data we create a database that is expansive enough to reduce the impact of 
suspect records but specific enough to say something interesting about social trends and 
politics in the two centuries surrounding the revelation of Islam. The biggest challenge to 
this approach is the extensive amount of time it takes to accurately gather data. For this 
reason, the source of the data has been limited to one work, the Nasab Quraysh, which 
contains large amounts of marriage information presented in a very straightforward 
format.  
  
There are dangers in using only one source, not least of which is the risk of it not being 
representative of the tradition as a whole. By sampling the Nasab Quraysh and checking 
this against the information recorded in other works it was shown that al-Zubayrī’s 
genealogical book is easily the most comprehensive in terms of recording marriage data.  
While it certainly does not contain every Qurashī marriage for which there is a record, it 




The dangers of not narrowly defining what is reliable data and being vague about 
methodology were amply demonstrated in the critique of Ahmed’s research on Saʿd b. 
Abī Waqqāṣ. In this case, using multiple sources made his argumentation weaker rather 
than stronger because he did not apply any means of discriminating between the types of 
data he was extracting. This resulted in consistently attested data being given equal value 
to information that was contradictory and in some cases obviously forged.   
  
Of course, we can never hope for the arrival of a simple rubric that can be applied to all 
sources in order to allow us to partition the ‘good’ data from the ‘bad’; the sources are far 
too divergent to ever allow this. Instead, our approach should be to methodically increase 
our understanding of each source and each category of data before analysing them in a 
way that allows us to easily distinguish between the root works should we need to. Simply 
compiling enormous amounts of decontextualised data for its own sake is never going to 
produce compelling results.   
  
The scope for conflict and confusion in this field is considerable, and while we are still at 
these preliminary stages a study that looks predominantly at marriage data as recorded in 
one source should not be judged as limited – it is simply the most logical way to proceed 
based on our current understanding of the sources. As the critique of Ahmed has shown, 
if we go too far too fast we can very easily find ourselves coming unstuck. The Nasab 
Quraysh has been shown to be the best source of data for marital information on account 
of it being conveniently structured, relatively short, credible and more comprehensive 
than other works. With this in mind, we are in a position to provide a historiographical 
analysis structured around the context of the work and its author.  
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Chapter Two: Historiography of the nasab tradition  
    
Introduction  
  
By this point it should be clear how central al-Zubayrī’s Nasab Quraysh is to the 
formulation of the database that constitutes the heart of this thesis. It is necessary therefore 
to understand where this work fits in within its genre: the nasab literary tradition.  
  
In its broadest sense, the historiography of the nasab tradition is genealogy as written by 
Arabian and Islamicate peoples. This is a problematic starting point for a number of 
reasons. First, the Arabian concept of ‘nasab’ is not directly translatable as ‘genealogical 
literature’ because the ideologies connected to kinship permeated pre- and early Islamic 
Arabia to a much greater extent than other societies, especially those with long-standing 
literary traditions. The result is that if we approach the historiography of nasab in the 
same way as we would approach the historiography of any other genre (or the same genre 
in a non-Arabian context), we quickly run into non-trivial issues. Something as simple as 
writing down a name is arguably an instance of nasab writing thanks to the North Arabian 
convention of listing a person’s ancestors along with their given first name(s); as such it 
may appear that genealogical literature technically extends to the first epigraphic instance 
of an Arabian name appearing in this format. But there is clearly a difference between the 
person who carved a name into a desert rock (who was following a common convention) 
and the degree of agency al-Zubayrī exhibited when he wrote the Nasab Quraysh.76   
  
A second issue is that the already complex subject of nasab literature is poorly treated by 
modern academic studies that do not incorporate the complexities of the genre into their 
                                                 
76 Having said this, when found in groups these inscriptions can be used by archaeologists to postulate 
surprisingly detailed genealogical connections – see Zeidoun al-Muheisen and Ahmad Ajlouni “A  
Nabataean Inscription From Northern Jordan Survey (Umm al-Jimāl area),” Syria 82 (2005): 167-171.   
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historiographical analysis.77 Works commonly ascribed to the nasab genre (this generally 
includes any work with the word nasab and its variants in the title) actually fall into 
several distinct sub-categories. Each sub-category has its own historiographic narrative, 
but this part of the story is only cursorily treated – despite the fact that the subcategories 
have been recognised by both contemporaries of the genealogists and by most modern 
scholars. Discussion of the Nasab Quraysh and its author cannot begin until we have first 
carried out this delineation.   
  
The first part of this chapter will therefore be an extended discussion of the literary 
category of nasab. We will begin by looking briefly at the different sub-categories of 
nasab literature before identifying the characteristics of the one to which the Nasab 
Quraysh belongs. The sub-category we are most interested in here is the 
‘genealogicallystructured history’ which is characterised by its radiating family tree 
structure, extensive scope in terms of numbers of individuals and its role as a literary 
work rather than a ledger maintained by a caste. Following this, we will look at the timing 
of the genre’s emergence and decline and which cultural and political forces may have 
been responsible for this historiographical trajectory.   
  
This groundwork will prepare us for the following chapter where we will consider the life 
and work of al-Zubayrī in more detail. It will be shown that the author of the Nasab 
Quraysh was in many ways exactly the sort of proto-Sunni, anti-shuʿūbī, pro-ʿAbbāsid 
historian we would expect to find behind a loyalist genealogical work of the Quraysh 
written in the first half of the ninth century. Throughout this it will be shown that although 
authorial bias is detectable in the Nasab Quraysh, it is both minor and easily detectable.  
  
  
                                                 
77 In the case of Chase Robinson’s Islamic Historiography genealogy is not treated at all (page 56); 
Szombathy is not interested in Qurashī genealogy (as discussed above) and Khalidi’s treatment of al-
Zubayrī ignores some important references in the historical sources (see note 161 below).  
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Defining nasab and the genealogically-structured history  
  
The idea that nasab can refer to more than one type of literary work is not a new one. 
When Zubayr b. Bakkār completed his Jamharat nasab Quraysh wa akhbārihā, a friend 
teased him saying that the work was not a nasab at all, but a collection of khabars.78 Many 
modern scholars have also noted the existence of more than one type of work within the 
nasab genre. These include Khalidi,79 Duri,80 Rosenthal81 and Leder,82 all of whom have 
contrasted the styles of the nasab works of al-Balādhurī and Zubayr b. Bakkār with those 
of the earlier Ibn al-Kalbī and al-Zubayrī.83  
  
These sub-genres do not have subtitles or even consistent definitions. Most modern 
scholars follow the lead of Zubayr b. Bakkār’s friend and describe works like that of al-
Balādhurī as genealogically-structured khabar works. Becker and Rosenthal go slightly 
further and describe al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-ahsrāf as a “ṭabaqāt in the style of Ibn Saʿd, 
arranged genealogically.”84 In almost all cases, it is Ibn al-Kalbī’s Jamharat al-nasab that 
is held as being the true and original genealogical literary work from which the alternative 
forms are derived.85  
  
In addition to these genres, Islamicate society produced other works described as nasabs 
that were of a very different nature to those described above. One popular form was the 
                                                 
78 “You have written a book and called it ‘A book of genealogy,’ yet it is a book of khabars.” (Aḥmad b. 
ʿAlī al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh Baghdad (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanjī), 8:469.  
79 Tarif Khalidi, Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 57-58.  
80 ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Dūrī, The Rise of Historical Writing Among the Arabs, trans. Lawrence Conrad 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 62.  
81 EI2, s.v. “Nasab” (Franz Rosenthal).  
82 EI2, s.v. “al-Zubayr b. Bakkār” (S. Leder).  
83 The chronology here is not strict; Ibn Ḥazm’s (d. 1064) Jamharat ansāb al-ʿArab is an interesting 
example of a genealogy written in the sparser Ibn al-Kalbī style yet coming from a much later period.  
84 EI2, s.v. “al-Balādhurī” (C.H. Becker, Franz Rosenthal). Crone describes it in similar terms: “a 
universal chronicle genealogically arranged” (Crone, Slaves on Horses, 11). 
85 E.g. Kazuo Morimoto “It is generally accepted that the science of Arab genealogies achieved its peak 
with Ibn al-Kalbī (d. 819 or 821) whose Ğamhara fi ansāb al-ʿArab...embodies the attainments of the 
science of Arab genealogies.” From “The Formation and Development of the Science of Talibid 
Genealogies in the 10th and 11th Century Middle East.” Oriente Moderno 2 (1999): 543.  
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elite genealogy which focused narrowly on dynasties of political and religious families. 
Extended relations were not of interest, and chronology was prioritised over genealogical 
connections.86 Another common genre was the one comprising the genealogical registers 
of the sayyids and sharīfs; descendants of Muḥammad who lived as a distinct caste in 
many parts of the Muslim world. These registers were kept in order to verify those who 
claimed membership of this group in order to access its benefits.87  
  
As the field develops, it is possible that these sub-divisions within the field of nasab will 
themselves be sub-divided further, but at this stage the schema outlined above will suffice. 
Our primary concern is with the first two types of genealogical writing: those that are 
organised according to a strict genealogical framework. These are our ‘genealogically-
structured histories’ and, though the differences between the two subgenres of ‘true’ 
nasabs (e.g. Ibn al-Kalbī’s Jamharat al-nasab) and genealogicallystructured khabar 
works (e.g. al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-ashrāf) are real enough, in this discussion it is the 
similarities that are of the greatest interest.  
  
As the name implies, structure is the most important distinguishing element of this 
subgenre. The paradigmatic form88 is thus; the works first link Muḥammad to Ismāʿīl (son 
of Abraham) through a patriline, and this is followed by details (or sometimes just names) 
of the Prophet’s wives, sons and daughters. Had Muḥammad had any siblings, these 
would have been addressed in the section immediately following. As he does not, the 
genealogy moves up one generation to that of his uncles. One uncle is selected, and the 
details of his descendants are listed. Once these are addressed, another uncle is selected. 
After the uncles are exhausted, attention turns to Muḥammad’s grand-uncles, then great-
grand uncles and so on until the founder figure of the descent group is reached (in the 
Nasab Quraysh this is Fihr). The genealogical books focusing on the Quraysh stop here; 
                                                 
86 There are many examples of these, but one relevant to the time period and available in translation is  
Salamah ibn Muslim ʻAwtabī's An Early Islamic Family from Oman: al-ʻAwtabī’s Account of the 
Muhallabids, trans. Martin Hinds (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1991).  
87 For a scholarly account of this process in action see Morimoto’s “Formation and Development,” 552 ff.  
88 I.e. that followed by most extant genealogies.   
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the others carry on to incorporate all the other Arab tribal groups within their scholarly 
remit.  
  
It is worth remarking that historiographies of this type are literary experiments that few 
other genealogically-minded cultures developed or emulated and that this was recognised 
by Muslims of later periods. 89  When we combine this novel structure with the 
overwhelming quantity of detail in some of these works (Ibn al-Kalbī’s Jamharat al-
nasab names 35,000 individuals)90 we are left with an achievement that has no parallel in 
pre-modern history. It is therefore somewhat surprising to see how rarely this uniqueness 
is noted in the secondary literature.91   
  
With this in mind we will consider the various forces that led to the preservation of 
genealogical knowledge in the form of the genealogically-structured history. Although 
this has been addressed to some extent in the secondary literature, these discussions have 
treated nasab as secondary to historiography in general. In the following section we will 
consider political and religious contexts of the time period in which the nasab genre 






                                                 
89 Morimoto, “The Formation and Development,” 542, citing: Ibn Funduq, Lubāb al-ansāb wa al-alqāb, 
ed. Mahdī Rajāʿī (Qom: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-ʻUẓma al-Marʻashī al-Najafī al-ʻĀmmah, 1410 h. 
[1990]), 195; and Ibn Ṭiqṭaqa, al-Aṣīlī fī ansāb al-Ṭālibiyyīn, ed. Mahdī al-Rajāʿī (Qom: Maktabat Āyat 
Allāh alʻUẓma al-Marʻashī al-Najafī al-ʻĀmmah, 1374 h. [1997]), 29 ff. See also Szombathy, The Roots 
of Arabic Genealogy, 29, note52.  
90 Kennedy, “From Oral Tradition to Written Record,” 531.  
91 There are exceptions: Kennedy describes the genealogies recorded in the Jamharat al-nasab as being 
“in a class of their own” (“From Oral Tradition to Written Record,” 531) while Morimoto says “the 
science of genealogies has been regarded as one which originated from among the Arabs” (“The 
Formation and Development,” 542). But most scholars treat the emergence of the nasab as a stepping 
stone to the more popular genres of ṭabaqāt and khabar narratives – for instance Rosenthal says 
genealogy “prepared the Arab mind for world histories” (A History of Muslim Historiography, 20).  
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The genealogists: temporal location  
  
Our first task is to locate the genealogists in time. Table 2.1 below is formulated from 
information taken from the section of Ibn al-Nadīm’s al-Fihrist92 that details historians 
and genealogists. Individuals he reports as writing a work with nasab (and its variants) in 
the title are extracted along with death dates, page references and some notes on their 
backgrounds. References are provided for the Dodge translation of the work (though this 
resource should be used with caution as the translation is frequently wayward).93 The six 
extant works are in bold.  
  
There is admittedly an assumption here that all these works are genealogically-structured 
histories, but this is a fair one given that all the works to have survived from this period 
that have variations of the word ‘nasab’ in the title are indeed structured in this fashion. 
Excluded from the selection are authors who wrote genealogies of smaller families as we 
have reason to believe that these do not necessarily share all the characteristics of the 
genealogically-structured history. 94  Added to the list are al-Sadūsī and Abū ʿUbayd 
alQāsim b. Sallām whose works survive and were written in the relevant era, but are not 









                                                 
92 Muḥammad b. Isḥāq Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, Cairo: Maktabat al-Tijārīyah al-Kubrá, 1929.  
93 Muḥammad b. Isḥāq Ibn al-Nadīm, The Fihrist: a 10th Century AD Survey of Islamic Culture, trans. 
Bayard Dodge (Chicago: KAZI Publications, 1998).  
94 For instance, see al-ʿAwtabī’s nasab of the Muhallabid family which is organised genealogically but 
includes only the most prominent of the Muhallabids (ʿAwtabi, An Early Islamic Family from Oman).   
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Table 2.1: Authors of genealogical works as recorded in the Fihrist  
  








al-kabīr (tr: The  
Great Book of  
Genealogy)  
786/7  138 (203-204)    
Ibn Abī  
Maryam  
Al-Kitāb al-
Nasab (tr: The  
Book of  
Genealogy)  
838/9  139 (205)    
Ibn al-Kalbī  Jamharat al-
nasab (tr: 
Collection of  
Genealogy)  
819/22  140-143 
(205206)  
Important source was 
his father who died 
763/4, who in turn 
was taught by al-
Shaybānī al-ʿIjlī (p. 139 
in al-Fihrist; p. 239 in  
Dodge)  
Al-Madāʾinī  Nasab Quraysh 
wa akhbārihā 
(tr: Genealogy of 
the Quraysh and 
Their History)  
830/1 (Dodge 
also has 846)  
147-152 
(220221)  
Also wrote a number 
of books on women 
and marriage.   
Ibn ʿAbda  Kitāb al-Nasab 
al-kabīr (tr: The  
Great Book of  
Genealogy)  
Probably mid  
9th C  
153 (229)  Work was based on  
Ibn al-Kalbī’s  
according to Ibn al-
Nadīm  
Muḥammad  
b. Ḥabīb  
Kitāb al-Nasab  
(tr: Book of  
Genealogy)  




Kitāb al-Nasab  
(tr: Book of  
Genealogy)  
First part of 9th 
century  
158 (240)    
                                                 











During the  
Conquests) 
815  159 (240)    
Al-Zubayrī  Nasab Quraysh 
(tr: Genealogy 
of the  
Quraysh), Kitāb 
al-Nasab al-
kabīr (tr: The 
Great Book of  
Genealogy)  








the Quraysh and 
Their History)  
870  160-162 (244)    
Al-Jahmī  Nasab Quraysh 
wa akhbārihā 
(tr: Genealogy 




of the caliph 
Mutawakkil (r. 
847-61)  
162 (244-245)    
ʿUmar b. 
Shābba  
Kitāb al-Nasab  
(tr: Book of  
Genealogy)  
876 in Samarrā  163-4 (246-
248)  
  
                                                 
96 Dodge has this name as “Ghuyūbah.” 
97 The Fihrist has 848; as will be discussed later, 851 is the date preferred by modern scholars. 
68  
  
Al-Balādhurī  Kitāb al-Akhbār 
wa al-ansāb (tr:  
Book of  
Historical  
Traditions and  
Genealogies)  
892  164 (247-248)  As Dodge notes this is 
probably the extant 
work Ansāb al-ashrāf 











Expeditions)   










of Ibn al- 
Nadīm and  
was alive at 
time the 
Fihrist was 
written (988)  
166 (251)  Also wrote book on 
Persian genealogies  




min nasab  
Quraysh (tr:  
Concise 
Genealogy of 
the Quraysh)  






Kitāb al-Nasab  
(tr: Book of  
Genealogy)  
837  Not in al-
Fihrist  
Work is an 
abridgement of Ibn 
al-Kalbī’s Jamharat al-
nasab  




                                                 
98 Dodge’s manuscript has this has “Makārī.” 
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What we are now interested in is when these individuals were active; we will do this by 
tracking the death dates over time. Using this information, the following table expresses 
the number of authors who died in a particular quarter century:99  
                                                                                                                                  
Table 2.2: Number of genealogist deaths per quarter century from al-Fihrist and 
extant works  
 
  
Era  Number of 
deaths  
Notes  
775-799  1   
800-824  4 Includes Ibn ʿAskām al-Kilābī  
825-849  4 Includes al-Makāwalī  
850-874  5 Includes al-Jahmī, Ibn ʿAbda and al-Zubayrī  
875-899  2   
Later eras  
1 
Abū al-Ḥassan al-Nassāba, alive at time the Fihrist was 
written (988)  
  
This can also be expressed in the form of a graph:  
  
  
                                                 
99 The two authors for whom ‘mid-ninth century’ is the best guess at death date have been evenly split 
between the 825-849 and 850-874 categories. 
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Graph 2.1: Number of author deaths per quarter century from al-Fihrist and 




Looked at in this way, the seeds of the genre must have been sown in the early ʿAbbāsid 
era when antiquarians like Ibn al-Kalbī endeavoured to turn the genealogical knowledge 
of their father’s generation into compendia of nasabs. These would have looked more like 
books than the notes used to support the oral performance of genealogy that the Arabs 
had previously relied on for the preservation of genealogical memory.100 It was following 
Ibn al-Kalbī’s death in 811 that the genre really flourished though; over the course of the 
next fifty years it is likely that at least ten different scholars wrote at least one book on 
genealogy that was notable enough to be mentioned by a Baghdad book-seller a hundred 
years later. But in the second half of the ninth century the genre seems to have declined 
in significance with many genealogists dying without being replaced by a younger 
generation. This is roughly contemporaneous with the crisis of the Samarran caliphate 
                                                 
100 This is somewhat speculative as writing and the oral transmission of genealogy are not specifically 
linked, but transmission in this form would be in line with Schoeler’s argumentation in Genesis of 
Literature which establishes that this is the case for other types of history writing.  
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71  
  
which began in 861 with the assassination of al-Mutawakkil. In 892 the caliphate moved 
back to Baghdad; in the same year al-Balādhurī died and with his passing ended the 
golden age of a unique experiment in history writing.101   
  
Underlying reasons for the emergence of nasab literature 1: Tribalism  
  
Using Ibn al-Nadīm’s al-Fihrist as a tracker for popularity is not an exact science – the 
high point of nasab writing coincides with a golden age for a lot of other types of writing 
too.102 But while scientific works, religious texts and non-genealogical historical works 
continued to be produced, 103  the genealogically-structured history would largely 
disappear from the repertoire of Muslim scholars. Additionally, no new genealogies 
structured along the lines of these works were ever made again for the families of any of 
the non-Arab tribal peoples that established themselves within the Islamic world. There 
is clearly something particular about the experience of Arab peoples as they moved from 
non-literacy to literacy that resulted in them creating the genealogically-structured 
history.  
  
That the pre-Islamic Arabs were genealogically-minded there can be no doubt; the poetry, 
the epigraphy, the Qurʾān and the consistency of the historical records referring to the 
jāhiliyya all indicate that the peninsular Arabians believed genealogy explained their 
internal political relationships as well as their identity (with an important exception being 
the southern Arabians). Disagreements and alliances were understood along tribal lines, 
while ancestry was the battle ground where poets fought in the language of shame and 
                                                 
101 Borrut also uses the year 892 as a cut-off point in his periodisation of Arab historiography (Antoine 
Borrut, Entre mémoire et pouvoir: l’espace syrien sous les derniers Omeyyades et les premiers 
Abbassides (Leiden: Brill, 2011)).  
102 See Fred Donner’s Narratives of Islamic Origins (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 280. It 
also coincides with the introduction of paper to the Muslim world.  
103 See for example the large number of contemporary authors of poetry Ibn al-Nadīm can name (339 ff. 
in al-Fihrist (371 ff. in Dodge translation)) compared to the one contemporary genealogist he mentions 
earlier. Again, it is emphasised that this is not a comprehensive analysis of Ibn al-Nadīm’s interests; the 
point here is that the references to the poets of his era means we he was not averse to the idea of including 
contemporaries in his work. The decline in number of genealogists is therefore significant. 
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pride (Rosenthal notes that the lack of a cognate for the n-s-b root in other Semitic 
languages is an indicator of its extreme age).104 If we take the historical records at face 
value, this ʿaṣabiyya, or tribal solidarity, was too strong even for Muḥammad to 
overcome;105 his attempt to create an umma was only briefly successful in cutting across 
tribal loyalties in the latter part of his career and it did not survive him.  
                                                                                                                                                 
It seems natural therefore that the Arab historians of the second century of Islam should 
structure their histories on similar lines. The centrality of Muḥammad to these 
genealogically-structured histories (he is always the starting point) is itself relic of the 
jāhiliyya in that it is similar to the way the tribal Arabs today reportedly see themselves 
as surrounded by layers of increasingly distant loyalties to relatives – as the Bedouin 
saying has it “Me against my brother; me and my brother against my cousin; me, my 
brother and my cousin against the world” (Hoyland analogises this world-view as being 
akin to a Russian doll).106 But by making Muḥammad the centre of this model rather than 
themselves, the genealogists were making a powerful statement about his centrality to 
their worldview.  
  
The connection between Late Antique Arabian culture and the pervasiveness of this 
genealogical mindset can be seen in the way that later non-tribal Muslim genealogists 
                                                 
104 EI2, s.v. “Nasab” (Franz Rosenthal). Margoliouth uses the same observation to argue that the term 
must have originated in Arabia (al-Samʿānī, Kitāb al-Ansāb, 1 (Introduction)). Joy McCorriston has 
argued that the emergence of tribal identities is linked to the adoption of the pastoral lifestyle; given that 
this is dependant on the domestication of animals, the archaeological evidence indicates that nasab as an 
organisational principle in Arabia can be dated to 6,000 BC (Joy McCorriston, Pilgrimage and Household 
in the Ancient Near East (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 91–2. These tribal bonds 
appear to have undergone a significant evolution in the Late Antique period; research by Hoyland has 
shown that from the third century CE the epigraphic record starts to show tribal groupings that would 
have been familiar to the early Muslims (“Arab kings, Arab tribes, Arabic texts and the beginnings of 
Arab historical memory in late Roman epigraphy,” in From Hellenism to Islam: Cultural and Linguistic 
Change in the Roman Near East, eds. Hannah Cotton et al,  374-401 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009)). 
105 EI2, s.v. “ʿAṣabiyya” (F. Gabrieli); EQ, s.v. “Tribes and Clans” (Ella Landau-Tasseron); Goldziher,  
Muslim Studies, trans. C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966), 1:45-
59; Mottahedeh “The Shu'ubiyah Controversy and the Social History of Early Islamic Iran,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 7, no.2 (1976): 161-182. 
106 Robert Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs (London: Routledge, 2001), 114.  
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were unable to replicate its structure. One example is the case of Fakhr-i Mudabbir’s 
genealogical work. This 13 year project, which resulted in a book called the Shajara-yi 
ansāb (tr: Tree of Genealogies), was written in Persian during the early 13th century in 
the territory of the Delhi Sultanate. 107  Fakhr-i Mudabbir’s starting point was the 
reconstruction of his own genealogy (which had been lost), and this was of some value - 
he reckoned himself to be a descendant on his father’s side of Abū Bakr, and on his 
mother’s side to the Ghaznavid dynasty. But once he worked this out he then became 
interested in the Prophet’s Companions, the anṣār, the muhājirūn, and a number of later 
Islamic dynasties – all of which he also wanted to incorporate into his genalogy. As a 
result of this, although gathering the information took time, it was its organisation that 
presented a far greater challenge. As he puts it:  
 
When all [information] was known and collected, a year, day and night had to be 
passed in reflection, and engineering-like effort had to be exerted in deciding how 
the relationships would occur in the composition of this book; because connecting 
father to father (pidar bā pidar), and branch to branch (shākh dar shākh) is very 
difficult. Establishing these affiliations is a thousand times more laborious than 
extracting and bringing [them] together. How can one connect these relationships 
branch by branch to Adam in an orderly and uninterrupted fashion? This difficult 
system of writing (kitābat) should be executed in such a manner that it should 
come downward from the top, or it should move up from the bottom to the top.108   
  
If Fakhr-i Muddabbir had read the nasab literature of the Arab tradition there is little 
evidence he borrowed their structure for his work. He instead approaches it from an 
                                                 
107 The following translations, transliterations and details are taken from Ilker Binbas, “Structure and  
Function of the Genealogical Tree in Islamic Historiography,” in Horizons of the World. Festschrift for 
Đsenbike Togan, ed. Ilker Binbas and Nurten Kılıc-Schubel, (Istanbul: Ithaki, 2011), 465-544. This 
reliance on Binbas’s translation and transliteration (which occasionally seems wayward) is because the 
Shajara-yi ansāb is only available in manuscript copy at the Chester Beatty Library in Dublin.  Also see  
Denison Ross, “The Genealogies of Fakhr-ud-dîn, Mubârak Shâh,” in A Volume of Oriental Studies 
Presented to E.G. Browne, eds. Thomas Arnold and Reynold Nicholson (Cambridge: [s.n.], 1922), 
392413.  
108 Binbas, “Structure and Function,” 476-477.  
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independent angle. The results are remarkable – although he starts with Muḥammad in 
his genealogy, he quickly departs from the Russian doll structure. The following is the 
order in which the cohorts appear in his book:  
  
- The Prophet and the ten companions (dah yār – most, but not all, Quraysh)  
- Muhājirūn (those who emigrated from Mecca with Muḥammad to Medina – 
most but not all, Quraysh)  
- Anṣār (Medinans who supported the early Muslim community – none were 
Quraysh)  
- Prophets mentioned in the Qur’ān  
- Ghassāniyān and Ḥimyariyān (Arabian tribal states of the sixth century – non-
Quraysh)  
- Poets who were Companions (ṣaḥāba) of the Prophet  
- Poets of the pre-Islamic period and those who lived both before and during 
the time of the Prophet (muḥaḍramūn) and Muslim and convert poets   
- Pīshdādiyān, Kiyāniyān, Sāsāniyān, Ashghāniyān (mulūk-i tavāʾif, or pre-
Islamic Iranian dynasties)  
- Progeny of Adam  
- Umayyads, ʿAbbāsids, Imām Abū Ḥanīfa, Imām Shāfiʿī  
- Arab tribes and companions that were separated from their tribes and cities  
- Alexander the Great and Luqmān Ḥakīm and Balaʿam Baʿūr and other  
- children of Mālik Duʿar  
- Amīrs of the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid periods  
- Ṭāhirids, Ṣaffārids and Sāmānids  
- Ghaznavids (āl-i Sebuktigin)  
- Ghūrids (descendants of Ḍaḥḥāk)  
- Sharīfs (descendants of the Prophet)  




This is completely different from the Arab nasab works discussed above. Particularly 
striking is the late appearance of the ʿAlids who are normally the first or second family 
to appear after that of the Prophet. The Shajara-yi ansāb is not a genealogicallyorganised 
work in the sense discussed above; it is more a prosopography where people are organised 
in terms of their membership of various descent groups, and as such it has more in 
common with ṭabaqāt works or compendia of miscellanea – works which Fakhr-i 
Mudabbir would no doubt have been familiar with and seem to have had a greater impact 
on him.  
  
Fakhr-i Mudabbir’s work is interesting because it looks exactly the way we would expect 
it to from an author who considered himself a genealogist but was the product of a non-
tribal environment. Though the personal ancestry he chooses to highlight was Turkish 
and Arab, his means of structuring the information betrays a cultural background where 
genealogy was not a primary principle of social organisation. The fact that he found the 
structuring of the work “a thousand times” harder than the actual gathering of the 
information is a sure sign of the difficulties created through his cosmopolitan interest in 
creating a more-or-less universal genealogy of Islam. The result is a work of genealogy 
that would have been acceptable to the settled literati of most cultures but would have 
seemed bizarre to a tribal Arabian.  
  
The case of Fakhr-i Mudabbir illustrates that it takes more than a scholar with a general 
interest in genealogy to create a work structured like the Jamharat al-nasab; he has to be 
part of a culture whose tribal thinking is so entrenched that it retains its power to create a 
literary genre after a century or more of gradual de-tribalisation. Had Ibn al-Kalbī not 
been part of this culture, we would expect his work to have looked a lot like the Shajara-
yi ansāb. The lingering legacy of pre-Islamic tribalism was hence an important factor in 
the creation of the genealogically-structured history.109   
                                                 
109 Szombathy discusses this from the opposite angle in The Roots of Arabic Genealogy. His argument in 
this monograph is that the way in which Ibn al-Kalbī (among others) connected various tribes to distant 
ancestors is a product of a literary age, and was nothing like the tribal networks as understood by the 
preIslamic Arabs. He criticises the secondary scholarship for being too credulous and for falsely 
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Underlying reasons for the emergence of nasab literature 2: The  
shuʿūbiyya  
  
Important as tribalism no doubt was, other motivations for the creation of the 
genealogically-structured history can be discerned from the texts. A serious deficiency 
with the nasab format is the fact that it excludes anyone who does not fall within the 
work’s genealogical remit; in the case of the Nasab Quraysh non-Qurashīs can only 
appear incidentally. Attempts to include a wider scope of history (as we saw with the 
Shajara-yi ansāb above) result in works that look nothing like the genealogies we are 
interested in here.   
  
But perhaps exclusion was the point. The high point of Arab genealogical historiography 
coincided with a number of emerging social contexts in which some felt that it was 
increasingly necessary to argue that the ‘Arab’ was superior to the ‘non-Arab’. These 
contexts included the reaction of the old elite to the marginalisation of the Arab heartlands 
(where many of the families detailed in the genealogical works resided),110 the increased 
veneration of the family of the Prophet (and by extension the rest of the Quraysh) and the 
emergence of the Islamic caste system (which would later be realised in the form of the 
sayyids and sharifs).  
  
All these factors were interwoven with more general tensions between Arab and nonArab 
Muslims as the former were declining in relevance while the latter were in the 
                                                 
presenting genealogists of this type as simply preserving knowledge rather than creating it. This does not 
conflict with the point made here though; Szombathy is saying that the work of Ibn al-Kalbī is less tribal 
than some scholars think, whereas it is argued here that the cultural context of this era is demonstrably 
more tribal than that of later periods.   
110 For the marginalisation of the Ḥijāz see Saleh El-Ali, “Muslim Estates in Hidjaz in the First Century 
A. H.,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 2, no. 3 (1959): 260–261; also Harry 
Munt, The Sacred History of Early Islamic Medina (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Oxford: 
2010), 91, which specifically looks at the post-ninth century lull in historiographical interest in the region. 
For similar treatment of other Arab (as opposed to Islamic) regions Tayeb El-Hibri, Reinterpreting 
Islamic Historiography: Hārūn al-Rashīd and the Narrative of the ʻAbbāsid Caliphate (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14; Ahmed, The Religious Elite, 2.  
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ascendant.111 It has been convincingly argued that this tension expressed itself in literary 
terms, not only in what is referred to as the shuʿūbiyya and counter-shuʿūbiyya writings, 
but also in the form of genealogy, which as noted above was becoming increasingly 
popular in the first century of ʿAbbāsid rule.112 Genealogical knowledge was valuable on 
both sides; for the anti-shuʿūbī party the mass of noble names they could muster was 
proof of Arabian greatness, while pro-shuʿūbī genealogists could respond by casting 
doubt on the genealogical claims of the Arabs or by mocking their ancestors.113   
  
This connection can be extended further. As mentioned above, the genealogies under 
consideration excluded non-Arabs and this may be a sign of the anti-shuʿūbī leanings of 
their authors. The Fihrist notes that in addition to writing Nasab Quraysh wa akhbārihā, 
al-Jahmī also wrote al-Intiṣār fī al-radd ʿalā al-shuʿūbiyya (tr: The Defence of the 
Refutation of the Shuʿūbiyya). In addition to two genres follow a similar trajectory of 
popularity. The first genealogical writers emerged in the first decades after ʿAbbāsid 
Revolution, a period when tensions between the non-Arab secretarial classes and the 
Arabs were at their height. A century later, while small-scale genealogical writing in 
general remained popular (typically in the form of an elite family history), the authors of 
the universal genealogically-structured history faded away along with the decline in 
enthusiasm for the shuʿūbiyya.114   
  
There is a further coincidence of timing when we consider a later period of Islamic 
history. In eleventh century al-Andalus there was a small revival of the shuʿūbiyya that 
survives in the form of Ibn Garcia’s epistle and the responses to it.115 The period of this 
dispute coincides with the life of pro-Umayyad and pro-Arab Ibn Ḥazm who wrote a 
                                                 
111 Hugh Kennedy, “Syrian Elites From Byzantium to Islam: Survival or Extinction?” in Money, Power 
and Politics in Early Islamic Syria, ed. John Haldon (Farnham; Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 98.  
112 A point made first by Ignac Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 1:164-198. See also EI2, s.v. “al-
Shuʿūbiyya” (S. Enderwitz); Szombathy, The Roots of Arabic Genealogy, 29 ff.  
113 H.A.R. Gibb, “The Social Significance of the Shuubiyya” in Studies on the Civilization of Islam, eds.  
Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (Routledge: London, 1962), 69.  
114 Gibb, “Social Significance of the Shuubiya,” 62-66.  
115 H.T. Norris, “Shuʿūbiyyah in Arabic literature,” in ʿAbbasid Belles-Lettres, ed. Julia Ashtiany et al. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 45-47.  
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genealogy of his own. Genealogically organised in the traditional way and excluding non-
Arabs, his Jamharat ansāb al-ʿArab is possibly the last fine example of the 
genealogically-organised history book.116   
  
On this point we should exercise caution. Authorial motivation is rarely clear in the works 
of this period, and even if we had more information to hand the situation is so complex 
that we can never hope to definitively say if a work is motivated more by an anti-shuʿūbī 
stance than a pro-ʿAlid one (for example) – people then, as now, had overlapping interests 
and loyalties. For example, the Yemeni tribes of the Umayyad period were not above 
spreading shuʿūbī sentiment amongst the Copts of Fusṭāṭ in order to drive a wedge 
between the populace and the non-Yemeni Arabians who ruled them.117 We can also note 
that one of the most famous early Umayyad genealogists, Daghfal b. Ḥanẓala (active 
during Muʿāwiya’s caliphate and died in 685), was according to some sources associated 
with Khārijite figures,118 Khārijism being in some ways the original expression of the 
shuʿūbiyya.119 The flourishing of genealogy in eleventh century al-Andalus may also have 
been due to other factors.120  
  
With these caveats however, the link between the genealogically-structured history and 
the shuʿūbiyya is very clear; it goes well beyond the general interest human societies have 
in genealogy and the specific interests of all Muslim societies in their religious heritage. 
The nasab genre could only have emerged in the ʿAbbāsid period where a large and 
closely related elite was losing its claims to religious and political authority to groups 
who could not be incorporated into their genealogical schema. In writing a genealogy 
                                                 
116 Ibn Ḥazm’s pro-Arab viewpoint is also evident in a letter preserved by al-Maqqārī (see Risāla fī faḍāʾil 
ahl al-Andalus, in Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Maqqārī, Analectes sur l’histoire et la literature des Arabes 
d’Espagne (Amsterdam: Oriental Press, 1967) 2:109 ff. (reference from EI2, s.v. “Ibn Ḥazm” (R. 
Arnaldez)).  
117 Further discussion in Norris, “Shuʿūbiyyah in Arabic Literature,” 32-33.  
118 Norris, “Shuʿūbiyyah in Arabic Literature,” 33.  
119 Gibb, “Social Significance of the Shuubiya,” 66-7; Donner, Narratives of Islamic Origins, 110; 
Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 1:130 ff.  
120 Rosenthal points to the “provincial” character of Umayyad Spain in addition to the aforementioned 
racial tensions (A History of Muslim Historiography (Leiden: Brill, 1952), 85).  
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consisting only of Arabs and structured in a way that was integral to their tribal world-
view, the genealogists were providing a bold (yet ultimately fruitless) attempt to fight 
back against those who believed Islamic society should be more cosmopolitan and less in 
thrall to its Arab constituencies. These circumstances did not exist for later tribal invaders; 
as these groups became de-tribalised there were not enough stakeholders in their (real or 
imagined) pre-conquest polity to establish a literary tradition with its own Ibn al-Kalbī or 
al-Zubayrī. Hence the Turks and Mongols failed to produce a Nasab Seljuk or a Nasab 
Chingiz.  
  
Underlying reasons for the emergence of nasab literature 3: Shīʿism  
  
Far more challenging an undertaking is understanding where Shīʿism fits in with the 
creation and dissemination of the genealogically-structured historiography. The 
shuʿūbiyya – while certainly not without its complexities – is historiographically 
approachable because it was in many ways a literary movement. The place of Shīʿism in 
early Islamic society on the other hand goes far beyond our written sources.  
 
Shīʿī thought is naturally interested in genealogy because of its ideological concerns; 
divine authority was frequently understood to be transmitted through the descendants of  
Muḥammad’s family and the means of this transmission was normally genealogical. It 
may be that the genealogically-structured history was an attempt to counter claims of  
Hāshimite exceptionalism; al-Zubayrī’s Nasab Quraysh can be seen to answer Shīʿī 
claims of ʿ Alid prominence by subsuming the family amongst all the other Qurashī tribes, 
most notably the families of the first three caliphs (al-Zubayrī was himself a student of 
Mālik b. Anas and hence ideologically a proto-Sunni).121 This is arguably a statement in 
favour of the Four Rightly Guided caliphs model, which was emerging as a proto-Sunni 
doctrine in this period. 122  But beyond this we find difficulties in pinning down al-
                                                 
121 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 160; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh Baghdād 13:112-114.  
122 Muḥammad Zaman, Religion and Politics Under the Early ʿAbbāsids (Leiden: Brill, 1997); EI2, s.v.  
“Imāma” (Wilfred Madelung).  
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Zubayrī’s ideological leanings; as Pellat has demonstrated we can see in al-Zubayrī’s 
family evidence of both support and hostility towards prominent Shīʿīs. 123  Sectarian 
divisions were blurred in this period (which is unsurprising as the sects were still 
evolving) and we can only tentatively suggest direct connections between a person’s 
religious convictions and their authorial interests. Ibn al-Kalbī after all was the son of a 
very prominent Shīʿī scholar, but produced a work that was far more comprehensive than 
the Nasab Quraysh. In this case his antiquarianism overrode any concerns he may have 
had over diluting the doctrine of ʿAlid exceptionalism.  
  
Shīʿism is not conveniently packaged in the manner of the literary shuʿūbiyya124 and it is 
hence impossible to track the relative popularity of genealogically-structured histories 
alongside this element of the authors’ social/religious context. There is more to be said 
about the effect of Shīʿism on the Nasab Quraysh as a book, but this cannot be generalised 
across the genre and is better reserved to the discussion of al-Zubayrī as an individual 
author.   
 
Underlying reasons for the emergence of nasab literature 4: 
statesponsored genealogical writing  
  
Some scholars link the emergence of nasab literature to a register of tribal names 
maintained by the caliphs known as the dīwān; they argue that the genealogists either 
borrowed from it directly, or were inspired to compose their own works because of its 
existence.125 But these links are poorly attested in the sources themselves and it is argued 
                                                 
123 EI2, s.v. “Muṣʿab” (Charles Pellat).   
124 Mottahedeh argues that “The shuʿûbîyah was primarily a literary controversy, and if it was used on 
rare occasions by political movements with a noticeable “ethnic” (or regional) character like the Ṣaffarids, 
most shuʿûbîs were not political and were, as often as not, faithful servants of the caliphate.” From “The 
Shuʿûbîyah Controversy,” 162.  
125 “In the first period of Islam knowledge of nasab was made necessary by the administrative needs of 
the dīwān” - Kister and Plessner, “Notes on Caskel’s Ǧamharat An-nasab,” 50; Retsö also claims the 
basis for Ibn al-Kalbī’s Jamharat al-nasab was ʿUmar I’s dīwān (Arabs in Antiquity, 29, referencing 
Rüdiger Puin’s 1970 dissertation Der Dīwān von ʿUmar). For Morimoto, the dīwān is as important as the 
shuʿūbiyya in understanding why the nasab genre emerged (“Formation and development,” 543).  
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here that newfound literacy within a tribal milieu was a more important factor in the 
emergence of the nasab tradition than the dīwān.  
  
The dīwān itself refers to some form of register of Arab tribes that was created 
(supposedly by ʿUmar I) for the purpose of managing payments to veterans and soldiers 
of the early Islamic conquests. A fragment of the dīwān survives: dated to 685 and written 
in Greek, it comprises a list of Arab names that have been crossed off alongside 
corresponding amounts of food and money.126 The central register was reportedly subject 
to repeated revision throughout the Umayyad period; the Umayyad caliph Walīd II 
commissioned a genealogical work of the Arab tribes as late as 744.127  In terms of 
organisation, the central dīwān was probably structured genealogically, even though the 
payments themselves were calculated according to sābiqa.128  
  
As for the dīwān’s relationship to historiography, it is possible to connect individual 
historians to the register; a student of the muḥaddith Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (who himself 
worked as an Umayyad tax collector and began his scholarly career by collecting his own 
clan’s genealogy) was said to have written works that resembled the dīwān.129 Szombathy 
has also collected references in historical works where genealogists are reported to have 
used the dīwān as a resource.130  
  
But we should exercise caution in making the connection between nasab literature and 
the dīwān too uncritically. The dīwān itself (whatever form it took) survives only in scant 
fragments and the genealogists themselves rarely refer to it as a source in their own works. 
                                                 
126 Hugh Kennedy, “The Financing of the Military in the Early Islamic State,” in The Byzantine and Early 
Islamic Near East, vol.3, eds. Cameron and Averil (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995), 376.   
127 “The dīwān, the poems, the histories, the genealogies and the dialects of the Arabs were gathered by  
Al-Walīd b. Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik and this collection (dīwān) was handed over to [the historians] 
Ḥammād and Jannād.” From Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, p. 95 (Dodge translation pp.197-198).   
128 In this context the term refers to the priority given to early converts and their families when 
distributing stipends. Martin Hinds, “Review of: Der Dīwān von ʿUmar Ibn al-Ḫaṭṭāb: Ein Beitrag Zur 
Frühislamischen Verwaltungsgeschichte. Inaugural-Dissertation  by Gerd-Rüdiger Puin,” Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 34, no. 1 (1971): 10.  
129 EI2, s.v. “al-Zuhrī” (Michael Lecker).  
130 Szombathy, The Roots of Arabic Genealogy, 117 and 127-128.  
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Indeed, even where there are references, we should be cautious of written evidence for 
the commitment of historians of this period to the use of primary sources. As Szombathy 
argues with regards to Ibn al-Kalbī, claims of carrying out primary research (in this case 
archaeology and study of epigraphy) may be a trope.131   
  
At the same time, it is indisputable that nasab works like those written by al-Zubayrī and  
Ibn al-Kalbī were based on an earlier generation of written sources - otherwise they would 
not have been able to exhibit the internal and external consistency demonstrated in the 
previous chapter.132 A society’s genealogical memory simply could not incorporate so 
many names over such a long period of time and in such a consistent fashion without 
recourse to writing. The question is: what form did these earlier writings take if not that 
of a state-sponsored register?  
  
One possibility is that the nasab works drew on registers maintained and drawn up not by 
the state but by castes. Al-Zubayrī’s book in particular provides some evidence for this in 
the form of the large number of people for whom no further record is provided 
(abbreviated as NFRs). People of this type do not appear in living genealogical traditions 
as they get forgotten; it is unlikely therefore that al-Zubayrī was drawing solely from non-
literate tribal sources. Furthermore, for many of these NFRs the Nasab Quraysh often 
explicitly states that a person had no descendants (inqaraḍa) which is an important 
expression when used in the ledgers of those who police caste systems as it cuts off people 
who claim descent from them. Additionally, these NFRs have been observed in the 
                                                 
131 Szombathy, The Roots of Arabic Genealogy, 117 and 127-128. Even if it were not a trope a reference 
to a documentary source would not necessarily result in a definitive result in contested issues; see 
discussion in Wadād al-Qāḍī, “A Documentary Report on Umayyad Stipends Registers (“dīwān al-ʿaṭāʾ”) 
in Abū Zurʿa's “tārīkh”,” Quaderni di Studi Arabi 4 (2009): 18. 
132 This is not to say that written genealogical sources in living societies are immune to abuse. See the 
Bāroṭs of Gujarat, genealogists for their caste who apply a pragmatic approach to who is or is not 
included. See A.M. Shah and R.G. Shroff, “The Vahīvancā Bāroṭs of Gujarat: A Case of Genealogists and 
Mythographers,” The Journal of American Folklore 71 (1958): 50. Similar pragmatism is also found 
within the Muslim caste of sharīfs, as demonstrated by Morimoto (“Formation and Development,” 566-




genealogical ledgers of the sayyids and sharīfs of the Muslim world.133 It should also be 
noted that the emergence of the naqīb (which denotes the office responsible for 
maintaining the caste’s register in any particular locality) is dated to the late ninth century 
- the period when the genealogically-structured history was in decline.134  
  
Another possibility is that the tribes of the period were writing down their genealogies 
not because they were trying to police a caste, but because they believed this heritage was 
important and in danger of being lost. This is an impulse that has been noted by 
anthropologists studying other newly literate tribal cultures. In one example, Bohannon 
observed a non-literate Tiv chieftain commission a written genealogy to aid his literate 
but politically inastute son; the purpose of this was to give the son authority to adjudicate 
in tribal disputes.135 Elsewhere in Africa, while carrying out his anthropological survey 
of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, Emrys-Peters noted that whenever he approached a new 
group the first thing he was asked to do was to write down their genealogies.136 It should 
also be noted that in writing down their genealogies the postconquest Arabs had some 
local precedent; al-Ṭabarī refers to Ibn al-Kalbī consulting the written records of the 
monasteries surrounding al-Ḥīra whose monks preserved the genealogies of the Banū 
Lakhm (an Arabian tribe who had controlled the area before the arrival of Islam).137   
  
It is highly likely therefore that the Arab tribes who converted to Islam and conquered the 
Near East used their new-found access to literacy to record their genealogies. Some of 
these writings would have been lost or forgotten, but others would have been reformulated 
and passed on; a few may have formed the basis of the caste ledgers that eventually 
                                                 
133 Morimoto, “Formation and Development,” 563.  
134 Also see Kazuo Morimoto’s “The Formation and Development” as well as his “A Preliminary Study 
on the Diffusion of the Niqāba al-Ṭālibīyīn: Towards an Understanding of the Early Dispersal of 
Sayyids,” in The Influence of Human Mobility, ed. Hidemitsu Kuroki (London: Kegan Paul, 2003): 3-42.  
135 Bohannan, “A Genealogical Charter,” 314.  
136 Peters, “Proliferation of Segments,” 40–41.  
137 Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh rusul wa-al-mulūk, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 
1879-1901), 1:770 (all future references to the Leiden edition will be by series and not volume). 
Translations of passages are from The History of al-Ṭabarī, ed. Ihsan Abbas (Albany: SUNY Press, 
19892007) unless otherwise stated (in this case they are from volume 4, page 150).  
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emerged amongst the sayyids and sharīfs in the late-ninth century. The result would have 
been a large number of written sources held by non-caliphal tribespeople and scholars 
which were eventually transmitted to compilers of genealogy such as Ibn al- Kalbī. This 
scenario would explain both the consistency of the extant nasab works as well as the 
absence of references to the use of the Umayyad dīwān as a source.  
  
In summary, connecting the dīwān of the early Islamic period to the extant genealogical 
works written in the ʿAbbāsid era is certainly a tempting idea, but with our sources as 
they currently exist it is ultimately unprovable, and actually quite unnecessary. Tribes do 
not need to rely on centralised efforts to preserve their genealogy; they just need access 
to writing. Not only this, the accuracy of the genealogical data is better established 
through other means such as correlation with the historical narrative and internal 
consistency. Establishing both these points is a recurrent theme in this thesis.  
  
Concluding remarks on the social context of the nasab  
  
Rosenthal was wrong when he argued: “Genealogical literature starts when genealogical 
lines become dubious and it is felt that a literary fixation would help to clear up doubts to 
forestall frauds.” 138  The study of the anthropology and the history of genealogical 
knowledge above shows that there is a perpetual element of dubiousness with regard to 
lineage – it is in fact an important feature of genealogical organisation itself as it provides 
it with the flexibility required to survive. The act of writing down these lineages is not 
the result of a literate tribe reaching breaking-point with regards to false claimants, but 
the consequence of a non-literate tribe gaining access to literacy before losing its tribal 
dynamic.  
  
The strength of the tribal ties meant genealogies were able to survive in the collective 
memory of the umma long enough to be recorded; not only this, the tribal method of 
                                                 
138 Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography, 19.  
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organising individuals in terms of relationships radiating outward from a central figure 
gave the nasab literature a distinctive structural form that is absent from its later 
imitations. Equally important were the specific tensions between those at the court who 
argued for and against Arab social primacy. Those who supported it could see the value 
of a work whose very structure specifically excluded their opponents.   
  
The effects of Shīʿism will be discussed in the next chapter in relation to the specific 
interests of al-Zubayrī as this is the only way in which the subject can be adequately 
addressed. The Shīʿī/Sunni divide was far too ill-defined at this stage for us to be able to 
definitively say that a sectarian stance was more or less likely to encourage an interest in 
genealogy. Also discussed above was the possible role of the dīwān in the formation of 
the genealogically-structured history; we concluded that, with the evidence as it currently 
stands, no direct connection could be made.   
  
We turn now from the general field of genealogically-structured histories to the work that 
is of central importance to this thesis; the Nasab Quraysh. While keeping in mind the 
dominant cultural factors at work in its creation, we will look at the life of al-Zubayrī and 
consider the contents of his one surviving book.  
  








We have very little historiographical information on the life of al-Zubayrī. His most 
extensive appearances are in Ibn al-Nadīm’s al-Fihrist and al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī’s 
Taʾrīkh Baghdād,139  and these sources cannot even agree on his death date or age at 
death; the former has him die as a 96 year old in 233 AH, while according to the latter he 
passes away in 236 AH at the age of 80.140 The Taʾrīkh Baghdād provides information 
on people from whom he transmitted (notably Mālik b. Anas) and to whom he passed on 
his knowledge (which include Ibn Abī Khaythama and his nephew Zubayr b. Bakkār). 
Little biographical detail is provided in the Nasab Quraysh itself; unlike Ibn Ḥazm’s 
comparable work141 he provides no introductory remarks where he explicitly speaks of 
any motivations or justifications for its composition. Other sources contain even less 
information.142  
    
A different approach is therefore needed. The investigation that comprises this chapter is 
based on the premise that genealogical works are characterised by two rules; that the 
author would ordinarily include every person known to him within the remit of his work, 
and that he would structure it so that the most important personages are treated before the 
                                                 
139 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 160; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh Baghdād 13:112-114. For surveys see  
Fuat Sezgin Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums (Leiden: Brill, 1967), 2:271-272; Carl Brockelmann  
Geshichte des arabischen Litteratur (Leiden: Brill, 1943), 1:212; and EI2, s.v. “Muṣʿab” (Charles Pellat). 
Levi-Provencal’s introduction to the critical edition of the Nasab Quraysh reproduces the most important 
references and also discusses the two manuscripts upon which his edition is based (al-Zubayrī, Nasab 
Quraysh, pp. 5-24).  
140 Both Levi-Provencal (Nasab Quraysh, 14, note 3) and Pellat (EI2, s.v. “Muṣʿab”) prefer the second 
estimate, meaning al-Zubayrī was probably born in 773 and died in 851.  
141 The Jamharat ansāb al-ʿArab of Ibn Hazm begins with a quotation from the Qurʾān 49:13 (“We ... 
made you into races and tribes”) and a number of related hadīths. This provides explicit Prophetic 
justification for his endeavour which is implicitly aimed at the shuʿūbīs.  
142 Other Arabic biographical references to al-Zubayrī include Samʿanī’s Kitab al-Ansāb (Hyderabad:  
Dā’irat al-Maʿārif, 1962), 265-266 and Shahāb al-Dīn al-Asqalānī’s Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb (Beirut: Dār 
alKutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994), 10:149-150.   
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less important. It will be shown that al-Zubayrī normally follows these rules and where 
he occasionally violates them, he does so in a manner concomitant with his background 
and social context.  
  
The investigation will conclude that the characteristics of al-Zubayrī as indicated in his 
meagre historiographical presence are just as proto-Sunni, anti-shuʿūbī, and proʿAbbāsid 
as the characteristics of the book he wrote. But all is not quite as it seems; despite the 
correlation, it will also be shown that the quantitative analysis awkwardly suggests a 
number of reasons as to why we should think that al-Zubayrī did not actually write much 
of the Nasab Quraysh at all.  
  
The result of our data analysis is a detailed picture of the Nasab Quraysh that has eluded 
those who have only read the book in the standard cover-to-cover fashion. It will also 
show that the biases of the author (whoever he was) are small-scale and normally 
detectable, which means that the nasab data is still a suitable subject of prosopographical 
investigation. Additionally, by applying the methodologies discussed above, we further 
demonstrate that the nasab tradition is particularly well-suited to statistical analysis.  
  
Absences: Who is not in the Nasab Quraysh?  
  
One of the most important editorial decisions when composing a genealogicallystructured 
history is whom to include. Normally, the genealogist does not record every name he 
knows about but chooses the most noble and notorious. Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn al-Kalbī follow 
this format quite rigidly – there are rarely instances where they include a name without a 
reason for its inclusion (normally they are accompanied by an anecdote or at least a job 
title). Al-Zubayrī is an exception though. We have already seen that he includes far more 
maternal information than the other two authors of similar works and this is not because 
the mothers in question are of any great significance; normally they are not. Not only this, 
al-Zubayrī also includes a lot of names with no additional information whatsoever – 
again, there are very few of these in other nasab works.  This makes it all the more 
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significant when al-Zubayrī chooses to omit names that are found in other historical 
sources. Uncovering all of these missing names is beyond the remit of this thesis; instead 
we will target our analysis at the section we would expect al-Zubayrī to know best – that 
of his own family.  
  
Our first task is to make a list of all the descendants of Zubayr b. ʿ Awwām that al-Zubayrī 
names in the Banū Asad section of the Nasab Quraysh.143 The result is a list of 77 names 
(including the founder) and the results are presented in the table below:144  
  
Table 3.1: Number of appearances of Zubayrids as recorded in the Nasab 
Quraysh in outside historical works  
  




77 15 39 28 
  
Despite the comprehensiveness, al-Zubayrī still misses out some of his relatives. The 
number of names that appear in outside works that do not appear in the Nasab Quraysh 
is seen in this table:  
  
                                                 
143 Zubayrids do appear outside this section, but given their infrequency and the time it would take to 
collect them this investigation has been limited to a more achievable scan of the book.   
144 These works were analysed in the same way as the descendants of Khalaf b. Wahb investigation in the 
previous chapter. A section of each book was selected for analysis; in the Jamharat al-nasab this was 
pages 69-75 and in the Ansāb al-ashrāf it was volume 8, pages 41-78. As before, excluded from this are 
names that appear only as links in patrilines. Al-Ṭabarī’s Taʾrīkh presented a particular challenge as it is 
not organised genealogically, making the extraction of names impossible without reading the entire work. 
This problem was overcome by searching for the word “Zubayr” in the Google Books scan of the Index 
volume of the English translation. As the name is not widely found in non-Zubayrid families, this search 
produced a list of page references which were then cross-checked to see if they do indeed refer to 
descendants of Zubayr b. ʿAwwām.  
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Table 3.2: Number of appearances of Zubayrids in outside works that do not 
appear in the Nasab Quraysh  
 
  






not named in 
NQ  
1 14 14 23 
  
For some of these names we have no idea why al-Zubayrī omitted them. For example al- 
Balādhurī tells us that one of al-Zubayrī’s uncles was a faqīh and died in Medina at the 
age of 72;145 this is hardly ignominious yet in the Nasab Quraysh this person does not get 
a mention. Most of the others however fall into three categories, each of which tells us 
something about al-Zubayrī’s interests and biases. These categories are the 
embarrassments, the rāwīs and the women. These will be treated in order below.  
  
Absences 1: The embarrassments  
  
Some of the relatives al-Zubayrī chose to ‘forget’ in his genealogy were guilty of 
relatively minor misdemeanours. One example of this is Ḥamza b. Jaʿfar b. Zubayr, who 
we learn from al-Balādhurī was punished for drinking.146 Others however were party to 
much more serious offences.  
  
We see this when we consider the only Zubayrid named in Ibn al-Kalbī’s Jamharat al-
nasab who does not appear in the Nasab Quraysh - Ibn Khuḍayr, also known as Ibrahīm 
b. Muṣʿab b. Muṣʿab b. Zubayr. Al-Zubayrī does tell us a bit about Ibn Khuḍayr’s father, 
and makes sure the son is completely erased from the record by specifically saying that 
                                                 
145 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf, 8:76.  
146 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf, 8:73.  
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Muṣʿab b. Muṣʿab (also known as Khuḍayr) produced no children except women.147 Ibn 
al-Kalbī’s entry for him gives the reason why this individual might have been excluded 
from the Zubayrid’s work; he was a member of the shurṭa of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh 
al-Nafs al-Zakiyya.  
  
The Nafs al-Zakiyya uprising of 762-3 is well-known as a Shīʿī attempt to overthrow the 
newly installed ʿAbbāsid caliphate.148 It was quickly crushed by the caliph al-Manṣūr but 
not before a number of Medinan families had joined the Shīʿī cause. Quite a few 
Zubayrids joined the rebellion; in addition to Ibn Khuḍayr, al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī tell 
us of five others who also supported the uprising in various capacities. These absentees 
are as follows:  
  
1) Ibn Khuḍayr, Ibrāhīm b. Muṣʿab b. Muṣʿab b. Zubayr: Ibn Khuḍayr was an 
active supporter of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh from the outset and joined his 
shurṭa. He was eventually killed alongside his leader.  
2) ʿUthmān b. Muḥammad b. Khālid b. Zubayr: ʿUthmān was a supporter of the 
rebellion, and appointed governor of Medina by Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh. He 
was later executed by the caliph al-Manṣūr after the uprising was put down.  
3) Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān b. Muḥammad b. Khālid b. Zubayr: As a youth, 
Muḥammad carried Muḥammad Nafs al-Zakiyya’s banner on behalf of his father 
(number 2, above). Al-Manṣūr wanted him executed following the suppression of 
the revolt, but he was judged a minor and flogged instead.  
4) ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. Yaḥyā b. ʿ Abbād b. ʿ Abd Allāh b. Zubayr: This individual 
was reported to have joined the revolt in an unknown capacity.  
5) Ibrāhīm b. Jaʿfar b. Muṣʿab b. Zubayr: Ibāhīm served as a scout for 
Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh as the caliphal forces approached. He died falling off 
a horse.  
                                                 
147 Al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 50.   
148 The following details are taken from al-Ṭabarī’s version of events which can be found on pages 3:189-
266 of the Leiden edition, and pages 142-231 of volume 28 in the translation.   
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6) Khālid b. ʿUthmān b. Khālid b. Zubayr (from al-Balādhurī only):149 Khālid 
joined the rebellion in an unspecified capacity and was subsequently crucified by 
al-Manṣūr.  
  
None of these men appear in the Nasab Quraysh. Not all the Zubayrids were unanimous 
in their support for the uprising however; al-Ṭabarī tells us of two Zubayrids who were 
against Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh. They are the following:  
  
1) Khubayb b. Thābit b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Zubayr: Khubayb was one of the four 
‘leading citizens’ to stay away from Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh at the outset of the 
rebellion.  
2) Nāfīʿ b. Thābit b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Zubayr: Nāfīʿ refused to meet Muḥammd b. 
ʿAbd Allāh at the outset of the uprising and when eventually brought forth he tells 
the rebel “I simply have no sympathy for what you intend to do.”  
  
Unsurprisingly, both men are spared excision by al-Zubayrī; he is clearly cleaning up his 
family’s past in this section by editing out family members who supported the Nafs al-
Zakiyya uprising while including those who were known to have opposed it. There are a 
couple of caveats; the men who voiced their opposition to the uprising are the author’s 
uncles (which may explain their presence) and if al-Zubayrī was proud of their refusal to 
join the uprising we would have thought he would mention these incidents (which he does 
not). There is also evidence of some squeamishness in general with regard to the uprising; 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Muṭṭalib b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Makhzūmī for instance is named in al-Ṭabarī 
as a supporter of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh and that he even worked as a judge under 
him.150 But although he gains an extensive entry in al-Zubayrī’s work with a couple of 
stories, no mention is made of his appointment under the pretender’s brief rule; we are 
told that he only operated as a judge for the ʿAbbāsid caliphs al-Manṣūr and al-Mahdī.151  
                                                 
149 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf, 8:64.  
150 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, Leiden edition 3:198-199 (translation 28:154).  
151 Nasab Quraysh, 341-342.  
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Despite these qualifications, the involvement of the Zubayrid family in the uprising 
(which happened only a decade before al-Zubayrī himself was born) must have been a 
lingering source of embarrassment to members of the clan. Not only were they connected 
to a failed rebellion but al-Zubayrī’s father and brother both had successful political 
careers under the ʿ Abbāsids; his father was a companion to three caliphs and was awarded 
governorships of Yamāma, Medina and Yemen. His son, Bakkār (al-Zubayrī’s brother) 
also served as Hārūn’s governor of Medina, a post he held for 13 years (though according 
to al-Balādhurī he was not popular with the local population).152 Bakkār’s son Zubayr 
(author of the Jamharat nasab Quraysh wa akhbārihā) would be appointed a tutor to the 
son of Mutawakkil and was also assigned by this caliph to be the qāḍī of Mecca around 
855 CE.153  
  
These close ties to the ʿAbbāsid dynasty may also explain why later historians were keen 
to preserve the misdemeanours of al-Zubayrī’s relations; the court environment is not 
always a friendly one, and a person could gain an advantage by recalling the details of a 
rival’s embarrassing relatives. These memories ultimately outlived al-Zubayrī. Writing in 
the late ninth/early tenth century, al-Ṭabarī reports that when al-Manṣūr was told that the 
two families most involved in the Nafs al-Zakiyya uprising were the descendants of 
ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb and Zubayr b. ʿAwwām, his response is: “Were I to find a thousand 
from al-Zubayr’s family, all of them good except for one evildoer, I would kill the whole 
lot. But if I were to find a thousand of ʿUmar’s family, all of them evil except for one 
good man, I would forgive the whole lot.”154  
  
Further evidence that the Zubayrids had political enemies is seen in two rather peculiar 
incidences involving the deaths of al-Zubayrī’s father and brother as recorded in al-
                                                 
152 Al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 242; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf, 8:76.  
153 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 160-161 (Dodge translation, 242). Also see EI2, s.v. “al-Zubayr b. Bakkār” 
(S. Leder).  
154 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, Leiden edition 3:260 (translation 28:226).  
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Ṭabarī.155 In the first, ʿAbd Allāh b. Muṣʿab accuses the imprisoned Yaḥyā b. ʿAbd Allāh 
(brother of the rebel Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah) of fomenting a plot against the 
caliph Hārūn, which the ʿAlid denies. Yaḥyā and ʿ Abd Allāh both swear oaths that should 
they be lying about this, God should strike them down. ʿAbd Allāh dies shortly after 
swearing the oath.156   
  
In the second incident, something remarkably similar happens to his son Bakkār.157 Once 
again, the trigger is a spat between the Zubayrid and the imprisoned Yaḥyā b. ʿ Abd Allāh. 
Bakkār accuses Yaḥyā of introducing evil into Medina; the ʿAlid retorts by saying that 
after his brother’s uprising was crushed, he was approached by Bakkār who cursed the 
one who had killed Muḥammad and then recited a 20 verse elegy for the dead pretender. 
Bakkār then promised his allegiance to Yaḥyā. In response to hearing this the caliph 
forces both men to swear an oath to the truth; again the Zubayrid dies shortly afterwards. 
However, al-Ṭabarī also gives us a Zubayrid version of events where Bakkār is killed by 
his wife out of jealousy for acquiring a concubine.158  
  
Neither event appears in the Nasab Quraysh and the second account is even more 
problematic when we try to calculate Bakkār’s age at the alleged swearing of allegiance 
to Yaḥyā.159 But the point here is not to decide whether or not these things actually 
happened; instead we should note the incredibly long period of time damage to a family’s 
reputation could last (al-Ṭabarī was writing around a century after these events). Al-
Zubayrī was of a generation that understood the power of historical writing to preserve 
                                                 
155 An element of this incident also appears in Abū al-Faraj al-Iṣbahānī, Maqātil al-Ṭālibiyyīn (Tehran: 
Muasasah-i Matbuati-i Ismailiyan, 1970), 285, though this only tells us that ʿAbd Allāh and his father 
Muṣʿab both revolted with Muḥammad Nafs al-Zakiyya.  
156 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, Leiden edition 3:619-624 (translation 30:127-131).   
157 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, Leiden edition 3:616-619 (translation 30:120-125).  
158 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, Leiden edition 3:618-619 (translation 30:124-5).  
159 If Bakkār’s brother Muṣʿab was born in 773 (as discussed above), and if we guess the minimum age 
Bakkār must have been to make a meaningful oath was 15 years old, then there must have been a gap of 
around 25 years between the two brothers’ ages. This is by no means impossible, but casts further doubt 
on an already unlikely story.   
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this genealogical baggage; hence the trimming of his family tree of its more embarrassing 
branches.160 It may even explain why he chose to write the work in the first place.161  
  
Absences 2: Rāwīs and recent generations  
  
The second significant group of absentees are the Zubayrids who appear only as rāwīs in 
al-Ṭabarī’s Taʾrīkh. They are the following:  
  
  Table 3.3: Zubayrid rāwīs in al-Ṭabarī’s Taʾrīkh162  
  
Name  Appearance in al-Ṭabarī   
Muṣʿab b. ʿUthmān (b. Muṣʿab) b. ʿUrwa b. Zubayr  2:818 (tr: 21:194) 
ʿUthmān b. Mundhir b. Muṣʿab b. ʿUrwa b. Zubayr  3:245 (tr: 28:208) 
Ibrāhīm b. Muṣʿab b. ʿUmāra b. Ḥamza b. Muṣʿab b. Zubayr  3:237 (tr: 28:201) 
  
Going by the number of generations that connected them, the men in question would have 
been contemporaries or near contemporaries of al-Zubayrī, meaning that he must have 
known them. It is possible that he did not include them because they were unremarkable 
in every respect except ḥadīth transmission, but the Nasab Quraysh contains a lot of 
people who do not seem to have achieved anything of note.   
  
                                                 
160 Genealogists were not the only ones to reveal their colours through omission; Rosenthal argues that 
historians of other genres can be guilty of the same thing (A History of Muslim Historiography, 57).  
161 Despite all these courtly shenanigans, Tarif Khalidi claims that “Unlike the Alids, who were often 
to rise in rebellion against both Umayyads and Abbasids, the Zubayrid clan was quietist, channelling 
its talents into religious scholarship and literature” (Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 52). Neither the involvement of the Zubayrids in the  
Nafs al-Zakiyya revolt nor the gubernatorial careers of al-Zubayrī’s brother and father receive mentions. 
In the absence of any other explanation, this treatment is typical of the short shrift genealogists in general 
and al-Zubayrī in particular receive in the secondary scholarship. 
162 Al-Samʿanī’s al-Ansāb records two other Zubayrid contemporaries of al-Zubayrī who are similarly 
absent from the Nasab Quraysh; they too are rāwīs (al-Samʿanī, Kitāb al-Ansāb, 6:266).  
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Another possible explanation is that the very fact that they were contemporaries excluded 
them from the Nasab Quraysh. The book as a whole seems largely indifferent to the more 
recent generations, and we can see this when we track the data over time. The following 
graph shows how the frequency of fathers and children as they appear in the Nasab 
Quraysh changes by generation:163  
  




The graph indicates a distinct bulge in the data. The number of entries increases rapidly 
three generations before Muḥammad (who was of the fifth generation), and declines 
rapidly three generations after it (this coincides with the generation that saw the fall of 
the Umayyads during their adulthood). The first observation is that this is clearly not the 
product of a non-literate tribal informant of the sort familiar to anthropologists. There is 
far too much data for a start; where a non-literate genealogist of a living tribal culture 
might be expected to accurately remember around 150 names, the Nasab Quraysh can 
                                                 
163 ‘Fathers’ here refer to men for whom we know at least the maternal status of their children; ‘children’ 
are people for whom at least maternal status is known. Generation 0 is that of Quṣayy for reasons 
explained in the previous chapter. Generations prior to Generation -6 are ignored as these generations 
contain only one entry in the ‘father’ category.   
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produce a database naming 2,938 people. 164  Furthermore, the data do not have the 
distribution we would expect them to have if they were from a non-literate tribal 
environment. Rather than the greatest number of records clustering around the generation 
of the informant (Generation 10 in al-Zubayrī’s case), the peak of the distribution here is 
around Muḥammad’s generation.  
  
This is to be expected; al-Zubayrī was indeed the product of a highly literate culture and 
it is unsurprising that the Nasab Quraysh should reflect this. The generations around 
Muḥammad’s also produce the greatest number of significant early Muslim figures, in 
particular the Companions and their wives. But even so, al-Zubayrī seems remarkably 
uninterested in the generations surrounding his own; the tenth to thirteenth generations 
(i.e. his contemporaries at time of writing) contain records only 20 men who had 
childbearing marriages out of a total of 813 men of this type in the whole book.  This 
ambivalence over things contemporary extends to his own family; we know nothing of 
his mother or grandmother, and he does not include himself. Even the ʿAbbāsid caliphs 
are treated only cursorily; only the first two gain proper genealogical entries (and here 
only as children, not as fathers); the others only appear as incidental characters in 
nonʿAbbāsid entries. This means eight ʿAbbāsid caliphs who reigned during al-Zubayrī’s 
lifetime do not appear as full entries. All-in-all, al-Zubayrī seems remarkably reticent 
about mentioning anyone who might have actually read his book or heard it being 
performed.  
  
The theory suggested here is that the Nasab Quraysh is only part of a more complete 
work; the missing part being the oral supplement to the written text. Al-Zubayrī did not 
record the generations closest to him in writing because he knew these very well, and his 
audience would probably have known them too. The generations most liable to be 
forgotten (or disputed) would be those further in the past. The decline in data also follows 
closely the three generational limit of genealogical memory observed by anthropologists; 
                                                 
164 These are people for whom we know the name of the father and the status of the father; the actual number 
of people named is higher. 
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as a member of Generation 10, his personal genealogical memory would have extended 
to Generation 7, which is where this decline starts. The caliphs and contemporaries of al-
Zubayrī would not be offended at their exclusion from the written portion of the work 
because they were not meant to see the physical copy; the Nasab Qurasyh was essentially 
a notebook.165   
  
Extending this theory we can argue that had literary and social fashions not changed then 
the Nasab Quraysh would have been added to as each generation and tribe would ‘adopt’ 
it as al-Zubayrī had done. They would have supplemented the work with the entries that 
their audience were forgetting, take out the ones that had ceased to be relevant (or were 
embarrassing), and use the resulting work as a support to their oral performances of 
genealogy. But as shown in the previous chapter, the great era of genealogical writing of 
this style was coming to an end, and al-Zubayrī’s notebook became frozen in time.166 The 
rāwīs present in al-Ṭabarī’s records but absent in the Nasab Quraysh are not the victims 
of their clansman’s purge – they are guilty of nothing except being alive at the time the 
book was written.  
  
Absences 3: Women  
  
The embarrassments and recent rāwīs account for nine of the 23 absent records. This 
leaves one last major group of absentees – eight women. These are all daughters of Zubayr 
b. ʿ Awwām, and they are named in al-Balādhurī alongside their brothers, but in the Nasab 
Quraysh they are reduced to the word ‘niswatan’ (tr: women).167  
                                                 
165 Again, this confirms Schoeler’s theories on the nature of the preservation and performance of historical 
memory in the first two centuries of Islam (Genesis of Literature).  
166 This is particularly interesting because the final link in the chain of transmission recorded in the extent 
version is a seventh generation descendant of the Umayyad caliph Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik; despite this 
he does not seem to have used his position as a transmitter to fill in the details of his more recent family 
ancestry so does not go beyond Hishām’s grandchildren (i.e. five generations before his own). Although it 
is has been shown that al-Zubayrī has less interest in his contemporaries than those of earlier generations, 
he still retains some interest in them (he includes his brother and father after all). His attitude to 
genealogical writing is hence very different to that of the Umayyad transmitter living a century and a half 
later.    
167 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf, 8:58; al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 236.  
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The Nasab Quraysh is in general biased against recording daughters as opposed to sons; 
the database has 2328 sons to 610 daughters, which is roughly four times as many. But 
the proportions become even more skewed when we look at the section concerning the 
Banū Asad, of which the Zubayrids were a constituent part.   
  
Beginning with Asad’s father (Generation 1) as our starting point, there are 162 children 
named in this section. 14 of these are girls, 8.64% of the total. This is far below the 
Qurashī average as recorded in the Nasab Quraysh; in the book as a whole 20.76% of the 
children with identified parents are female. For some reason the Zubayrid section – the 
section we would expect the author to known best – has significantly less information on 
women than the others.  
  
This cohort also has slightly fewer children per father than the Qurashī average; 3.31 per 
man as opposed to 3.62. If we multiplied the number of recorded fathers for whom we 
have named children in the section (49) by the Qurashī average of 3.62, we would expect 
to find 177 children – 15 more than the actual amount recorded. If we assume that these 
forgotten children are all female, we would get a total of 29 girls in a cohort of 177 
children, which gives us a proportion of 16.35% - a significant improvement on our earlier 
figure. It is clear that in this section there are people missing, and it is likely that these 
people are women.  
  
This absence is most striking amongst the descendants of Zubayr b. ʿAwwām himself. 
Not a single one of the 49 named children for whom maternal status is known is female 
despite this section including some very significant figures, such the caliph ʿAbd Allāh 
b. Zubayr and the traditionist ʿUrwa b. Zubayr. In their place, we are told that a number 
of men had daughters (niswatan), but these women remain unnamed.   
  
Yet the names of these daughters were not only known to al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭabarī (who 
were writing several decades after al-Zubayrī died) but also to al-Zubayrī himself – five 
Zubayrid daughters appear in the Banū Asad section of the Nasab Quraysh as wives, and 
99  
  
at least one more appears outwith this section. As they are left out of their fathers’ sub-
sections, we do not know the names or statuses of their mothers, hence their absence from 
the database.  
  
These women were not excluded for being of recent generations like the rāwīs – the 
daughters were of early generations and born to important figures. There is (with the one 
exception of the Zubayrid woman who had a child by Muḥammad Nafs al-Zakiyya) also 
no evidence that they were excluded for being embarrassments like the male supporters 
of the ʿAlid rebellion mentioned above.   
  
In the absence of any other explanations, it is most likely that al-Zubayrī omitted his 
female relatives simply because he did not think them important enough to be named in 
the context of a father’s children. If this is the case, then it raises a further question – if 
he did not think the Zubayrid women were important enough for inclusion in the Nasab 
Quraysh, why did he not omit the daughters of the non-Zubayrid families? The proportion 
of women in the Banū Asad section would not be so far below average if the editorial 
policy had been universally applied. And why is Fākhita bt. Fulaykh b. Muḥammad b. 
Mundhir b. Zubayr excluded from the Zubayrid section of the Nasab Quraysh but 
mentioned in the entry for Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya where we are told she bore 
him a son?168   
  
This leads us to suggest that there is more than one editorial policy evident in the Nasab 
Quraysh and – as will be shown through further evidence below - this is probably because 
the work had multiple authors. Al-Zubayrī’s policy was to include women only when they 
produced children and even here only in their husbands’ entries; they would not be listed 
alongside their brothers in their fathers’ entries. From this, it appears that al-Zubayrī did 
not write much of the Nasab Quraysh; he acquired the bulk of it off someone else and 
then revised his own family’s section before passing it on to his students.   
                                                 
168 Al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 54 (for Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya’s wives); 244 (for Mundhir b. 
Zubayr’s wives).  
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Nor is this the only instance where we find evidence of multiple editorial strategies. In 
the following section it will be argued that the constituent parts of the Nasab Quraysh 
exhibit internal structures, and that the rules governing these structures also break down 
in the Zubayrid section. We will begin by explaining these structures as they exist in the 
non-Zubayrid sections. This will not only lay the groundwork for understanding al-
Zubayrī’s authorship, but will also add to our argument that the Nasab Quraysh should 
be seen as a pro-ʿAbbāsid, proto-Sunni and somewhat anti-Shīʿī work.  
  
The arrangement of the Nasab Quraysh  
  
The purpose of this chapter is to gain a better understanding of the Nasab Quraysh by 
comparing it to other related works. So far this has been done by comparing its 
genealogical remit to that of other nasab works; where we find omissions, we have 
suggested reasons for this, and these reasons are often found in the social context of the 
author. The following section aims to continue this by comparing not the content of the 
Nasab Quraysh but its structure. It will again be shown that where a genealogist has 
editorial freedom, he often uses this to display his ideological background.  
  
The ‘classical’ structure of a genealogy is the following. If the remit of a genealogist 
includes Muḥammad he is put at the beginning of the work and everyone else radiates 
away from him. After dealing with Muḥammad, his wives and his children, the 
genealogist has to move to the next closest link – the generation of his father. In 
Muḥammad’s case, the father did not produce any children other than the Prophet which 
means that the genealogist can then move to the marriages and progeny of one of  
Muḥammad’s many uncles.  
  
At this point the genealogist has options in terms of ordering. This is important because 
there is evidence in wider Islamic literature that the ordering of lists of individuals reflects 
the affiliations of the person doing the ordering. This has been noted by Muḥammad 
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Zaman, whose translation provides the following passage from Sunnī legal scholar Yaḥyā 
b. Maʿīn’s Taʾrīkh:  
  
  [Abū’l Faḍl al-ʿAbbās b. Muḥammad b. Hātim b. al-Dūrī, the transmitter of Yaḥyā 
b. Maʿīn’s Taʾrīkh, said:] I said to Yaḥyā: What about one who says: Abū Bakr 
and ʿUmar and ʿUthmān [were legitimate caliphs]? [Yaḥyā] said: He is correct 
[muṣīb]; and one who says Abū Bakr and ʿUmar and ʿUthmān and ʿAlī is [also] 
correct. He who says Abū Bakr and ʿUmar and ʿAlī and ʿUthmān is a Shīʿī, but 
one who says Abū Bakr and ʿUmar and ʿUthmān, and stops at that, is correct. 
Yaḥyā said: I say. Abū Bakr and ʿ Umar and ʿ Uthmān and ʿ Alī. This is our doctrine 
(madhhab) and our position (qawlunā).169  
  
Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn was a contemporary of al-Zubayrī (they died within a year of each other) 
and was also connected to the ʿAbbāsid court; he was even summoned along with Ibn 
Sāʿd as part of al-Maʾmūn’s miḥna.170 The passage above shows that for some people in 
al-Zubayrī’s milieu, the ordering of names (and not just inclusion) was an important 
marker of doctrinal allegiance.  
 
Similarly, the Nasab Quraysh appears to prioritise certain lines over others. For instance, 
when it comes to Muḥammad’s uncles the work first goes to ʿAbbās (founder-figure of 
the ʿAbbāsid dynasty) before Abū Ṭālib (father of ʿAlī) despite the fact that ʿAbbās was 
by far the younger man and was not a figure of any great repute. This decision with 
ordering therefore fits the pro-ʿAbbāsid, proto-Sunni image we are developing of the 
author. The Shīʿī Ibn al-Kalbī on the other hand swaps the order around in his Jamharat 
al-nasab.171   
 
                                                 
169 Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn, Taʾrīkh, ed. Muḥammad Nūr Sayf (Mecca, 1979), 3:465. Translation from Zaman, 
Religion and Politics, 52.  
170 EI2, s.v. “Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn” (F. Leemhuis); al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, Leiden edition 3:1116; (translation 
32:204).   
171 Ibn al-Kalbī, Jamharat al-Nasab, 30-31. 
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This practice of placing the more important names as early as possible in the genealogical 
schema is exhibited in the other sections of the Nasab Quraysh. Looking at the Taym b. 
Murra section, we see that the first genealogical line is the one that includes Abū Bakr. It 
appears like this:  
  
Murra – Taym – Saʿd – Kaʿb – ʿAmr – ʿĀmir – Abū Quḥāfa – Abū Bakr al- 
Ṣiddīq – ʿAbd al-Raḥman - ʿAbd Allāh - Abū Bakr – ʿAbd al-Raḥman – Abū  
Bakr – Hāshim  
  
Identifying Abū Bakr as the locus of this line is not clear-cut; it could be that it is one of 
his  descendants whom the genealogist really thinks is the most important, and Abū Bakr 
is simply a link in the chain that leads to the more relevnt figure. But although this may 
be the case in instances such as the Zubayrids and ʿAlids (families that have a lot of 
famous names spanning generations), in general it is quite clear whom the genealogist is 
prioritising.   
  
Additional proof that Abū Bakr is the locus can be found when we can look at the number 
‘splits’ in his ancestry that the genealogist could have taken that would not have led 
directly to the caliph. So in the example above, the genealogist could have followed the 
lines of ʿUthmān b. ʿAmr, Judʿān b. Kaʿb, ʿAbd Manāf b. Kaʿb and ʿĀmir b. Kaʿb in 
order to relegate Abū Bakr. Instead, these lines are pursued only after Abū Bakr and his 
descendants have been addressed. This is evidence of the genealogist making a decision 
regarding the way in which he is intending to structure his data.  
  
 This decision making can also be seen in a number of other families:  
  
ʿAdī b. Kaʿb – this section selects the lineage of the caliph ʿUmar over six other 
lineages that would have excluded him (other lineages split at Zayd b. Khaṭṭāb  
(p.363), ʿUmar b. Nufayl (p.364), Udhā b. Riyāḥ (p.366), Tamīm b. ʿAbd Allāh  
(p. 367), Ṣadād b. ʿAbd Allāh (p. 368), ʿAwīj b. ʿAdī (p.369)).  
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ʿAbd al-Dār b. Quṣayy – this section selects the lineage of the companion and 
early convert Ṭalḥa over three other lineages that would have excluded him (other 
lineages split at Shuraqḥ b. ʿUthmān (p.253), ʿAbd Manāf b. ʿAbd al-Dār (p.254), 
Sabbāq b. ʿAbd al-Dār (p.256)).  
Zuhra b. Kilāb – this section goes directly to a female – Muḥammad’s mother, 
Āmina bt. Wahb (p. 261).172  This is selected over two other lineages (other 
lineages split at Uhayb b. ʿAbd Manāf (p.263), Ḥārith b. Zuhra (p.265)).  
Makhzūm – this very large section also goes first to a female, Ḥantama bt.  
Hāshim, who was the mother of the caliph ʿUmar. Her line is selected over her 
ten uncles and numerous great-uncles (p. 301).  
  
If this is accurate, then the placing of Abū Ṭalib after ʿAbbās is a sign of a 
proʿAbbāsid/anti-Shīʿī slant to the Nasab Quraysh. We may also see similar forces at 
work in the later nasab work of the Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī (d. 1223), the 
Tabyīn fī ansāb al-Qurashīyīn.173  After dealing with Muḥammad’s family, the book 
names the people who wrote for Muḥammad (this includes some non-Qurashīs). Only 
then are the uncles’ families addressed, beginning with Ḥārith b. ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib. 
Particular attention is devoted to Ḥārith’s son Nawfal, who was the progenitor of a long 
line of historians.174 Abū Sufyān b. Abī Ṭālib is then addressed, and only then does Abū 
Ṭālib appear – even here, his most famous son ʿAlī is the last to appear amongst his 
brothers. Then the other uncles appear, and finally ʿ Abbās. ʿ Abbās and Abū Ṭālib are also 
relegated towards the end in the nasab of Ibn Ḥazm (a pro-Umayyad Sunni of eleventh 
century Spain), though are not quite the last of ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib’s sons to appear (this 
distinction goes to Ḥārith then Abū Lahab).   
  
                                                 
172 Strangely, Wahb does not get his own entry which would include his wife and their connection to a 
daughter. Āmina’s mother is hence only mentioned in Muḥammad’s entry as part of a matriline (al-
Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 20-21).  
173 Muwaffaq al-Dīn Ibn Quḍāma al-Maqdisī, al-Tabyīn fī ansāb al-Qurashīyīn, ed. Muḥammad Nāyif 
alDulaymī (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1988).  
174 EI2, s.v. “al-Nawfalī” (Charles Pellat).  
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In the examples above there appears to be some correlation between the interests of the 
author and the genealogical ordering, though in some cases we struggle to find an 
explanation. In Ibn Qudāma’s case, we can see evidence of his love of scholarship and 
being somewhat anti-Shīʿī in his nasab work, though it is harder to explain the relegation 
of the ʿAbbāsids.175 In Ibn Ḥazm’s case, the relegation of the ʿAbbāsids and ʿAlids to the 
end with the hated Abū Lahab is perhaps understandable given the author’s pro-Umayyad 
political views,176 but the appearance of Ḥārith and his children in the same place is harder 
to explain given the family’s connections to historians and early converts.  
  
If the placing of important figures at the beginnings of genealogies tells us something 
about the biases of the author, it correlates with what we know about al-Zubayrī from his 
biographies; the structure of the Nasab Quraysh in this regard is proto-Sunni, proʿAbbāsid 
and to some extent anti-Shīʿī. We should also note in this context the treatment of ʿAlī’s 
mother. While Muḥammad and ʿ Umar’s mothers are placed at the front of their respective 
genealogies,177 ʿAlī’s mother Fāṭima bt. Asad b. Hāshim appears only after every other 
descent line of Hāshim has been dealt with. This means she is outranked by the largely 
unremarkable lineages of her paternal uncles Abū Ṣayfī and Naḍla. When she does 
appear, the Nasab Quraysh does not name ʿAlī as her son - it is simply stated that Fāṭima 
gave birth to all of Abū Tālib’s children.178 This is significant because when the mothers 
of all the other caliphs appear in their family sections, their famous progeny are named 
alongside them.179   
  
But the fore-fronting of important personages in the Nasab Quraysh does not occur in one 
important instance – the section on the Zubayrids. We would expect that the line of 
                                                 
175 Ibn Quḍāma came from a family of prominent Hanbalite scholars. He lived in Damascus, though also 
spent several years in Baghdad where the ʿAbbāsid caliphs were still ruling. He also took part in Saladin’s 
conquest of Jerusalem (EI2, s.v. “Ibn Ḳudāma al-Maḳdīsī” (G. Makdisi)).  
176 EI2, s.v. “Ibn Ḥazm” (R. Arnaldez). 
177 While ʿUthmān and Abū Bakr’s mothers do not appear first in their genealogies it should be noted that 
they belong to the same tribal grouping as their sons; they are hence out-ranked.  
178 Al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 91.  
179 Page 294 of al-Zubayrī’s Nasab Quraysh for Abū Bakr’s mother; page 301 for ʿUmar’s mother; page 
147 for ʿUthmān’s mother.  
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Zubayr b. ʿAwwām and his son ʿAbd Allāh to appear first amongst the descendants of 
Asad (no-one else in the family could rival these two men for importance in the history 
of early Islam) but instead the organisation of the section takes the slowest possible route 
to get to Zubayr and his descendants.  
  
Moreover, this is not the only way in which the expected structuring breaks down in the 
Zubayrid section. In the rest of the Nasab Quraysh, the information is transmitted in a 
very strict form; a person is introduced along with all their children and the women they 
had them by. Only then do we move on to details of the children’s children. The Zubayrid 
section does not rigidly adhere to this. When discussing ʿAbd Allāh b. Zubayr’s 
children180 the Nasab Quraysh first lists those born to his wife Tumāḍir; it then provides 
further details on the marriages and descendants of these children before moving on to 
the children of the next of Ibn al-Zubayr’s wives with their descent details, and so on. 
This unusual format happens again with Muṣʿab b. Zubayr’s children some pages later.181   
  
This again shows that there is evidence for multiple editorial politices at work in the 
Nasab Quraysh. Al-Zubayrī does not flatter his family as we would expect him to based 
on the the preferential ordering given to other prominent Muslims in the work; perhaps 
he was either unaware of the potency of ordering names, or simply did not find it 
particularly compelling as an insult or compliment. The organisational structure also 
breaks down in this section with the descendants of children being nestled within the 
entries for their fathers; this does not a feature anywhere else in the Nasab Quraysh.  
  
Who wrote the Nasab Quraysh?  
  
The Zubayrid section stands out for a number of reasons: its absence of daughters; the 
way it places its most significant actors towards the end; and the way internal organisation 
differs from that used in other families. The best explanation for this is that al-Zubayrī 
                                                 
180 Al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 240-243.  
181 Al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, 249-250.  
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was far more involved in the transmission of this section than he was for the others. Our 
analysis of this is by no means complete; there are very probably other parts of the Nasab 
Quraysh on which al-Zubayrī left his fingerprints (most likely in the more recent 
generations) that remain undiscovered. But even with our preliminary findings we are in 
a position to outline a theory of where the Nasab Quraysh came from and what al-
Zubayrī’s connection to it really was.  
  
It is suggested here that the Nasab Quraysh as it exists today is only the written part of a 
more complete performance that included oral delivery. The written component was for 
the most part not original research by al-Zubayrī; the contrasting editorial standards 
employed in the non-Zubayrid sections (i.e. the structuring and the inclusion of women) 
are evidence that another scholar – one who evidently shared al-Zubayrī’s proto-Sunni, 
pro-ʿAbbāsid, somewhat anti-Shīʿī views – did the bulk of this work. At some point al-
Zubayrī acquired this work (either in written form or as an oral performance) from the 
unknown genealogist. The historiography that formed the written element of this 
performance included a section on the Zubayrids that al-Zubayrī did not find flattering so 
when he came to pass an authorised copy of this work onto his student Ibn Abī Khaythama 
he revised this part while leaving much of the rest intact.   
  
This transmission could not have been entirely oral otherwise al-Zubayrī would have had 
the opportunity to drop the awkward marriage of his Zubayrid relative from Muḥammad 
al-Nafs al-Zakiyya’s section and remove the female names in the rest of the book as he 
read it out. It may have been that he asked the student to copy the work in its entirety 
apart from the Zubayrid section; al-Zubayrī would then be able to deliver the ‘correct’ 
version of this genealogy in oral form for Ibn Abī Khaythama to write down. 
Alternatively, the revised version was inserted into the manuscript prior to transmission 
and the student simply copied the whole work.  
  
There is evidence for this sort of non-oral transmission in the period. Mālik b. Anas – a 
teacher of al-Zubayrī – is specifically named as someone who handed out official versions 
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of his Kitāb al-Muwaṭṭa without a corresponding oral performance.182 Also of interest is 
the fact that although al-Zubayrī’s book as it survives today was passed through a further 
three links, these links have not smoothed out the jarring differences between editorial 
systems. Al-Zubayrī’s reformulation appears to be the final one, which correlates well 
with Chase Robinson’s observation that redactions in other historical genres were also 
stabilising in this era.183   
  
In terms of who was responsible for writing the original Nasab Quraysh, al-Khaṭīb al-
Baghdādī tells us that al-Zubayrī gained his knowledge of nasab from al-Wāqidī.184 This 
would seem to fit; al-Wāqidī was a contemporary, and although Ibn al-Nadīm suggests 
he had Shīʿī leanings, Leder does not find that this is particularly evident from his actual 
writing. 185  But while al-Wāqidī is precisely the sort of proto-Sunni, pro-ʿAbbāsid 
historian we could imagine being behind a work like the Nasab Quraysh, these 
characteristics were common to a lot of scholars of the period. Nor does Ibn al-Nadīm 
provide us with a record of al-Wāqidī having written a genealogy of the Quraysh.186 We 
should not forget that al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī was writing a long time after the supposed 
transmission took place and while there is so much more work we can do with the actual 





The purpose of this chapter was not to provide a ‘life and times’ of al-Zubayrī as this is 
not possible with the available source material. Instead the aim was to establish the 
                                                 
182 Khatīb al-Baghdādī, al-Kifāya fī ʿilm al-riwāya, (Hyderabad: Maṭbaʻat Majlis Dā irat al-Maʻārif 
alʻUthmānīyah, 1970), 443. Reference from Gregor Schoeler, The Oral and the Written in Early Islam 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 33.  
183 C. Robinson, Islamic Historiography, 34-38.   
184 Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh Baghdād, 13:114.  
185 EI2, s.v. “al-Wāḳidī” (S. Leder). 
186 Ibn al-Nadīm’s al-Fihrist does however mention that al-Wāqidī wrote a book on ʿUmar I’s 
organization of the dīwān along genealogical lines (page 144 in the Arabic edition).  
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grounds upon which we can claim that the Nasab Quraysh is a suitable source for 
generating a prosopographical database. By using traditional historiographical 
approaches we have been able to place the work in the social context of the maturing 
ʿAbbāsid caliphate, and by supplementing this with quantitative methods we have for the 
first time been able to identify anomalies within the Nasab Quraysh. Our best explanation 
for these anomalies is that rather than being an active collector, compiler and editor of a 
genealogy, al-Zubayrī instead inherited a largely complete version of the genealogy of 
the Quraysh which he adapted with regard to his own family (and possibly 
contemporaries), but otherwise left untouched.   
  
This is a significant discovery for a number of reasons, not least because it gives us such 
a clear insight into medieval Islamic notions of authorship and the nature of literary 
transmission. But it is also a problematic discovery because by shining a light on al-
Zubayrī’s limited contribution the bulk of the work becomes authorless. There is no 
indication as to where al-Zubayrī got the work in the first place and although this is not 
surprising given the time period it was produced, it is somewhat frustrating.  
  
Nonetheless, as far as the current investigation is concerned the most important finding is 
that the historiographical analysis above has not provided us with any compelling reason 
as to why we should not trust the marriage data as recorded in the Nasab Quraysh. So far, 
where the biases of the author(s) have been found in the text, these can be characterised 
as being limited. The high degree of correlation between the Nasab Quraysh and other 
sources, the nature of the memory that preserved it and the anthropological arguments in 
favour of its accuracy all come together and give us grounds for justifying the 
investigations into the data that constitute the remainder of this thesis.   




Part Two - Data analysis and application 
  
Introduction to Part Two  
  
Part One of this thesis focused on the nature of the marital records in the Nasab Quraysh 
and outlined the ways in which we intend to extract this data. Part Two moves onto the 
analysis itself, and demonstrates how quantitative methodologies can be used to provide 
a narrative of social change amongst the Quraysh in the period 500-750 CE. We are 
particularly interested in patterns of exogamy and endogamy, and how these were affected 
by the arrival of Islam.  
    
Two recurring themes of Part Two should be highlighted at this stage. The first is the 
ongoing question of reliability. The prosopographical analysis we are undertaking only 
works if we believe the marriage records of the nasab tradition to be broadly accurate. 
While this issue was discussed at some length in Part One, the investigations below will 
provide a crucial additional component to the argument for the veracity of the data; this 
is the connection between historical trends when statistically measured and historical 
events as recorded in the non-genealogical sources. Because the trends revealed by the 
quantitative analysis could not have been apparent to the authors, in the absence of a 
historiographical explanation for their existence, we can conclude that the data are a 
generally accurate record of child-bearing unions as they actually occurred.   
  
The second issue is the nature of endogamy and exogamy itself. This seemingly simple 
concept (the degree to which the members of a group marry each other rather than 
outsiders) actually belies a huge amount of complexity. People are never members of a 
single group throughout their lives; instead, they have multiple identities which change 
over time. Because of this, a seemingly unremarkable ‘inside’ marriage in one generation 
can become strikingly ‘outside’ in the next. Fortunately, a lot of the groundwork in 
handling this problematic issue has already been carried out by sociologists studying 
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people living in much more recent eras. Before we move onto the analysis of Quraysh 
marriage patterns, we will briefly explore the problems surrounding exogamy/endogamy 
in general and propose a framework for inquiry borrowed from the discipline of 
sociology.  
  
Exogamy and Endogamy  
  
The study of the degree of relatedness between marriage partners has a long history in 
Western academia. The terms exogamy and endogamy were first coined by the 
anthropologist John McLennan in his Primitive Marriage published in 1865,187 and this 
was symptomatic of a wider fascination with genetics and degrees of relation in the 
Victorian era. Charles Darwin himself was particularly concerned with this subject as his 
research had given him an insight into the health risks caused by inbreeding, which was 
of relevance to him as he had married his cousin.188   
  
The issue of the degrees of relatedness in terms of child-bearing partnership is as much 
an obsession today as it was in the Victorian era, though this is now largely driven by a 
perceived need to measure the integration of religious, ethnic and immigrant minorities. 
As a result, the issue of exogamy and endogamy is served by a wealth of information and 
approaches that have accumulated over the course of 150 years of academic and non-
academic study. These approaches are now a lot more sophisticated than they were in 
McLennan’s day and not only in terms of the theory that underpins them; sociologists 
today have enormous amounts of data available to them and increasingly sophisticated 
tools for their analysis.189  
                                                 
187 John McLennan, Primitive Marriage (Edinburgh: A. and C. Black, 1865), 48, 53.  
188 For a very readable short history of the study of endogamy see Adam Kuper, “Changing the Subject – 
About Cousin Marriage, Among Other Things,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 14, no. 4 
(2008): 717–735.   
189 A recent paper drawing on a number of different studies and introducing some of the advanced 
analytical tools readily available to sociologists today is Matthijs Kalmijm and Frank van Tubergen's “A 
Comparative Perspective on Intermarriage: Explaining Differences Among National-Origin Groups in the 
United States,” Demography 47, no. 2 (2010): 459–479.  
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The majority of these tools and approaches are not relevant to us in our present study. 
While the 3,000 people in our database may represent a remarkable feat of pre-modern 
genealogical preservation, compared to modern resources (namely censuses and surveys), 
the Nasab Quraysh is extremely thin on detail. While this is frustrating in one respect, it 
also means that the data can be studied with the general audience in mind - no 
sophisticated mathematical knowledge will be required for anything that follows.   
  
The modern studies provide us with two very useful ideas. The first is the universal 
agreement that linking trends in marriage to wider social and historical changes is an 
intellectually fruitful endeavour; the only disagreements are over how this connection can 
best be explained. The second is that sociologists can provide us with a basic framework 
of inquiry for marriage behaviour that we can borrow from.  
  
The framework that will be used in this thesis is based on the following model, as 
described by Kalmijn:  
  
Marriage patterns arise from the interplay between three social forces: the 
preferences of individuals for certain characteristics in a spouse, the influence of 
the social group of which they are members, and the constraints of the marriage 
market in which they are searching for a spouse.190  
  
In terms of the first, Kalmijn explains that the preference of the individual effectively 
relates to whether or not they share norms and values. This is of limited relevance when 
applied to our study; the Quraysh can be assumed to have a high degree of cultural 
homogeneity during their pre-conquest history as they all lived in the same geographic 
area. Though cultural differences may have emerged in later times (such as between the  
                                                 
190 Matthijs Kalmijn, “Intermarriage and Homogamy: Causes, Patterns, and Trends,” Annual Review of 
Sociology 24, no. 1 (1998): 398; see also Matthijs Kalmijn, “Status Homogamy in the United States,” 
American Journal of Sociology 97, no. 2 (1991): 496–523.  
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Damascene Umayyads and the Zubayrids who remained in the Ḥijāz), we have no way of 
recovering the possible effects of these changes from our sources.  
 
The other two factors are far more relevant. The influence of the social group relates to 
the ability and desire of a cohort to police the marriage market, normally through 
preventing certain marriages. In our case this would have included restrictions on which 
non-Qurashīs Qurashī women could marry, and after the conquest it would prevent 
Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim men.   
  
The third factor – the structural element – is also of great interest, as the Qurashīs could 
only marry people with whom they came into contact. Our analysis will show that in the 
pre-Islamic period Qurashī marriages were restricted to the central Ḥijāz in the region 
surrounding their hometown of Mecca. This contrasts with the marriages of the early 
Muslims who married women from a much wider array of backgrounds thanks to their 
ostracisation from the Quraysh and their later conquest of the Arabian Peninsula. 
Following the conquests of North Africa, the Near East and Iran we see a further change; 
anonymous foreign slave women begin producing increasing numbers of children. 
Additionally, the fact that we can connect statistical trends to historical events proves that 
the genealogical data should be considered as reliable primary evidence when studied 
prosopographically.  
  
Part Two of this thesis is not structured chronologically but in terms of the relative 
complexity of the prosopography. We will begin by analysing the most easily detectable 
exogamous marriages – those made to concubines – by tracking the increasing number of 
concubines bearing Qurashī children. The results of this and its analysis constitute 
Chapters Four and Five.   
  
Chapter Six consists of tables detailing the marriages of three cohorts of Quraysh men 
spanning the period 500-750. The purpose of these tables is to illustrate the extra levels 
of complexity added when we decide to consider women with known tribal affiliations. 
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In Chapter Seven we use these tables to analyse the earlier two cohorts (that of 
Muḥammad’s generation and that of his fathers’ generation) in order to demonstrate how 
the geographic origins of brides changed as a result of the revelation of Islam.  Finally, in 
Chapter Eight, we will analyse the marriages of a third cohort – the Umayyad caliphs and 
their sons. This will show that despite theoretically having access to any woman they 
wanted within the Islamic world the Umayyad caliphs and their sons were surprisingly 
limited in terms of their marriage choices. This behaviour will be explained in terms of 
the context in which they were living and also in terms of the concubinage data discussed 
in Chapters Four and Five; in so doing it ties together the prosopographical strands that 
run throughout this thesis.  
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The first subject of our quantitative analysis is concubinage as recorded in the Nasab 
Quraysh. This is for a number of reasons. As with many other practices rooted in the first 
Islamic century, attempts to explain the origins of concubinage are poorly served by 
primary sources, and if quantitative approaches can help illuminate the subject of slave 
marriage then they are serving a useful purpose. Our analysis will show that this is indeed 
the case; prosopography allows us to obtain a surprisingly detailed narrative of the 
emergence and evolution of concubinage in this period.  
  
The study of concubinage is also important for methodological reasons. Without 
accounting for marriages between Qurashī men and foreign slave women (who represent 
the most exogamous marriages possible) we cannot adequately discuss exogamy or 
endogamy between Qurashī men and named Arab women. Additionally, the investigation 
is useful as it allows us to trial some of our methodological tools on a relatively simple 
type of relationship before moving on to more complicated types of marriage.  
  
After a discussion on terminology and some minor methodological issues, this chapter 
will show that the quantitative analysis of the Nasab Quraysh provides us with a narrative 
of the evolution concubinage superior to those narratives derived solely from the 
traditional historical sources. It will be shown that as far as the Quraysh are concerned, 
concubinage as a practice was enthusiastically adopted as soon as foreign slave women 
became available, and it will also be suggested that there are few grounds for believing 
that the children of concubines were widely discriminated against. This goes against the 






The suitability of the word ‘concubine’ in discussing these slave mothers is questionable; 
the word is derived from the Roman institution of concubinatus which they understood 
as being “a long-lasting, monogamous union, an alternative to marriage employed by 
those for whom legitimate marriage was legally impossible or socially unacceptable.”191 
In the Roman world, a union of this type would typically involve young men who intended 
to make a better marriage in the future, or older widowers who did not want to complicate 
inheritance (concubines in the Roman world did not normally produce children).192 These 
women were frequently freeborn, though of a lower social status than the husband. In 
Evans-Grubbs’s analysis, concubinage was “an alternative, not a supplement, to legal 
marriage” and Roman men did not have both wives and concubines at the same time 
(though she suspects that in the eastern part of the empire this may not have been the 
case). 193  Equally importantly, the children of these unions were not assumed to be 
legitimate.  
  
This institution is clearly very different from the comparable one as understood by 
Muslims. First, as translated into English, the term ‘concubine’ covers (at least) two 
words in Arabic denoting distinct statuses; the surriyya (derived from the root s-r-r 
denoting pleasure)194 was a slave woman in a sexual relationship with her master but had 
not produced any children while the umm walad (tr: mother of a child) was a slave woman 
                                                 
191 Judith Evans-Grubbs, Law and Family in Late Antiquity: the Emperor Constantine's Marriage 
Legislation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 294.  
192 This last point is not as surprising as it sounds; a recent study found that the failure rates of withdrawal 
as a contraceptive method (which was perhaps the most common form of pre-modern contraception) are 
almost exactly the same as failure rates for male condom use as a contraceptive method in real-world 
conditions. See Rachel Jones et al., “Better Than Nothing or Savvy Risk-reduction Practice? The 
Importance of Withdrawal,” Contraception 79, no. 6 (2009): 407–410.   
193 Evans-Grubbs, Law and Family in Late Antiquity, 299.  
194 Another term for a female slave is jāriya; according to Lane this is connected to the Arabic root j-r-y 
denoting activity. There was not necessarily a sexual element to this term though; it is used as the 
counterpart to the male ghulām. Similarly, the Qurʾānic terms for female slaves (ama and fataya) should 
not be assumed to be synonymous with ‘concubinage’ either (for discussion see EQ, s.v. “Concubines” 
(Jonathan Brockopp)).  
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who had produced a child by her master.195 Second, the institution of concubinage was 
not necessarily an alternative to marriage (as in the Roman case) – quite often it was a 
supplement. Social and legal practice allowed the Muslim man to own a limitless number 
of concubines in addition to his quota of four wives.   
  
Further complications arise when we try to establish a fixed definition of the status of the 
concubines and their children in Islamic society. Looking at this from a strictly legal 
perspective (i.e. what our legal texts explicitly state), we see that the positions of both 
mother and child in the Islamic household were as precarious as it had been in the Roman 
system in that many of their rights were dependent on the recognition of full legitimacy 
by the father. In some Islamic legal traditions, the master has the option of declaring 
whether or not the children through a surriyya are his; if not, then the children cannot 
become full heirs and the mother does not gain the legal benefits available from becoming 
an umm walad (namely emancipation on the death of the master plus prevention from sale 
beforehand).196   
  
But there is an important distinction to be made here between legal arguments and actual 
social practice; Brockopp uses the status of the umm walad as presented in Mālikī law to 
illustrate precisely this point. By analysing the Muqtaṣar al-kabīr fī l-fiqh of Mālikī jurist 
Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam (d. 829), Brockopp argues that although the options of recognition or 
denial of paternity existed in the law codes, the fact that the ramifications of selecting the 
latter are not discussed is an indication that the the child was in practise automatically 
                                                 
195 This is a simplification of a complex legal debate; Schacht draws from the ḥadīth and legal literatures 
to suggest an evolution of the status of concubinage in EI2, s.v. “Umm al-walad” (J. Schacht). See also  
Khalil ‘Athamina, “How Did Islam Contribute to Change the Legal Status of Women: The Case of the 
Jawārī or the Female Slaves,” Al-Qantara 28, no. 2 (2007): 383–408. In some interpretations, pregnancy 
was enough to change a surriyya’s status to that of umm walad.  
196 The most detailed treatment of this subject has been by Jonathon Brockopp (Early Mālikī Law: Ibn 
ʻAbd al-Ḥakam and His Major Compendium of Jurisprudence (Boston: Brill, 2000), 162-205) where he 
discusses the umm walad as she appears in al-Muqtaṣar al-kabīr fī l-fiqh of Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam (d. 829). 
See also Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 
264-266 (the latter also notes that in Shīʿī law the umm walad was only emancipated if she was still in her 
master’s possession at time of his death); EI2, s.v. “Umm al-walad” (Joseph Schacht); and EQ, s.v.  
“Concubine” (Jonathan Brockopp).  
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recognised as legitimate. Brockopp also points to the fact that there is no discussion of 
royal succession with regard to the ʿAbbāsid caliphs, and that the umm walad gains very 
little attention in any legal works prior to the Muqtaṣar (indeed, this work may be the first 
text to ever give the umm walad her own chapter). His conclusion is that, although this 
legal work technically allows a man to deny paternity of his child, this is only because 
Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam’s primary aim was to provide an account of Mālikī law that was 
internally consistent – he was not interested in creating something that might be usefully 
applied to Islamic society in general.197  
  
Although we are still waiting for more early-period legal works to be given the same 
scholarly attention as carried out by Brockopp, it is unlikely that the conclusions he draws 
will be significantly undermined. The written output of medieval Islamic legal 
scholarship is better understood as being the product of a desire to satisfy its own internal 
consistency198 and hence should not be considered a barometer of social change (we are 
reminded of the risks of conflating Islamic history with “ulamology”).199   
  
Our definition of ‘concubinage’ will therefore have to rely on our understanding of the 
institution as broadly practiced by Muslims; an understanding that is no different from 
the scholarly consensus (at least as far as the post-ʿAbbāsid elites were concerned). To 
summarise this consensus we will highlight three relevant characteristics. First, 
concubinage is a type of marriage200 conducted between a Muslim man and a woman born 
outside the Muslim world who has been reduced to slavery. Second, it was very common 
                                                 
197 Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law, 205. Brockopp’s analysis is a development of Schacht’s EI2 entry “Umm 
al-walad”, which also contains useful further references.  
198 This is the conclusion of Brockopp (Early Mālikī Law, 205). For a more detailed study see Calder’s 
Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), especially chapter eight.  
199 This term is ascribed to Mottahedeh’s 1975 review of Bulliet’s Patricians of Nishapur by R. Stephen 
Humphreys (Islamic History: a Framework for Inquiry (London: Tauris, 1991), 187), but Cornell 
believes it has older precedence. See Vincent J. Cornell, Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in 
Moroccan Sufism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 295, note 4.  
200 Defining ‘marriage’ is a highly complex issue and this is because the question of legitimacy is not 
fixed but (as Bell puts it) “a strategic variable in the control of dominants within a social system” (Duran 
Bell, “Defining Marriage and Legitimacy,” Current Anthropology 38, no. 2 (1997): 237). In this thesis we 
will handle this issue by considering all child-bearing unions to be marriages; this is as far as we need to 
go for the purposes of our data gathering and analysis.  
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in the Islamic world: between the ʿAbbāsid period and the twentieth century, this type of 
marriage was familiar to most Muslim elites. Finally, while the Muslims recognised a 
parallel institution of full-marriage which gave a different set of rights to the wife, the 
products of unions of this type were not treated any differently to their concubine-born 
siblings.   
  
The growth of concubinage: data and graphical illustrations  
  
The database of concubine marriages can quickly provide us with visualisations of data 
that illustrate the growth in concubinage from the time of Muḥammad. This will be shown 
in two ways. The first is to look at the unions themselves and track the number of child-
bearing unions of Qurashī men with freewomen over time and compare it to the number 
of unions with concubines conducted over time. The problem here is that the way the 
concubine data have been collated means that there is a bias towards undercounting; when 
the plural form of umm walad appears it is recorded as meaning two women when it could 
in fact mean many more. But since we are trying to establish a rapid increase in the 
number of concubines, having a bias towards under-representation represents best 
practice as it is more likely to undermine our theory.   
  
In addition to this, we will mitigate the consequences of undercounting by also taking into 
consideration the absolute number of children produced from each type of union.  
  
(Further note on terminology for the following datasets: as a genealogical work, the Nasab 
Quraysh has little interest in the surriya, so for our purposes here the term ‘concubine’ 
will refer to the ‘umm walad’. The term ‘freewoman’ will be used to refer to any named 
woman. There are occasions when this does not work; sometimes, as with Māriya the 
Copt, we have a named woman who was a concubine and later freed. But as instances 
like this are rare it will not adversely affect conclusions drawn from a dataset consisting 




The raw collated data appear in the following table:  
 
Table 4.1: Maternal status of children by generation  
  








1 and 2 486 0 195 0 
3 245 3 125 2 
4 365 7 180 6 
5 385 53 190 25 
6 321 118 170 71 
7 261 144 143 76 
8 169 123 90 54 
9 138 85 69 40 
10 to 13 26 9 18 7 
  
(The fifth generation is that of Muḥammad. The table has collapsed the earlier generations 
into a single category as there are no records of any concubine unions before the third 
generation. The final generations have also been collapsed; as discussed in the earlier 
chapter al-Zubayrī does not seem particularly interested in the marriage behaviour of 
these later generations so they account for very few records).  
  
The columns of greatest interest here are the ones labelled ‘Conc. children’ and ‘Conc. 
women’ both of which show a rapid rise in concubinage. These can be visualised 













This graph performs the same function but for numbers of children born to the respective 
categories of women:  
  





Another way of representing the data is through the proportion of total unions that are 
with concubines, and proportions of children produced through these unions against the 
total number of children produced. This can be expressed in the form of a table:  
  
  Table 4.2: Proportion of concubines and children of concubines by generation  
  





1 and 2 0 0 
3 1.21% 1.57% 
4 1.88% 3.23% 
5 12.10% 11.63% 
6 26.88% 29.46% 
7 35.56% 34.70% 
8 42.12% 37.50% 
9 38.12% 36.70% 
10 to 13 25.71% 28.00% 
  
It can also be presented graphically:  
 





The proportion of unions of each type can also be compared graphically:  
  




Preliminary Analysis  
  
The analysis of the data clearly shows that concubinage is closely linked to the arrival of 
Islam. Before the generation of Muḥammad’s grandfather, there are no Quraysh born to 
foreign slave women. The first instances of concubinage appear in Generations 3 and 4, 
but are still very uncommon. In Generation 5 however – the generation of Muḥammad – 
the picture changes completely with a six-fold increase in the number of children born to 
concubines. The proportion of children born to slave mothers then increases rapidly 
throughout the generations of the Umayyad period, before settling somewhat in the 
generations living closer to the period of the Nasab Quraysh’s authorship.  
  
It may be objected that these trends are actually caused by historiography. It could be that 
the Qurashīs took large numbers of slave women before Muḥammad’s generation, but did 
not consider the children produced through these unions to be Qurashīs. They therefore 
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had some sort of second-class status and because of this did not form a part of 
genealogical memory. The rise of Islam did not increase the numbers of slave women 
producing children; it simply meant that the children who were being produced were now 
recognised as being full members of the tribe.  
  
This is an unlikely explanation. Principally, there is no evidence for large numbers of 
slave women and children owned by Qurashī men for the pre-Islamic period (Brockopp 
finds only two references of pre-Islamic concubinage in North Arabia – ʿAntara and 
ʿAmmā b. Yasīr), while ‘Athamina’s list of Meccan tribal aristocrats who were born to 
Greeks and Abyssinian slave women in the pre-Islamic period is on closer inspection a 
far more contestable reference than he allows for.201 It is also unlikely that the Quraysh 
could have owned large numbers of slave women given the marginality of their existence 
(which will be discussed in Chapter Seven).   
  
It is more likely therefore that the increasing numbers of concubines producing Qurashī 
children is linked to the economic power of the Quraysh tribe as a whole. In the early 
stages, their involvement in the conquests would have brought in slave women directly 
(as war booty) or provided them with the wealth required to purchase slave women at 
market.202 This would have continued in the Umayyad era thanks to the continued dīwān 
                                                 
201 Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law, 195, note 151. ‘Athamina’s list (alluded to on page 385 of “How did  
Islam contribute”) is found in the Muḥabbar of Ibn Ḥabīb which lists sons born to niṣrāniyyāt and  
ḥabashiyyāt (pages 304-309). ‘Athamina makes four errors. First, there is no mention of the Greek 
women (rūmiyyāt) he claims can be found here – instead with have niṣrāniyyāt who are Christians, and 
who may be (and sometimes demonstrably are) Arabs. Secondly, despite the name, habashiyyāt does not 
necessarily mean that the women are from Abyssinia; variations on the root h-b-sh sometimes refer to 
Arab tribes (EI2 – Glossary and Indes of Terms, s.v. “Aḥābish” (unknown)), and given that some of the 
men listed in this section of the Muḥabbar have Arab mothers in the Nasab Quraysh (e.g. Umayma bt. 
Wudd of the Quḍāʿa, mother of the first three men listed in this part of the Muḥabbar) which may have 
confused Ibn Ḥabīb. Thirdly, not all the men in this list are from the jāhiliyya (e.g. ʿAbd Allāh b. Qays b. 
ʿAbd Allāh b. Zubayr). Finally, there is no indication in the Muḥabbar that these women are slaves.  
202 Jairus Banaji dates the emergence of a wealthy Quraysh elite to ʿUthmān’s caliphate in “Late Antique 
Legacies and Muslim Economic Expansion,” in Money, Power and Politics in Early Islamic Syria, ed.  
John Haldon (Farnham; Burlington: Ashgate, 2010): 181-200. As for the number of slaves that the 
Muslims acquired, the conquest narratives are replete with numbers of slaves acquired, the names of 
those who acquired them and the locations from where they were taken, but the overriding conclusion is 
that none of this information is to be trusted. For a largely uncritical summary of these ‘facts’ and figures, 
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payments and the close connections of the Quraysh to caliphal elites. More tentatively we 
can suggest a change following the ʿAbbāsid Revolution; the tenth to thirteenth 
generations (the era of al-Zubayrī) show a marked drop in the number of children born to 
concubines. The ʿAbbāsid era saw the end of the dīwān payments to the families of the 
early conquerors, the end of Qurashī involvement in new conquests, the marginalisation 
of the Ḥijāz (where many of the families featured in the Nasab Quraysh resided) and the 
increasing irrelevance of the wider Quraysh at the ʿAbbāsid court. All this would have 
conspired to restrict their access to and ability to acquire slave-women, though caution is 
required on account of the small sample sizes.  
  
There are two points to be made here. The first is that this is an argument for the soundness 
of the methodology. The timing of the rise in concubine mothers comes exactly at the 
point where we would expect it to; namely the conquests that followed the revelation of 
Islam. While this point may seem obvious, we must remember that it is built on two 
contentions that are not obvious, namely the idea that the Nasab Quraysh contains large 
quantities of accurate data and that organising this data generationally is a viable means 
of structuring it. The second point is more elaborate, and concerns the degree to which 
the data confirms or contradicts the current scholarly consensus on the emergence of 
concubines in Islamic society. This is discussed below.  
  
The rise of the concubine – earlier studies  
  
Attempts to explain the emergence of Islamic concubinage have to date been limited. 
While Schacht’s EI2 entry on “Umm al-walad” remains one of the most thorough analyses 
of Muslim concubinage as it exists in the written sources, it barely touches on the subject 
of its origins. Instead, Schacht simply notes that the “old pre-Islamic point of view” 
(which was prejudiced against the concubine and her progeny) was eroded to the point in 
the second half of the ninth century where “the absolute equality of the children born from 
                                                 
see Daniel Pipes, Slave Soldiers and Islam: the Genesis of a Military System (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981), 140-144.  
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a marriage with a free-woman and in concubinage has now been long completely 
established.” Evidence for this is based on the emergence of legal texts that seem to 
improve the condition of the concubine, but underlying reasons for this change are not 
given.203   
  
Schacht’s shortcoming in this regard is completely understandable; the problematic nature 
of the sources for the first century of Islam means that there is little scope for uncovering 
social history using conventional methodologies. But unlike Schacht, other scholars have 
not let the paucity of source material withhold them from making some very bold claims 
which betray their own biases and prejudices. So with Nabia Abbott we find that the 
concubine was an “evil social consequence” which ultimately pitted the “free Arab 
woman of noble race and lineage, haughty but generally virtuous” against “the foreign 
slave woman, singer or concubine, with pride of beauty and talent but easygoing and of 
comparatively loose morals.”204 The concubine is hence symptomatic of a broader moral 
decline which is linked in a vague sense to the decline of the Islamic empire.205  
  
On the same subject, Bernard Lewis is more sophisticated, if no less flawed. The aim of 
his Race and Slavery in the Middle East is to puncture what he sees as a 
Westernconstructed myth of “Islamic racial innocence,”206 and part of his argument rests 
on the discriminatory treatment by “true Arabs” of their “half-Arab” (his terminology) 
counterparts. These half-Arabs were “half-privileged” and he presents the ʿAbbāsid 
revolution as being in no small part due to the fact that the children of these mixed unions 
                                                 
203 The subject is also treated in his Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 264–266, but in less detail. 
204 Nabia Abbott, “Women and the State in Early Islam,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 1, no. 3 (1942), 
351. 
205 Remarkably, this does indeed appear to be the judgment of Abbott herself rather than the sources. But 
this attitude towards concubinage was not limited to Western scholars of the period; a tafsīr of the Qurʾān 
produced by the Aḥmadiyya community in the 1940s tells us that “The Muslim Empire of Baghdad fell to 
pieces because the Khalīfas took to contracting conjugal relations with bondwomen. The incompetent 
princes born of them ruined the State. In most cases marital relations with bondwomen are calculated to 
have a demoralizing effect on both husbands and children.” I. Alhaj, Mirza Bashir-ud-Din, Mahmud 
Ahmad, The Holy Quran with English Translation and Commentary, (Tilford: Islam International 
Publications Ltd., 1988), 515.   
206 Bernard Lewis, Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Enquiry (New York; Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1990), 101.  
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were “ever less willing to accept the disabilities and humiliations imposed upon them by 
their full-blooded half brothers.” Evidence for this is slight; he refers to the concubine-
born Maslama b. ʿAbd al-Malik who was an able commander yet never became caliph.207 
This is enough to unequivocally state that “Umayyad princes who were the sons of non-
Arab slave women were not for one moment considered as possible candidates for the 
succession”;208 this is in contrast to the more liberal ʿ Abbāsid era where almost all caliphs 
have concubines for mothers. These observations are bolstered with a collection of 
disparaging statements regarding the hajīn – the Arabic term for the products of these 
mixed unions – which Lewis notes should be likened to the words “mongrel” and “half-
breed” as used in English.   
  
Parallel to Lewis and Abbott runs more sober scholarship. One of the first substantive 
analyses of the social forces that dictated the nature of Islamic concubinage was carried 
out by Goldziher in his Muslim Studies.209 Goldziher’s approach is to subsume analysis 
of the concubine and her progeny into a wider discussion on the Arab treatment of the 
mawlās, and in so doing makes the narrative of the two institutions indistinguishable.210 
The emergence of the hajīn211 caliph is therefore linked to the successful efforts of the 
ʿajam (non-Arab Muslims in this context) in breaking down Arab chauvinism. The 
position is supported through multiple references to negative attitudes shown towards 
female slave ancestry from the poetry of the jāhiliyya and the criticism against men who 
married their concubines as preserved in anecdotes from the Umayyad era. According to 
Goldziher, it was only in the middle of the ʿAbbāsid period that maternal status was 
considered irrelevant; evidence for this is in the status of the caliph’s mothers, the 
                                                 
207 This ‘fact’ appears repeatedly in the secondary sources, despite the fact that there are other reasons 
why Maslama never became caliph such as his lack of opportunity (he died towards the end of the long 
reign of his brother Hisham) and his responsibility for the failed siege of Constantinople.  
208 Lewis, Race and Slavery, 38-39.  
209 Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 1:118.  
210 Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 1:98-136.  
211 Goldziher does not use this term and it may be anachronistic for much of the period 500-750 CE. I 
have chosen to employ it freely in this thesis however as it does not have the negative connotations that 
the terms ‘half-breed’ or ‘half-Arab’ have for the native English speaker. Incidentally, the term hajīn is 




elevation of the ʿajam to positions where they outranked Arabs, and the appearance of 
reports remarking on the qualities of concubines and their children.  
  
Like Schacht, Goldziher is quite vague in terms of why he thinks the child of the 
concubine should have been accepted as equal in the mid-ʿAbbāsid period. There is a 
reference to a story telling of the respect Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn (the son of Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī b. 
Abī Ṭālib by a concubine) enjoyed amongst his contemporary Medinans. This led the 
Medinans to have children by concubine women, but the whole story is judged by 
Goldziher to have been produced by religious scholars in a much later period. According 
to Goldziher, the hajīn seems to have earned acceptance only because of the success of 
the ʿajam in general breaking into the upper echelons of power, and the eventual 
recognition by Arab Muslims that ‘true’ Islam does not discriminate between believers.212   
  
Goldziher’s arguments are closely followed in Bashear’s 1998 monograph Arabs and 
Others in Early Islam and again in ‘Athamina’s 2007 article “How did Islam Contribute 
to Change the Legal Status of Women.”213 Bashear points out that even the sons of 
Umayyad caliphs who had concubines for mothers were discriminated against; he refers 
to the ʿIqd al-farīd of Ibn ʿAbd Rabbihi (d. 940) which tells us that ʿAbd al-Malik’s hajīn 
son had difficulties in finding a wife,214 while a reference to Ibn ʿAsākir (d. 1175) shows 
how the issue of a mother’s slave origins arose in the struggle between Yazīd III and 
Walīd II.215 ‘Athamina expands the number of sources used by the earlier scholars but 
still supports the same proposition - that the child of the concubine was the “target of 
contempt and derision” (‘Athamina is quoting Goldziher here). So we hear that the caliph 
Maʾmūn was mocked for the slave-status of his mother in a poem that appears in the 
                                                 
212 Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 1:116 (“The old Arabs remained quite untouched by the consequences of 
Muhammed’s and Islam’s teaching of equality in regard to this question [of Arab men being allowed to 
marry non-Arab slaves]); 1:117 (“It cannot be denied, and this has been repeatedly stressed in 
descriptions of Islam, that the Islamic spirit helped make good treatment of slaves a duty and inner duty 
and to encourage an attitude that had its roots in the oldest documents of Islam”).  
213 Suliman Bashear, Arabs and Others in Early Islam (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1998); ‘Athamina, “How 
Did Islam Contribute,” 383–408.  
214 Bashear, Arabs and Others in Early Islam. 39.  
215 Bashear, Arabs and Others in Early Islam, 39-40.  
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Maʿārif of Ibn Qutayba (d. 889). Ibn Qutayba also provides the information that the Arab 
nobles were “appalled” at the idea of their daughters marrying the sons of concubines 
(this in his ʿUyūn al-akhbār). ‘Athamina returns to Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih’s al-ʿIqd for the 
notion that the Umayyads forbade the sons of concubines from assuming the caliphate 
because they were not considered members of Arab society.216  ‘Athamina even goes so 
far as to suggest that the Umayyads believed in a Prophetic ḥadīth that the accession of a 
concubine-born son would lead to the end of their dynasty (this ḥadīth appears in a variety 
of sources including the Ansāb al-ashrāf of al-Balādhurī (d. 892); the Taʾrīkh of al-Ṭabarī 
(d. 923) and the Rabīʿ al-abrār of al-Zamakhsharī (d. 1144)).217  
  
Like Goldziher, ‘Athamina also judges these attitudes to have dissipated in the ʿAbbāsid 
era, and his evidence for this again includes the statuses of the caliphal mothers; he points 
to the fact that only three of the 38 ʿAbbāsid caliphs were born to Arab women is “clear 
evidence” that the “obstinate, conservative” attitude of the Arabs was in decline. 218 
‘Athamina goes on to extend his study of maternal origins by including references to the 
marriage preferences of Shīʿī religious leaders; the sixth imām (by the Twelver reckoning) 
Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and the seventh imām Qāẓim all had multiple children through slave 
women.219  
  
Further evidence for the change in attitudes comes from the positive comments on the 
hajīn. Like Goldziher, ‘Athamina also refers to the use of hajīn religious scholars as a 
means of habilitating the children of concubines. Specifically, he refers to the same 
tradition mentioned by Goldziher saying that the people of Medina only married the 
                                                 
216 ‘Athamina, “How did Islam Contribute,” 395, note 67.  
217 ‘Athamina, “How Did Islam Contribute,” 395. This prophecy appears in a conversation between 
Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik and the ʿAlid rebel Zayd b. ʿAlī. The caliph also asks: “How could you claim 
the position of caliph despite the fact that you are the son of a jāriya?” (this version is from al-Balādhurī). 
Lewis also implies that this prophecy can be dated to the Umayyad era (Race and Slavery, 105). Given 
that neither Lewis nor ‘Athamina provide any evidence dating this prophecy to the Umayyad period, and 
given the fact that unlike most prophecies it accurately predicts an event, we must assume that this report 
first appeared in the ʿAbbāsid era.  
218 ‘Athamina, “How Did Islam Contribute,” 395.  
219 ‘Athamina, “How Did Islam Contribute,” 395-6.  
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jawārī (another term for slave women) and had sons by them after Zayn b. ʿ Ābidīn, Qāsim 
b. Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr al-Ṣadīq and Sālim b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb 
established themselves as leading members of the Muslim community.220 In addition to 
this, the taking of concubines is presented as a deliberate policy to “improve the stock” 
of their descendants (referring back to Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih’s al-ʿIqd), while the virtues of 
foreign mothers were praised in other sources (such as Ibn Qutayba ʿUyūn al-akhbār and 
al-Zamakhsharī Rabīʿ al-abrār). ‘Athamina goes on to say that the acceptance of the 
concubine and her children was a result of a “more understanding attitude presented by 
Islam toward the institution of slavery, the decline in the basic concepts of the jāhilī 
heritage in favour of the basic values of Islam, and the increasing numbers of jawārī 
which resulted in an ever-increasing number of births to non-Arab mothers among the 
Arab aristocracy.”221   
  
Putting Abbott and Lewis to one side to focus on the more mainstream strand of academic 
discourse, we see that Goldziher, Bashear and ‘Athamina agree on a number of 
fundamentals (in this paper this will be referred to as the ‘Goldziher argument’). Up to 
the time of Muḥammad, there were few children born of Arabs and foreign slave women. 
Following the conquests the picture changes; large numbers of these women arrive in the 
Islamic world and an unknown number of Arab men had children with them. Not all men 
took concubines; the majority seem to have been highly critical of the practice. The 
children of these unions were subsequently discriminated against as a result of the 
chauvinistic beliefs of the Arab majority; evidence for this is in the derogatory reports 
that can be dated to the time, as well as the lack of hajīn caliphs and the poor performance 
of hajīns in the marriage market. But over time these attitudes softened and with the 
arrival of the ʿAbbāsids came greater tolerance. In this later period we see hajīn caliphs 
become the norm and reports referring to the qualities of concubines and mixed-race 
children correspondingly proliferate.222  
                                                 
220 He refers to Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih’s al-ʿIqd, al-Zamakhsharī’s Rabīʿ al-abrār and al-Ibshīhī’s al-Mustaṭraf.  
221 'Athamina, “How Did Islam Contribute,” 395.   
222 ‘Athamina (“How Did Islam Contribute”) appears to hold a number of positions on when the 
concubine emerged as a significant source of Muslim children; at one point he says the Islamic conquests 
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Critiquing the Goldziher argument  
  
There are some obvious problems with the Goldziher argument. To begin with, it is 
worryingly similar to what ʿ Abbāsid-era scholars would want us to believe; that the ‘true’ 
Islam of Muḥammad was hijacked and subverted by the conservative Umayyads, and 
only with the arrival of the ʿAbbāsid dynasty could the legitimate faith be restored (this 
trope has been described in some detail by Crone).223 Secondly, the derogatory antihajīn 
remarks collected by the proponents of the Goldziher argument are used without 
considering that they may be later fabrications or indicative only of a minority opinion.  
None of these remarks are from sources contemporary to the Umayyad or early ʿAbbāsid 
eras (most are from the mid-ninth century or even later) and there is no way of knowing 
which ones were genuinely handed down through isnāds and which were backdated in 
order to add authenticity.224 The result is that the Goldziher argument is forced into the 
circular reasoning of saying that if a report demonstrates intolerance then it must be early, 
but if it is enlightened then it must be late. It is suggested here that all the reports should 
be considered as undateable component parts of a wider discourse akin to the literary 
banter of the shuʿūbiyya, and cannot be used as evidence of a deep social cleft between 
Arabs and hajīns in the first century of Islam.   
 
But the Goldziher argument does have one piece of incontrovertible evidence – the change 
in status of the mothers of the caliphs from freeborn to slave. This is essentially a simple 
prosopographical observation; in the cohort of all caliphs, a single data category (maternal 
                                                 
before 650 led to the numbers of jawārī to “increase continuously” (page 388) and later on (page 396) he 
refers to “a surge of marriages to jawārī” at the time that the complimentary reports on the concubines 
and their children emerge (presumably the ʿAbbāsid era).   
223 Patricia Crone, “The First-century Concept of Hiğra,” Arabica 41, no. 3 (1994): 353.  
224 It also ignores the evidence for the existence of an anti-concubine prejudice in later centuries; e.g. al-
Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) judgement that marrying a concubine was “evil” but better than fornication or 
masturbation. Al-Ghazzālī and Madelain Farah, Marriage and Sexuality in Islam: a Translation of Al- 
Ghazālī’s Book on the Etiquette of Marriage from the Iḥyāʾ (Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 1984), 
64. Even later than this, we find Ibn Khaldūn (d.1382) blaming marriages to foreign women for causing 
Arabs to forget their genealogies (Walī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-ʿIbar wa-diwān 
(Cairo: Būlāq, 1867), 6:3. Musil also reports that the Rwala Bedouin punished any man who married a 
slave with death (Manner and Customs, 137).  
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status) is selected and the results are tracked over time. So between 632 and 744 there 
were no caliphs with concubines for mothers; between 744 and 785 two thirds of them 
were hajīns (Yazīd III, Ibrāhīm, Marwān II, al-Manṣūr); and after 785 they were almost 
all born of concubine women. This would appear to indicate that there was a seachange 
in social attitudes that the Umayyads could not keep up with, a change which ultimately 
opened the door to the less chauvinistic Islam of the ʿAbbāsids.  The Goldziher argument 
then appends the anecdotal traditions that concur with this point upon the foundation stone 
of the caliphal mothers and incorporates the entire argument into a narrative of the wider 
social changes that ʿAbbāsid-era Islam engendered (particularly more inclusive attitudes 
towards the mawlās).  
  
Our findings on the emergence of concubinage offer a different narrative. The graphs and 
tables above show that the Quraysh as a whole took up concubinage as soon as they were 
able to; there is no evidence of widespread reticence towards the practice here. As for the 
caliphal Umayyads,225 they were in fact more likely to have children by concubines than 
the Quraysh in general – hardly the conservative laggards implied by the Goldziher 
argument.   
  
It would appear from this that there was never any great problem with having children by 
concubines. As for discrimination against the children of these unions, the quantitative 
approach also provides no good evidence that this was widespread; in fact, it often points 
in the opposite direction and indicates that the hajīn was considered an equal to his (and 
possibly her) full-Arab sibling.   
  
Evidence for the absence of discrimination comes from two secondary prosopographical 
studies, one on the marriages that the hajīns made and the other on the wider changes in 
marriage behaviour that were happening in this period. The former is discussed in 
Appendix 1 which also provides a list of hajīns who made marriages to Qurashī women.  
                                                 
225 This refers to the marriages of the Umayyad caliphs and their sons which are discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter Eight.  
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The fact that marriages between hajīns and Qurashī women appears to be quite common 
not only refutes a postulation of the Goldziher argument that this was a rare occurrence 
but it strongly implies that the sons of concubines were not considered second-class 
Qurashīs.   
  
As for the wider social changes it will be argued that the late emergence of the hajīn caliph 
was the result of structural changes caused by the Islamic polity’s adoption of increasingly 
imperial trappings. In the earlier tribal period, men with only one set of familial relations 
(i.e. the hajīn) were at a disadvantage when compared to those with two sets (i.e. their 
full-Arab siblings) because they lacked the connections needed to thrive in this informal 
environment. As these tribal connections diminished in importance over the course of the 
Umayyad period, the barriers to the caliphate were lowered, allowing hajīns like Marwān 




This chapter has provided the first outlines of what prosopographical approaches can tell 
us about the history of early Islam. Most strikingly we have been able to elucidate 
elements of social change in this period, which is not something we thought possible 
given previous assumptions about the quality of the sources. We have also learned that 
the acceptance of concubinage amongst Islamic elites was not a gradual process that had 
its roots in the mid-eighth century. The trends illustrated appear to be consistent with a 
narrative of the elites taking concubines as soon as they became available and - for the 
most part - treating the offspring of these unions no differently to their full Arab siblings 
from birth.   
  
This is in contrast to our prior understanding of the emergence of concubinage, referred 
to here as the Goldziher argument. It was shown that the evidence upon which this 
argument rests was not particularly secure and relied on the contention that the change in 
the statuses of caliphal mothers at the time of the ʿAbbāsid Revolution was a strong 
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indicator of wider social trends. The prosopographical investigation undermined this 
point by showing that if we consider the mothers of all recorded Quraysh (as opposed to 
just the caliphs) we find that the hajīns arrived a long time before the fall of the 
Umayyads. The prosopographical approach will also be used later to show that the late 
emergence of the hajīn caliph was more likely the result of structural change rather than 
discrimination.  
  
In addition to these historical findings, important lessons have been learnt about our 
methodology. The most significant is that a result of our quantitative analysis finds a 
parallel in the historical sources; in the case above, it is the rapid increase in the number 
of hajīns which happens at the same time as the Islamic military conquests. This 
vindicates our methodological contentions that the Nasab Quraysh is a repository of high-
quality data and that generational structuring is a valid means of organising the undated 
marriages.  
  
Another lesson has been the importance of keeping prosopographical study simple. The 
tables and graphs above are nothing more complicated than counting the appearances of 
certain words in one book, yet we have still been able to generate substantive findings 
that will be difficult to refute. The contrast here is with Ahmed’s Religious Elite - 
especially in the case of Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās as discussed in Chapter One - where too 
many questionable sources are compiled into one narrative without adequate assessment.   
A similarly problematic prosopography can be found in Jabali’s Companions of the 
Prophet,226 a study that aims to make a connection between the geographic origins of 
Muḥammad’s companions with their stance at the Battle of Ṣiffīn. The issue with this 
work (as pointed out by Zaman), is not that it draws on too many sources, but that it 
assumes that the terminology of affiliation  did not change in meaning over the 600 years 
between the events he refers to and the time when the last of his sources was written.227 
                                                 
226 Fuad Jabali, The Companions of the Prophet: a Study of Geographical Distribution and Political 
Alignments (Leiden; Boston, MA: Brill, 2003).  
227 Iftikhar Zaman, “Review: The Companions of the Prophet: A Study of Geographical Distribution and 
Political Alignments,” Journal of Islamic Studies 16, no. 1 (2005): 63–65.  
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Without the necessary groundwork of establishing what the various authors and their 
sources mean when they use these terms, we are left only with a collection of anecdotes 
masquerading as a database.  
  
Given the complexity of the source material, the sheer volume of data available and the 
fact that we are still in the process of developing our tools, it is important to restrain 
ourselves from adding too many layers of information without adequate thought or 
checks. By keeping matters simpler we can avoid serious pitfalls yet still make a 
meaningful contribution to the study of early Islamic history. The concubine/Arab status 
of a person’s mother is binary and in the vast majority of cases quite straightforward 
which simplifies data gathering.  
  
The success of the quantitative analysis of the rise of the concubine provides us with proof 
that the methodological programme outlined in Part One of this thesis is workable. It also 
allows us to move to the more complicated subject of marriages between Quraysh men 
and Arab women as we not only understand exogamy/endogamy better, but have faith in 
our methodological tools and source material.  
  
Before we do this however, we will continue our discussion of the concubine. The 
prosopographical study above has indicated that there was a massive increase in the 
number of children born to foreign slave women that coincided with the arrival of Islam.  
This may appear to require no further comment; the arrival of Islam led to the Arab 
conquests which gave the Quraysh access to large numbers of slave women. This 
translated into the practice of concubinage which would go on to become a common form 
of marriage for Muslim elites throughout the world until relatively recently.   
  
But we are lacking an explanation for this change in behaviour and the long-term survival 
of the practice; concubinage is not a significant component of the Qurʾān or the 
Prophetical ḥadīth literature and was not a widespread pre-Islamic practice in the Ḥijāz 
or anywhere else conquered by the Arabs. Major ruptures in social practice – especially 
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in areas as sensitive as marriage and legitimacy – do not happen without some sort of 
impetus. Unless we are prepared to believe that Arabs or Muslims are particularly 
libidinous (which, needless to say, takes us down some very dark Orientalist corridors) 
we must suggest a reason behind this transition – this is the subject of the next chapter.   
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The quantitative analysis of the marriage data preserved in the Nasab Quraysh as detailed 
in the previous chapter has allowed us to be more specific about the rate at which 
concubinage spread amongst the Muslim elites.228  The study showed that large numbers 
of men were taking concubines from the early Umayyad period onwards, and this change 
in marriage practice may even have begun during the time of the Rashīdūn caliphs. The 
study also suggested that there is little evidence that the majority of Muslims in the 
Umayyad era treated concubines and their progeny any differently to Muslims of later 
eras.  
  
But there is a problem with this alternative narrative because it does not explain why the 
Arab conquerors changed their marriage practices so quickly and in such a widespread 
fashion. Ruptures in social practice – especially in matters as sensitive as marriage and 
legitimacy – do not happen in a vacuum. There must have been some outside impetus and 
in this chapter we will suggest what forms this impetus could and could not have taken.   
  
We will begin by considering the obvious sources of changes in marriage behaviour, 
namely precedent. We have already shown in our graphs and tables above that 
concubinage was not widely practiced amongst the pre-Islamic Quraysh; here it will be 
shown that concubinage of the normative Islamic type was not a practice known to other 
peoples of the Late Antique Near East either. Having exhausted the possibility that the 
behaviour was borrowed we will turn to another seemingly obvious source of change in 
                                                 
228 While it is true that this research currently can only tell us about one tribe, it would be surprising if 
similar results were not found amongst other tribal groups; the Quraysh were numerous, diverse and 
influential so while it is possible to consider them some sort of outlying vanguard that the rest of the 




marriage behaviour – the Qurʾān and Prophetic practice. Here too we will find no obvious 
parallels between revelation and normative Islamic concubinage.  
  
In the final part of the chapter, it will be suggested that the emergence of Islamic 
concubinage was a result of the unique set of circumstances faced by the Muslims of the 
Umayyad era. Chief amongst these was that the tribal environment creates an enormous 
amount of pressure to create sons; not only could concubines satisfy this need, they could 
do it without the problems of split-loyalties and expense assosciated with Arab wives.229 
Elements of the tribal dynamic survived to the very end of the Umayyad era, and because 
of this concubinage survived the first military conquests and remained a relatively 
common form of elite Islamic marriage practice right into the twentieth century.  
  
Concubinage in law and practice  
  
In the ‘Definitions’ section of Chapter Four, we highlighted a number of key elements of 
Islamic concubinage, the most important of these being: Muslims allowed unrestricted 
concubinage; that children of these unions were considered full members of their tribes 
and societies; and that this type of union was very common amongst elites. It is the 
emergence of these three attributes that concerns us here.   
  
Concubinage of this form was not an extension of Ḥijāzī practice. Part of this has been 
established above with the quantitative analysis of the Nasab Quraysh showing that no 
Qurashī before the generation of Muḥammad’s grandfather (i.e. the generations born 
before the sixth century) is recorded as having had a concubine for a mother. Additionally 
only two hajīns are found in literature referring to pre-Islamic North Arabian literature.230 
                                                 
229 Jack Goody, The Oriental, the Ancient and the Primitive : Systems of Marriage and the Family in the 
Pre-industrial Societies of Eurasia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 362-363, on cousin 
marriage being cheaper, and page 364 on the links between a married woman and her father's family that 
continue after marriage. For a collection of reports concerning caliphal wives who may not have had their 
husbands’ best interests at heart see Abbott, “Women and the State in Early Islam,” 353-354.  
230 EQ, s.v. “Concubine” (Jonathan Brockopp).  
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Nor does the term umm walad appear in the Qurʾān or in the ḥadīths. According to 
Brockopp’s survey a woman with some comparable legal characteristics makes a first 
appearance in an anecdote dated to ʿUmar I’s reign, but even here the term ‘umm walad’ 
is not used.231   
  
Where textual evidence does exist, the indications are that the hajīns of pre-Islamic Arabia 
were automatically considered as slaves at birth and they would remain in this state unless 
the father chose to recognise them as full heirs. This was the case with the sixth century 
poet and hero ʿAntara, who was raised as a slave (following his mother’s status) before 
his father rewarded him with recognition as a full son following a demonstration of valour 
in battle.232   
  
Pre-Islamic Arabian practice in this regard has parallels with elements of the ancient law 
code of Hammurabi and reported Achaemenid customs, but it is harder to establish what 
non-Arabian norms concerning concubinage were extant the period immediately prior to 
the Islamic conquests.233 The Jewish position on the subject is particularly difficult to 
ascertain; although concubinage appears in Biblical texts, it seems to have fallen out of 
favour a long time before the birth of Muḥammad and is rarely mentioned.234 We can 
only say that in later periods Jewish legal authorities under Islamic rule prohibited Jews 
from sexual intercourse with their slave women on pain of death. It was also forbidden 
for a Jewish man to even live under the same roof as a slave girl if he did not also cohabit 
with a close female relative.235   
  
                                                 
231 Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law, 195-196.  
232 EI2, s.v. “ʿAntara” (R. Blachere).  
233 For the law code of Hammurabi, see stipulations 170-171(Martha Roth, Law Collections from 
Mesopotamia and Asia Minor (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 113-114). In the Achaemenid period, the 
children of concubines had a second-class status, and they were termed by the Greeks as ‘nothus’, 
meaning illegitimate. EIr, s.v. “Harem: In Ancient Iran” (A. Shapur Shahbazi).  
234 Encyclopaedia Judaica, s.v. “Concubine: in the Talmudic Period and the Middle Ages” (Louis 
Rabinowitz).  
235 S. D. Goitein, “Slaves and Slavegirls in the Cairo Geniza Records,” Arabica 9, no. 1 (1962), 6. These 
practices could of course have been a product of the Jewish community wishing to differentiate itself 
from the Muslim majority.  
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With regards to Christian communities, not only was their understanding of concubinage 
completely different to the normative Islamic version (as discussed in Chapter Four), but 
they had banned this more limited practice a long time before the conquests. The first 
instance of this prohibition is dated to Constantine I (r. 306-337), though laws regarding 
the inheritance rights of children did later appear in the Near Eastern provinces (these 
children got some rights rather than none).236 Despite this small caveat, there is still no 
way we can equate derivations of the Roman practice of concubinatus as it existed in the 
seventh century Christian Near East with concubinage as practiced by Muslims – and it 
is safe to say that the Christians utterly condemned Islamic behaviour in this regard. We 
can see this in the purported letter of Leo III to ʿUmar II:  
    
And what shall I say of the execrable debauchery which you commit with your 
concubines? For you are prodigal with them of all your fortune, and then, when 
you are tired of them you sell them like dumb cattle.237  
  
As for Christians living in the Sasanian Empire, the evidence is sparse. Brockopp refers 
to the Syriac law text of the Church of the East which says in the case of a non-legal 
marriage with a slave woman resulting in children, the slave woman is freed on the 
master’s death but the children “have no right to be seen as heirs or [legitimate] children 
of the deceased.” While there are parallels between this practice and that of Islamic 
concubinage, we have a problem (noted by Brockopp) in the late date of its composition; 
it was probably written in the early ʿAbbāsid era.238  
  
                                                 
236 “Concubine”, Glen Warren Bowersock, Peter Robert Lamont Brown, and Oleg Grabar, Late Antiquity: 
A Guide to the Postclassical World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).   
237 Arthur Jeffrey, “Ghevond’s Text of the Correspondence Between ‘Umar II and Leo III,” Harvard 
Theological Review 37, no.4 (1944), 325-326. Further evidence of negative attitudes towards Muslim 
marriage practices can also be found in these pages, especially note 83. The shame of being descended 
from a concubine was so great according to Sozomenus, writing in the 440s, that the name ‘Saracen’ 
itself was an attempt to forge a genealogical link to Abraham’s wife, Sarah (Fergus Millar, “Hagar, 
Ishmael, Josephus and the Origins of Islam,” Journal of Jewish Studies no. 1 (1993): 42. For a Christian 
rejection of polygamy see John Meyendorff, “Byzantine Views of Islam,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 18 
(1964):120121.  
238 Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law, 194. Translation Brockopp’s from Sachau’s Syrische Rechtsbucher.  
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Amongst the Sasanian elites and the Mazdaeans the situation is slightly different in that 
intercourse with slave women was permitted. But the second part of the Islamic practice 
– that the children were automatically legitimate – was explicitly not a feature of the 
institution. The Shāh himself would choose a chief wife who would be the only woman 
through which legitimate heirs could be produced.239 As for the non-elites, a Mazdaean 
law book dating from just before the Islamic conquests says that “up to the reign of 
Wahrām” (420-439 CE according to Macuch)240 the status of children followed that of 
the father. The law book explains this early custom by referring back to a third century 
jurist who stated that “the child belongs to the father.”241 But after this point the law code 
explicitly states that the child follows the mother’s status; this too is divergent from 
Islamic practice.  
  
So with the taking of concubines, and the full acceptance of their offspring, the Muslims 
did something that contrasted with the prevailing norms of every major Near-Eastern 
religious practice of the conquest era – including that of the pre-Islamic Ḥijāz. By 
allowing unlimited concubinage they were overturning the Roman understanding of it 
being a monogamous institution, and by allowing it at all they were in conflict with Jewish 
and Christian law. Even in the only religious system that did allow concubinage in 
something approaching the Islamic sense – the Mazdaean – there were important 
discrepancies. The Muslims did not continue the concept of a chief wife who produced 
heirs for the king, and their practice was also in conflict with the Mazdaean law declaring 






                                                 
239 E. Ir., s.v. “Harem: In Ancient Iran” (A. Shapur Shahbazi).   
240 There were more than one Wahrām’s; Macuch has selected the most recent. See E. Ir., s.v. “Barda and  
Barda-Dāri: in the Sasanian Period” (Maria Macuch)  
241 E. Ir., s.v. “Barda and Barda-Dāri: in the Sasanian Period” (Maria Macuch).   
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Understanding the emergence and survival of concubinage  
  
It is logical at this point to turn to the Qurʾān and Muḥammad’s example on the basis that 
such an unprecedented sea-change in seventh century Arab social behaviour must be 
related to the revelation of Islam. But neither in the Prophet’s practice nor in the Qurʾān 
do we find the normative framework for the umm walad and hajīn.  
  
In terms of the Qurʾān, the exegetes have explained that it permits a Muslim man to take 
as many concubines as he wants; this goes back to a number of references in the Qurʾān 
where the curious expression mā malakat aymānakum (‘that which your right hands 
possess’) is used in the context of a list of those with whom intercourse is permitted. The 
exegetes explain that this term should be understood in Arabic as meaning ‘umm walad’ 
with little further discussion.242  
  
But this is the limit of what the Qurʾān can tell us with regard to the institution of 
concubinage. Mā malakat aymānakum as a reference to a woman with whom a man has 
right of sexual access is clear, and elsewhere in the Qurʾān she is linked with winnings 
from successful battles.243 But this does not mean she is a slave, and a free Arab woman 
taken in battle from a local tribe is a very different category of person to the deracinated 
concubine.244 There is also no mention made of the status of her children meaning that 
the Muslims could have discriminated against the progeny if they so wished (the fact a 
person is a Muslim is not necessarily a guarantee of equality in law – as we see with 
Muslim women and Muslim slaves in general). As Brockopp notes, mā malakat 
                                                 
242 Harald Motzki, “Wal-muhsanatu mina n-nisa'i illa ma malakat aimanukum (Koran 4: 24) und die 
koranische Sexualethik,” Der Islam 63, no. 2 (1986): 192-218.  
243 Q 33:50 – “Prophet, we have made lawful for you the wives (azwājaka) whose bride gift you have 
paid, and those whom your hands possess given to you by God as the spoils of war (wa mā malakat 
yamīnuka mimmā afāʾa Allāh ʿalayku).”  
244 The difficulty in making any sort of generalised remarks about marriage through capture are elucidated 
by R. H. Barnes in “Marriage by Capture,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 5, no. 1 
(1999). Here it is shown that ‘capture’ not only involves varying degrees of willingness on the part of the 
captive, but false accusations of using capture as a source of spouses were useful as polemic against 
neighbouring tribes.  
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aymānakum could refer to a lesser type of marriage;245 indeed it does bring to mind the 
Roman institution of the in manus246 marriage, which was a lower class of marriage in 
comparison to the full variety.   
 
The hadīth corpus is not a great deal more helpful; as discussed above in relation to 
Brockopp’s work (where the term umm walad could not be found in the sources 
concerned with Muḥammad’s time) concubinage was not a common occurrence in the 
Prophetic era. The result is that a small number of tales appear repeatedly in the discussion 
of the legal implications of concubinage, one of which involves the (by now familiar) 
figure of Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās. In this story, Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās claims that a certain boy 
is a relative of his through his brother and a slave girl. Muḥammad’s brother-in-law 
(through his wife Sawda bt. Zamʿa) counters this, saying that the boy was actually born 
to the slave girl on the bed (firāsh) of his father. In response, Muḥammad rules against 
Saʿd with the maxim (mathal) “al-walad li-l-firāsh wa-li-l-ʿāhir al-ḥajar” – which is 
normally interpreted as “the child belongs to the bed, and the fornicator gets nothing” 
(ḥajar is less commonly, though more literally translated as ‘the stone’).247   
  
Earlier Western scholars were very doubtful of the Prophetic provenance of this mathal, 
with Schacht going so far as to say it is “incompatible with the Koran.”248 But further 
work by Motzki and Rubin has established that not only are there supporting reports of 
Muḥammad acting in accordance with the maxim, at one stage it may even have been part 
of the Qurʾān that did not make it into the ʿUthmānic codex.249   
  
                                                 
245 EI2, s.v. “Concubines” (Jonathon Brockopp).  
246 For further discussion on in manus marriage see Archie Bush and Joseph McHugh, “Patterns of 
Roman Marriage,” Ethnology 14, no. 1 (1975): 27.  
247 Uri Rubin, “‘Al-Walad li-l-Firāsh’ on the Islamic Campaign Against “Zināʾ,” Studia Islamica 78 
(1993): 5.  
248 Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 181. Goldziher was similarly skeptical; Muslim 
Studies, 1:174, note 2.  
249 Harald Motzki, “The Muṣannaf of ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī as a Source of Authentic Aḥādīth of the  
First Century A. H.,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 50, no. 1 (1991): 16 ff; Rubin, “Al-Walad li-
lFirāsh,” 18-19. Powers has also discussed the issues of paternity relating to missing sections of the 
Qurʾān; see Powers, Muhammad is not the Father, 65-66.  
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Although this anecdote may refer to an actual event, and the maxim uttered by 
Muḥammad may also have been an accurate reflection of what he said, neither it nor the 
Qurʾānic references help us a great deal with the origins of the distinctive characteristics 
of the Muslim concubine. First of all, we have the established problem of the example of 
Muḥammad and the stipulations of the Qurʾān not being the pre-eminent sources of law 
for early Muslims.250 In addition to this, there is a lot the Qurʾān and hadīths do not tell 
us (such as the change to the slave girl’s status upon pregnancy or the status of the child), 
so we are again left wondering how it was that the Muslim polity quickly adopted and 
maintained a practice that had no heritage in its own pre-Islamic context or the preIslamic 
context of the Near East.  
  
The evolution of sexual ethics  
  
Given all this, the expected narrative might have been that concubines were taken in the 
first flush of military success and then abandoned when the conquerors were faced with 
the condemnation of the subject populations and the lack of Prophetic justification for the 
practice. After all, this is what we see happening to other closely related matters of sexual 
ethics and paternity which seem to be veering to the norms of the written nonIslamic law 
codes of the Near East in exactly the same period. This is despite the fact that in some 
instances this accommodation takes place even when it directly contradicts explicit 
Qurʾānic edicts. Consider the following examples:  
  
1) Rajm (stoning to death): This is the punishment for adultery in Islamic law, 
which is at complete variance to the non-capital punishment of flogging 
stipulated in the Qurʾān.251 In some traditions this discrepancy led to the story 
of forgotten sūras which should have abrogated the parts of the Qurʾān that 
                                                 
250 G.H.A. Juynboll, Muslim Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 30 ff.;Patricia  
Crone and Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 58 ff.   
251 EI2, s.v. “Zinā or Zīnā” (R. Peters); John Burton, The Collection of the Qur’an (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), 72-82, 89-94.  
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limit the punishment to flogging; this is just one of a number of creative 
measures employed by later jurists to overrule the verse.252  
2) Mutʿa: This term refers to temporary marriage, which is mentioned in the  
Qurʾān, and according to some reports was both practiced and sanctioned by 
Muḥammad. Ultimately it was prohibited in Sunni Islam (normally through 
reference to a ḥadīth of ʿUmar where he bans it).253  
3) Istilḥāq: This refers to a number of different ways in which paternal 
genealogical relationships can be modified; here it will be translated as 
‘adoption’.254 Powers has argued that the Qurʾān does not prohibit adoption, 
and the fact that normative Islam would later take such a hard line against this 
practice is a result of the doctrinal implications of the existence of  
Muḥammad’s own adopted son.255  
  
In all these cases we have examples where the Qurʾānic stipulations been overridden by 
later jurists. In cases 2) and 3) above, ambiguity in the Qurʾān led to a number of intensely 
argued legal debates that ultimately resulted in a banning of the practice in most cases. In 
case 1) however, the Qurʾānic injunction is at complete variance with the opinions of the 
later jurists, resulting in an extended legal discourse on the matter and in some cases the 
generation of a story of a ‘forgotten’ sūra.   
  
Quite why the Muslim jurists went in this direction is beyond the realms of scholarly 
knowledge; the juristic material as it survives today is the end product of around two 
centuries of oral debate to which we have no access. We also have no idea the extent to 
which these juristic norms affected actual social behaviour, or vice-versa. But the 
direction of travel appears to be towards the norms of the written laws of the existing 
                                                 
252 For discussion see chapter seven of John Burton's The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of 
Abrogation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990).  
253 EI2, s.v. “Mutʿa” (W. Heffening).  
254 This is a necessary over-simplification; for the full range of meanings istilḥāq can take see 
LandauTasseron, “Adoption, Acknowledgement of Paternity,” 180 ff.  
255 Powers, Muhammad is not the Father, 68-71.  
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settled populations of the Near East; this is particularly true of stoning adulterers (a 
Biblical punishment) and the ban on temporary marriage. Relaxed attitudes towards 
sexual ethics on the other hand can be found in non-settled societies (the Bedouin 
observed by Musil had a surprisingly permissive attitude towards extra-marital sex).256 
The Qurʾān, in the instances where it is concerned with law, appears to follow the more 
pragmatic approach of these groups than the restrictive written law of the cities.257   
 
We cannot go so far as to suggest a direct link between the written law of the conquered 
populations and the conclusions of the jurists. As Burton notes with regard to the “striking 
coincidence” that the Islamic penalty for adultery – along with its justification – mirrors 
that in Karāite Judaism, current scholarship is such that we are in no position to do any 
more than draw attention to the fact. We simply do not know – and may never know – 
enough about the nature of the contacts of the Muslims with their non-Muslim subjects 
over the course of the first two Islamic centuries to be able to make assertions about the 
origins of these social norms.258  
  
The usefulness of these three cases however is that they throw the institution of 
concubinage into sharp relief. The Muslim jurists of the first centuries of Islam could have 
done to the practice of concubinage what they did to adultery penalties, temporary 
marriage and adoption by making them less permissible. We should also not be fooled 
into thinking that the existence of the expression mā malakat aymānakum and the firāsh 
maxim were enough to offer any clues that normative concubinage would emerge and 
survive; Qurʾānic support was no guarantee of survival. There was clearly something 
about concubinage that ensured it emerged and lasted.  
  
                                                 
256 Musil reports that pregnancy before marriage was common amongst the girls of the Rwala Bedouin, 
and this was normally dealt with by their families through abortion (Manner and Customs, 240).  
257 Despite being ostensibly strict about such matters, comparable tolerance of extra-marital sex is found 
in a number of other tribal cultures. For contemporary example in a polygamous societies see Yasuko 
Hayase and Kao-Lee Liaw, “Factors on Polygamy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Findings Based on the 
Demographic and Health Surveys,” Developing Economies 35, no. 3 (1997): 297.  
258 Burton, Collection of the Qur’ān, 71.  
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Before we move to our explanation for this difference we will provide a quick summary 
of the above. The pre-Islamic Arabians of the Ḥijāz probably owned slave women and 
had intercourse with them, though there is little evidence that this was particularly 
widespread. The few offspring of these unions were presumed slaves unless the father 
chose to change their status (e.g. ‘Antara). Concubines were still uncommon amongst 
Muslims of the Prophetic era; this is supported by the near-complete absence of 
unambiguous references to the institution in the Qurʾān and recorded Prophetic practice. 
Despite this, according to the narrative suggested by the trends in the nasab data, the 
Arabs took concubines in large numbers as soon as the conquests began.   
  
When the inevitable children of these unions arrived, there is no conclusive evidence that 
they were treated as anything less than equals from birth. The result is a widespread 
practice that can be considered a novelty in terms of both the practitioners’ pre-Islamic 
behaviour and that of the peoples they conquered. Additionally, the institution flourished 
in the context of a majority non-Muslim post-conquest world that condemned this form 
of marriage. That the Arabs might be influenced by pre-Islamic Near Eastern norms can 
possibly be seen in the way Muslim attitudes on other matters of sexual ethics evolved in 
the period - even where these had better pre-Islamic, Qurʾānic and Prophetic support.  
  
Emergence of concubinage: a hypothesis  
  
For an explanation of the origins of concubinage we have taken two standard routes 
followed by both modern scholarship and the Islamic tradition. The first has been to locate 
it in pre-Islamic practice (both Arabian and Near Eastern) but here we found no direct 
parallels. The second approach (the one more familiar to traditional Islamic scholarship) 
aimed to locate the practice in the Qurʾān and the example of the Prophet. As before, we 





The failure of both these approaches in explaining the origins of concubinage forces us to 
consider the complexities social change for the period in question. In his work Studies in 
Early Muslim Jurisprudence, Calder found himself at a similar juncture with regard to 
the origins of Islamic law codes. The traditional scholarship strove to place the origins of 
Islamic law in a single time and place (seventh century Arabia), but this was an 
unsatisfactory explanation for the modern scholar because it could not be reconciled with 
how these codes evolved and what was actually in the works themselves. Calder found 
modern scholarship similarly wanting as it sought to ascribe the origins of Islamic law to 
the non-Islamic law codes of the Near-East. The problems here were that the modern 
scholars had not taken enough consideration of the differences between the different legal 
systems, or the ease of parallel evolution or (most importantly) the complete lack of 
interest the legal works seem to show in either other faiths or realworld situations.259  
  
Calder’s conclusion was that neither of these approaches can generate compelling results; 
as he put it “The origins of Muslim culture lie in the experience of the Muslim 
communities of the Middle East and in the uncountable systematic responses to that 
experience.” His response was to root the origins of Islamic law in the cities and time 
periods in which it actually emerged (e.g. early medieval Baghdad and Qayrawān); not 
the cities and time periods that its texts refer to (Prophetic and conquest era Baṣra, Kūfa 
and Medina).260  
  
The riddle of what the law might have been in the pre-classical period is not one Calder 
attempts to answer in his work; he makes the point that law in the earlier period was oral 
and informal which lends itself very poorly to literary study. But our interest here is not 
law, it is concubinage, about which we now seem to know a lot in this very period of 
                                                 
259 The whole book is dedicated to establishing this; the most useful synopsis can be found in Chapter 
Eight.  
260 Norman Calder, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 208.  
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Islamic history thanks to our quantitative analysis of the Nasab Quraysh.261 This means 
we are well-placed to reconsider its origins.  
  
Ethics and elites  
  
If neither pre-existing practice nor revelation were the origins of concubinage, we will 
propose a third factor – the evolving needs of the elite Muslims in the social context of 
the Rashīdūn and Umayyad eras. ‘Elite’ here does not just comprise the caliphs and their 
families; it means the thousands of members (male and female) of the leading Arab 
families of the early conquerors and converts, the most important single constituency of 
which would have been the Quraysh. By understanding the needs of this group, we can 
perhaps suggest more satisfactory explanations for the evolution of Islamic sexual ethics.   
  
The hypothesis here is that attitudes towards adultery, fosterage and temporary marriage 
became increasingly hardened following the death of Muḥammad because they were 
precisely the sexual ethics that concerned the elites the least. Harsher punishments for 
adultery are of less concern to men who usually had access to limitless women and whose 
wealth was able to maintain a physical segregation between the genders that had been 
impossible in the pre-Islamic era.262 Because of this they would not have reason to resist 
their legal scholars who modified jāhilī and Prophetic-era permissiveness and over the 
course of generations introduce opinions more akin to the official practices of the non-
Ḥijāzī urban populations they mingled amongst.  
                                                 
261 In fact, Calder suggests caliphal and gubernatorial practices may have been the starting point for law 
and that this represents a potentially fruitful avenue for future study (he lists “fiscal law, law of war, and 
penal law” as possible areas of interest with the caveat that this “is no more than a first thought on this 
matter and is probably subject both to expansion and to qualification” (Calder, Early Muslim  
Jurisprudence, 221)). As concubinage is very much a caliphal practice our investigation into its origins 
may represent just such an expansion.   
262 The word ‘usually’ is included here as even the most powerful men sometimes had a check on their 
ability to acquire women. For instance, al-Ṭabarī tells us that al-Manṣūr’s wife made him sign a 
declaration that he will take no more wives or concubines while he is married to her. He responds by 
repeatedly asking lawyers for ways to get out of this clause, and in one case the wife bribes the caliph’s 
faqīh in order for the judgement to go in her favour rather than her husband’s. When the wife died he took 
a hundred virgin concubines (Taʾrīkh, 3:423 (translation 29:127-128)).  
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With the abrogation of temporary marriage the scholars were also successful in bringing 
what was probably an early Islamic practice into line with what the conquered populations 
considered more normal, although it survived in Twelver Shīʿism (not Zaydī) rather than 
suffer from totally eradication.263 Following the reasoning above, the reason for this was 
that the elites had little use for mutʿa; it - like adultery - was of little use to men who had 
access to many women. As it was divergent from the marriage practices of most of the 
subject populations,264 without any constituency of support it too could vanish from what 
was considered normative Islamic behaviour by the ʿulamā without upsetting their 
political superiors.  
  
The stickiest of the three altered practices was adoption because the ability to manipulate 
paternity still appealed to elites as a means of rewarding or ensuring loyalty. There are 
numerous examples of Muslims attempting to incorporate others into their lineages; the 
most famous one being that of Muʿāwiya’s attempt to claim that he and Ziyād b. Abīhi 
shared a father (not adoption per se, but still an attempt to join another individual into a 
descent line through a freshly created genealogical claim).265 Ultimately though, this did 
nothing to change the long-term trajectory of social opinion; adoption would later be 
completely outlawed in normative Islam.266   
  
This demise was partly due to theological concerns (as argued by Powers),267 but a more 
significant problem is that it was not universally beneficial to the elite constituency. An 
individual unilaterally adding people to his family was likely to provoke objections from 
the family’s existing members – especially when there was the prospect of significant 
                                                 
263 Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 266–267. 
264 Temporary marriage has some Mazdaean precedent – Young notes that temporary marriage (though 
specifically ten years long) appears three times in the Mādigān ī hazār dādistān (Walter Young, Stoning 
and Hand Amputation: the pre-Islamic Origins of the Ḥadd Penalties for Zināa and Sariqa (unpublished 
dissertation: 2005), 225)  
265 Rubin, “Al-Walad li-l-Firāsh,” 14.  
266 Adoption was also negatively viewed in Sasanian and Roman law (Powers, Muḥammad is not the 
Father, 61).  
267 Powers, Muhammad is Not the Father. His theory is that because Muḥammad adopted a son, and this 
son had children who outlived Muḥammad, there was potentially a line of Prophets that could make a 
claim on the leadership of the umma.  
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inheritance. This can be compounded with insensitive language; in Muʿāwiya’s case, the 
caliph managed to offend the prospective adoptee’s family with his suggestion that his 
brotherhood with Ziyād originated in his father’s congress with a prostitute.268   
  
Adoption could only have survived if it provided mutual benefit for the parties concerned 
without any negative consequences for their wider social and familial connections. 
Muḥammad’s adoption of Zayd was initially a perfect instance of how this should work 
as it connected a man removed from his people with an orphaned and otherwise sonless 
man who had no siblings.269 Even here, the adoption eventually did turn out to have 
negative consequences for others (later Muslims as argued by Powers), and this may have 
been a factor in its ban in normative Islam.   
  
The survival of adoption was ultimately imperilled by the increasing bureaucratisation of 
the Muslim polity. In the early decades, the more informal, tribal structures of the empire 
meant adoption would have been a logical way of incorporating talented outsiders into a 
ruling family. But in later periods, outsiders would have been more interested in acquiring 
lucrative posts and regional governorships than nominal inclusion in a lineage (we return 
to this theme in Chapter Eight). While adoption almost certainly continued amongst many 
lower-ranking Muslims – even perhaps amongst the Quraysh270 – it was not enough to 
secure the preservation of the practise in normative Islam.  
  
                                                 
268 EI2, s.v. “Ziyād b. Abīhi” (I. Hasson). 
269 Cf. Ella Landau-Tasseron, “Adoption, Acknowledgement of Paternity,” 169–192. Her assertion that 
adoption was infrequent in the pre-conquest era (page 171) because it has little textual support is 
unconvincing; a successful adoption means the new person is seamlessly grafted into an existing 
genealogy (she does concede this to a degree on page 172).   
270 The database also suggests the ʿAbbāsids in the era of the daʿwa may have been using adoption to 
connect the leadership with its followers. This comes from the odd finding that the man recorded as 
having had more sons than any other in the Nasab Quraysh is the otherwise obscure ʿAlī b. ʿAbd Allāh b. 
ʿAbbās – the father of Muḥammad who was instrumental in organizing the movement during its 
underground phase. Most of these 22 sons do not reappear in the Nasab Quraysh or in other sources. Was 
Muḥammad recruiting agents to his project by rewarding them with fictive genealogies? We should recall 
that the word used to describe the ʿAbbāsid project during the pre-revolutionary era was daʿwa which 




Appeal of concubinage  
  
Concubinage did not suffer the same fate as the three practices mentioned above because 
it benefited large numbers of men at an acceptable cost to wider society – indeed it may 
be that the widespread use of concubinage hastened the demise of the three changes in 
sexual ethics mentioned above. The most important facets of concubinage were its ability 
to provide many sons without the problems related to money (no dowries were required) 
and the potentially destabilising effect marriage a marriage to an elite woman could have 
on the balance of power between the various tribal groupings. This was no different to 
any other court culture, but the Islamic case is different because the social networks of 
the elite were tribal at the time of the conquests, and this dynamic took a very long time 
to disappear. In the diffuse, power-sharing environment of a tribal political culture, both 
the pressure to produce sons and the negative impact of in-laws were more acutely felt 
than in royal courts that owed less of their structure to tribal relationships.  
  
As we learnt in the previous chapter, a concubine mother may have been a barrier to 
political success on account of her deracination, but a concubine wife was a different 
matter entirely. Having the capacity to reproduce using concubines meant that Arab elites 
could generate large numbers of their most important social relationships; namely father-
son, brother-brother and cousin-uncle. The more of these connections a man enjoyed the 
more likely he would be to have a successful career. Unlike the situation in a non-tribal 
society, one son was not enough to serve as an heir; the heir needed brothers, and the 
heir’s sons would need uncles in order to prevail.  
  
The necessity of sons and brothers as a component of political success in a tribal society 
is difficult to quantify, but we should note that a number of high-profile early Muslims 
lacked these connections and it may have been that their religious bonds were a 
convenient supplement. Muḥammad’s situation is a case in point; from an early age he 
had no father-son relationships of any sort (until the adoption of Zayd), and he never had 
any brothers. In terms of a lack of brothers he was not alone – the Nasab Quraysh tells us 
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that none of the first three caliphs had a full-brother (Abū Bakr and ʿUthmān had no 
paternal brothers; ʿUmar had a paternal half brother).271 As such, all these men were in a 
genealogically precarious position.  
  
Hence it may be that the Islamic message was tailored to appeal to men in a similar 
situation. Establishing this is not easy; although the Qurʾān is full of references to 
brotherhood it is difficult to differentiate between the moments where it is using a 
standard monotheist metaphor and where it is speaking of something more literal.272 More 
securely, we can point to the use of brotherhood in the historical events of Muḥammad’s 
life; for instance, the arrival of the Muslims in Medina after the Hijra was followed by a 
brothering event between the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār (there may have been other 
brotherings prior to this in Mecca involving Muḥammad himself).273 We should also note 
that in the Medinan case these brotherings were explicitly instituted in order to solve 
potential problems of inheritance claims from family members who had refused to 
convert; they are not purely metaphorical. While more research is needed on this, 
brotherhood for early Muslims seems to have been something more than a Late Antique 
scriptural trope.274  
  
Ultimately Islam was unable to replace the old tribal loyalties with its more egalitarian 
vision of an umma. Once most Ḥijāzī tribes had converted, a Muslim brother was no 
longer remarkable and the old rules still applied; biological brothers were the ones that 
                                                 
271 For Abū Bakr see page 275, for ʿUthmān see pages 101-104, for ʿUmar see page 347. 
272 EQ, s.v. “Brothers and brotherhood” (Roy Mottahedeh).  
273 These were occasions were two men would become brothers for the purpose of inheritance. EI2, s.v. 
“Muʾākhāt” (W. Montgomery Watt).  
274 Although the connection between political success and the number of sons has not had a great deal of 
anthropological attention, mention should be made of Beverly Mack’s observation that “I have lived long 
enough in the Kano harem to know that it is all about sons, sons, sons, not sex, sex, sex. One needs a big 
offspring pool from which the kingmakers choose if the kingship is to be kept in the family.” From 
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, “Women, Marriage, and Slavery in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Nineteenth 
Century,” in Women and Slavery: Africa, the Indian Ocean World, and the Medieval North Atlantic, eds. 
Gwyn Campbell, Suzanne Myers and Joseph Miller (Athens (Ohio): Ohio University Press, 2007), 70.  
The quote is from personal correspondence with Coquery-Vidrovitch; for Mack’s related academic work 
see “Royal Wives in Kano,” in Hausa Women in the Twentieth Century, eds. Catherine Coles and 
Beverley Mack (Madison (Wisconsin): University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 109–129  
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counted and by producing a large number of sons you were giving your lineage the best 
chance of survival.275 The need to produce sons was partly satisfied through polygamy, 
but marriage was costly and could be problematic given the split loyalties of the wives. 
By allowing sexual intercourse with the newly-acquired foreign slave women, and 
stipulating that the children of these unions were fully legitimate from birth, Islamic 
society offered an attractive supplement to standard marriage.   
  
For the highest echelons of the elite (notably the caliphs and their most serious opponents) 
the need to create large numbers of sons diminished as the empire matured. This was 
because new ways to secure a loyal following were emerging, such as the distribution of 
resources through appointments or largesse. The influence of money and the dispersion 
of families across the empire ultimately reduced the loyalty of brothers; a high profile 
example of this being ʿAbd Allāh b. Zubayr whose brother ʿUrwa allied himself to the 
Umayyad cause shortly after the Zubayrid caliph’s downfall in 692.276   
  
By the time the legal schools were establishing themselves in the ʿAbbāsid period the 
concubine was an established element of the Islamic court. The lawyers were unlikely to 
develop or maintain a legal position of prohibition as it would have been very unpopular, 
and so concubinage became an unremarkable part of normative Islam. Eventually the 
practice acquired pseudo-historical support through the tales of high profile hajīn 
religious scholars (such as Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn) who won over the once-chauvinistic 
Muslims.   
  
                                                 
275 Interestingly, we are told that Muʿāwiya (whom we saw above attempting to adopt a brother) was 
rendered infertile by a botched Khārijite assassination attempt around the time he assumed the caliphate 
(al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 1:3464-3465 (translation 17:223)). While the exact details of this story may not all be 
accurate, it is interesting that the infertility of the caliph concurs with the fact that our statistical analysis 
reveals him to have produced a remarkably small number of children for such a powerful and long-lived 
man. This lack of depth with regards to progeny may have been a contributing factor towards the later 
usurpation of the Sufyānid dynasty, and it may also provide an explanation as to why he was so keen to 
incorporate Ziyād into his family.  
276 EI2, s.v. “ʿUrwa b. al-Zubayr” (G. Schoeler). 
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Another reason that the concubine continued to survive as a feature of the Islamic court 
was the fact that the tribal-to-imperial trajectory was followed by a number of other 
notable non-Arab elites in later centuries. For example, the Ottoman sultans were born of 
freewomen until they established themselves at Constantinople in 1453, after which point 
they were produced by concubines. Other converts to Islam, from West Africa to 
Mongolia, could see the benefits offered by concubinage and repeatedly adopted the 
practice; we can only presume that this was due to political expediency. In terms of the 
longevity of its appeal, we should note that the Kano harem still had concubines in the 
1990s.277   
  
So, unlike some other aspects of sexual ethics practiced by the first Muslims, concubinage 
did not veer towards the norms of the first societies conquered by Arabs because it was 
too useful to too many elites over too long a period of time. By the time legal opinions on 
the matter were beginning to crystallise, 278  the concubine and the hajīn were 
unremarkable parts of both Islamic history and the wealthier urban Muslim family.  
  
As for the reports decrying the incorporation of hajīns and concubines into Muslim 
society these are more likely to be vestigial remains of conservative attitudes. These 
would have most likely have been held by members of the conquered societies; not only 
non-Muslims but also converts. Equally likely is the existence of a minority of Arab 
chauvinists who had converted to Islam but retained older social norms. Given the 
viciousness of the invective directed against the hajīns and concubines we cannot deny 
                                                 
277 Heidi J. Nast, “Islam, Gender, and Slavery in West Africa Circa 1500: A Spatial Archaeology of the 
Kano Palace, Northern Nigeria,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 86, no. 1 (1996): 
71, note 1.  
278 That there are no surviving legal works from before 150 A.H. is an indicator of the period when the 
crystallisation on this matter must have taken hold (date from Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law, 147). 
Brockopp also argues that the lack of interest in the origins of the umm walad and the mukātab in Ibn 
ʿAbd al-Ḥakam’s work (despite the fact that neither term is found in the Qurʾān or ḥadīth) as being “an 
attempt to present both of these slaves as long-accepted institutions in Islamic law” (page 204). This 
indicates that the concubine was well established in terms of her presence in Muslim society and it was 
only the legal scholars who had to catch up by reconciling their conflicting arguments on the matter.  
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the existence of some deep-seated hostility towards these groups; we simply question the 
Goldziher argument’s contention that these beliefs were at all widely-held.  
  
The origins of Islamic law  
  
This alternative narrative for the rise of Islamic concubinage means we can reappraise 
other narratives of the emergence of Islamic law, particularly narratives that root this law 
in pre-existing practices. A typical approach is that of Crone in Roman, Provincial and 
Islamic Law where she argues that Islamic civilization borrowed heavily from Greek and 
Persian provincial practice. Her aim in this is to counter the existing notion that “Sundry 
elements apart, one is assured, Islamic civilization is simply Ḥijāzī culture writ large”, a 
view that “rests on nothing but a documentary sleight of hand.”279  
  
The rise of concubinage brings the premise of this argument into question. In the first 
instance, we have already shown that concubinage was not a common practice of the 
conquered societies, and where it did it appear it was phrased in terms of condemnation 
– the Muslims could not therefore have borrowed it. But nor can concubinage be seen as 
an example of “Ḥijāzī culture writ large”; even to the limited extent that it was practiced 
by the Arabs prior to the conquests, it existed in a very different form - one that ascribed 
markedly fewer rights to both mother and child.  
  
The normalisation of concubinage cannot therefore be characterised as an Islamisation of 
Ḥijāzī or Near Eastern cultural/legal practices. It is instead the result of human innovation. 
The early Islamic elites had a need (producing sons), and they satisfied this need through 
pragmatism (buying concubines). Eventually, legal cover was provided for this by a 
creative interpretation of the ḥadīth and Qurʾān (predominantly the use of the firāsh 
maxim and the Qurʾānic expression mā malakat aymānakum).   
 
                                                 







The potential of prosopographical approaches when applied to the study of early Islamic 
history is evinced in the way that even at this most basic level of quantitative analysis we 
can spark a scholarly inquiry that draws in social, legal, political and historical material. 
The fact that we can do this for the first century of Islam makes it even more significant.  
  
The data show that concubinage was adopted by large numbers of Qurashī men of the 
fifth and sixth generations; in other words, contemporaries of Muḥammad. This must 
have happened as soon as concubines became available to them, and was not the result of 
a small number of hajīn children proving their worthiness in the manner of ʿAntara in 
pre-Islamic poetry. While there is certainly evidence of discriminatory attitudes towards 
the hajīn, these are not reflections of the sorts of social divisions we see between the 
Arabs and the mawlās; evidence for social parity can be seen in their marriage behaviour 
and alternative explanations for the late emergence of the hajīn caliph.  
  
Concubinage as it existed in the first decades of Islam was therefore likely to have been 
broadly the same in social terms as it was in the ʿAbbāsid period, and as it remained in 
later Islamic courts. Men were not condemned for entering into sexual relationships with 
slave women and the children of these unions were considered full heirs. But upon 
accepting this we are then forced to consider where the Arabs got the concept from; it had 
no precedence in either the pre-Islamic Ḥijāz or the conquered territories. The solution 
offered here is one of Muslim innovation; the early elites solved a problem (winning the 
fecundity arms race) in a novel way using the tools to hand (concubinage, which they 
made licit through interpreting ambiguous phrases in the Qurʾān).   
  
The investigation has also highlighted the fact that previous narratives of the emergence 
of the concubine at the Islamic court have been skewed by poor prosopography as well 
as their over-reliance on problematic sources. After all, the proponents of the Goldziher 
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argument noted above are not known for their overly-credulous attitude to the traditional 
Islamic historical tradition - indeed, it is to their credit that they used the prosopography 
of caliphal mothers as a supplement to their literary research in the first place. But by 
assuming that the caliphs were a bellwether for wider social trends, scholars have 
erroneously placed the appearance of the concubine and the recognition of the equality of 
her children towards the end of the Umayyad era. Looking at a wider pool of Muslims – 
all Quraysh as recorded by al-Zubayrī – we see that the hajīns first appear in significant 
numbers as the children and grandchildren of the first generation of Muslims and that 
there is no unequivocal evidence from their marriage behaviour to indicate that they were 
ever considered as second class Arabs or Muslims.  
 
Finally, this new interpretation of the origins of concubinage can be used to highlight the 
shortcomings of a tendency within the study of early Islamic history for what Biblical 
scholars call “Parallelomania.” This term, as defined 50 years ago by Samuel Sandmel, is 
“that extravagance among scholars which first overdoes the supposed similarity in 
passages and then proceeds to describe source and derivation as if implying literary 
connection flowing in an inevitable or predetermined direction.” 280  We see this 
predisposition in the work of many Islamicists; Crone, Schacht, Goldziher and the editors 
of many popular encyclopaedias frequently resort to explaining Islamic behaviour in 
terms of parallels with non-Islamic cultures. The overall effect is too frequently redolent 
of that which irked Sandmel. Returning to his paper he states:  
  
While I hold that Mark was a source utilized by both Matthew and Luke, I am not 
prepared to believe that the writers of Christian literature only copied sources and 
never did anything original and creative.281  
  
The quantitative analysis above suggests the following reformulation: while we hold that 
pre-Islamic behaviours were sources for later Islamic practice, we are not prepared to 
                                                 
280 Samuel Sandmel, “Parallelomania,” Journal of Biblical Literature 81, no. 1 (1962), 1.  
281 Sandmel, “Parallelomania,” 4.  
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believe that Muslims only copied pre-Islamic practices and never did anything original 
and creative. Islam was certainly creative enough with regard to other elements of 
preexisting law when it came to slavery; as Irene Schneider notes, Muslims prohibited 
debt bondage and the enslavement of family members, as well as introducing the default 
position of freedom for foundlings.282 It is hoped that our non-literary approach to the 
mothers of the Quraysh means we can add concubinage to this list and thereby show the 
societal originality and creativity of the early Muslims in action.   
  
  
                                                 
282 Irene Schneider, “Freedom and slavery in early Islamic time (1st/7th and 2nd /8th centuries),” Al-Qanṭara 
28 (2007): 361-376.  
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The previous two chapters showed how Qurashī marriage behaviour can be extracted 
from the Nasab Quraysh and then organised to show correlations with historical events. 
In doing this we established the efficacy of our methodology; namely that temporal 
organisation by generation is a sound means of diachronically studying marriage patterns, 
and that the marriage behaviour preserved in the Nasab Quraysh is remarkably consistent 
with events as recorded in other sources.  
  
Having established this and accounted for the concubine marriages, we are now in a 
position to analyse patterns of marriage between Qurashī men and Arab women. Three 
cohorts of men have been chosen for this: the fourth generation descendants of Quṣayy;  
Muḥammad and eight of his Companions; and the Umayyad caliphs and their sons.283 
Through the analysis of the marriages of these three groups we will further our 
understanding of how Qurashī marriage behaviour changed during the period 500-750 
CE. The framework of inquiry remains that of Kalmijn noted above; marriage patterns 
will be explained in terms of social pressure (namely Qurashī opinion on the 
permissibility of intermarriage between groups) and opportunity (the ability of two 
partners to meet).  
  
Arab wives are a great deal more complicated than concubines and this is reflected in the 
structure of the remaining parts of this thesis. This chapter will provide the datasets as a 
reference tool, along with notes on how the data was gathered. Chapter Seven will show 
                                                 
283 The selection of these cohorts is based on a number of factors, namely that they are of similar size in 
terms of numbers of marriages and their ability to represent a before-during-after illustration of the effect 




how we can use this data by extracting information relevant to the pre-Islamic Quraysh 




Other than the addition of the wives’ names and tribal affiliation our methodology is much 
the same as that used in the previous chapter; the generational system is still employed 
and the object of our attention remains child-bearing marriages as preserved in the Nasab 
Quraysh.  
  
The first cohort investigated will be that of the fourth generation male descendants of 
Quṣayy which includes Muḥammad’s father and uncles. This cohort is realised in the 
form of a database comprising 53 marriages, in 52 of which the tribal affiliation of the 
wife can be ascertained. There is no implication here that these husbands formed a single 
recognisable tribal sub-grouping within the Quraysh whilst they were alive, but as they 
contained in their number the parents of many early Muslims their marriages will provide 
us with a snapshot of how the Quraysh married before the arrival of Islam.   
  
The marriage behaviour of this cohort will be compared to a second group consisting of 
the men at the heart of the Islamic project in its formative years; Muḥammad, the first 
four caliphs, and the Companions Ṭalḥa, Zubayr, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf and Saʿd b. 
Abī Waqqās (according to the traditional historical sources these latter four were potential 
caliphs thanks to their appointment to ʿUmar’s shūra). This group provides us with a 
sample size of 54 marriages, 52 of which were to women of known tribal groupings. This 
sample is intended to give us a picture of marriage behaviour during Muḥammad’s life 
and the period of the Rashīdūn caliphs.  
  
Our third cohort consists of the marriages of the Umayyad caliphs and their sons. The 
number of marriages carried out by this group is similar to those of the other two cohorts 
(56) but extends over a far longer period in time (four generations). The purpose of 
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creating this cohort is to show us how marriage practices inherited from a tribal society 
were adapted to suit an increasingly imperial environment. Analysis of this group will 
also allow us to re-introduce our concubine data; these data are not relevant for the earlier 




It should be noted that the nature of exogamy and endogamy is not always as 
straightforward as it was in the previous chapter. While the distinction between Arab and 
non-Arab was for the purposes of that investigation more-or-less absolute, when it comes 
to tribal assignations matters are complicated by the fact that the Arabs had multiple and 
changing loyalties. Reducing this complexity to a single name assignation implies an 
unwarranted sense of confidence, yet to abandon any attempt to address the issue of the 
existence of tribes is, as Conrad puts it, “excessive.”284  
  
As a result, the editorial decision-making process that has led to the assignation of tribal 
loyalty has been made as open as possible. For each entry multiple levels of tribal 
affiliation are provided in the tables below allowing the reader to perform their own 
analyses if they disagree with the tribal affiliations used here.  
  
Cohort One – the pre-Islamic Quraysh  
  
This cohort includes all the fourth generation descendants of Quṣayy who are recorded in 
the Nasab Quraysh as having had children with named women. Only one individual had 
children with concubines – this is ʿAbbās b. ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib (Muḥammad’s uncle and 
ancestor of the ʿ Abbāsid dynasty). Assuming the historical record is correct in this regard, 
                                                 
284 Lawrence Conrad, “The Arabs,” in The Cambridge Ancient History vol. 14, ed. Averil Cameron, 
Bryan Ward-Perkins and Michael Whitby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 679. For a 
fascinating example of how differing tribal affiliations can exist simultaneously across different 




his status as an outlier is in keeping with his being a young member of his generation; he 
outlived his nephew Muḥammad by over 20 years. As such he would have been alive at 
the time a large influx of slave women came into elite Arab hands as a result of the 
conquests.   
  
These marriages are recorded in Table 6.1 below. Preceding this are some useful terms 




Ref(erence): number code for identifying individual marriages.  
Husband name: Familiar characters are named to the level of their father’s generation; 
less familiar ones are given longer lineages.  
Wife name: This is provided in the form of first name plus father’s name if the individual 
is non-Qurashī; a longer lineage is given to show familial connection if the person is 
Qurashī.   
Wife tribal affiliation: Non-Qurashī women are given tribal affiliations at multiple levels 
where available with the predominant affiliation first (e.g. ‘Quraysh; Hāshim’). Decisions 
on what constitutes a tribal division are only suggestions and are largely based on the 
relevant entries in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Watt’s table on page 7 of Muhammad at 
Mecca, and Caskel’s tribal schema which appears on pages 85-86 of his Ǧamharat An-
nasab.  
Degree of separation: “Non-Quraysh” consists of all Arabs not descended from Fihr 
(normally regarded as the man from whom all Quraysh are descended). “Non-lineal 
Quraysh” equates to Quraysh who are not descended from Quṣayy. “Lineal Quraysh” 
includes all descendants of Quṣayy and is accompanied by a number in parentheses 
indicating the generational degree of separation between the husband and the nearest 
common ancestor he shares with his spouse (first cousins would be (2), for instance).  
Ordering: As appears in the Nasab Quraysh. Page references are for the relevant 
appearance of the husband’s entry.  
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Other notes:  
  
Only one man had children with concubines; ʿAbbās b. ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib. These 
relationships are not included in the table below.  
  
There is one woman of unknown tribal affiliation (entry A11); the Nasab Quraysh only 
provides her first name and she has not been recovered in other sources.  
  
Table 6.1: Marriages of the fourth generation descendants of Quṣayy b. Kilāb 
(Cohort One)  
 
Ref  Husband 
name  





A1  ʿAbd Allāh b. 
ʿAbd al-
Muṭṭalib  
Āmina bt. Wahb 
b. ʿAbd Manāf  
b. Zuhra  
Quraysh; Zuhra  Non-lineal 
Quraysh  
20  
A2  ʿAbbās b. 
ʿAbd al-
Muṭṭalib  
Umm al-Faḍl bt. 
Ḥārith  
ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa; 
Hilāl  
Non-Quraysh  27  
A3  ʿAbbās b. 
ʿAbd al-
Muṭṭalib  




to Kināna).  
Non-Quraysh  27  
A4  Abū Ṭālib b.  
ʿAbd al-
Muṭṭalib  
Fāṭima bt. Asad 
b. Hāshim  





A5  Ḥārith b. 
ʿAbd al-
Muṭṭalib  
ʿAdiyya bt. Qays  Quraysh; Ḥārith 




A6  Abū Lahab 
b. ʿAbd al-
Muṭṭalib  
Umm Jamīl bt.  










A7  Arqam b. 
Naḍla b.  
Hāshim  
Khalda bt. Asad 
b. Hāshim  
Quraysh; Hāshim  Lineal Quraysh; 
connected  
through Hāshim  
(2)  
91  
A8  Ḥunayn b. 




Quraysh; Zuhra  Non-lineal 
Quraysh 
91  
A9  Qays b.  
Makhrama  
b. Muṭṭalib  
Durra bt. ʿUqba 
b. Rabīʿa  
Aws; Nabīt; ʿAbd 
Ashhal  
Non-Quraysh  92  
A10  Ṣalt b.  
Makhrama  
b. Muṭṭalib  
Fāṭima bt. ʿAbd 
Qays  
Quraysh; Banū 
ʿAbd al-Dār   
Lineal Quraysh; 
connected 
through Quṣayy  
(4)  
93  
A11  Ṣalt b.  
Makhrama  
b. Muṭṭalib  
Rumayma  Unknown  Unknown  93  
A12  ʿUthātha b. 
ʿAbbād b. 
Muṭṭalib  
Umm Misṭaḥ  







through Muṭṭalib  
(2)  
95  
A13  ʿAbd Yazīd b. 
Hāshim  
b. Muṭṭalib  
ʿAjla bt. ʿAjlān b.  
Tabāʿ (Biyāʿ in 
JN)  
Kināna; Layth.286  Non-Quraysh   95  
A14  Abū al-ʿĀṣ  
b. Umayya  
Āmina bt. ʿAbd 
al-ʿUzza  





A15  Abū al-ʿĀṣ  








A16  Abū al-ʿĀṣ  
b. Umayya  
Ṣafiyya bt.  







Shams (2)  
100  
A17  Abū al-ʿĀṣ  
b. Umayya  
Arwā bt. Asīd b.  
ʿAlāj b. Abī  
Salama  
Thaqīf287  Non-Quraysh  100  
                                                 
285 The wife’s genealogy in the edited edition of the Nasab Quraysh is erroneous; it should read  
“Muṭṭalib” rather than “ʿAbd Muṭṭalib”. See Ibn al-Kalbī, Jamharat al-nasab, 60.  
286 Ibn al-Kalbī, Jamharat al-nasab, 129, line 6. 
287 Tribal attribution not provided in Nasab Quraysh, but father’s genealogy can be found on pp. 388-389 
in Ibn al-Kalbī’s Jamharat al-nasab.  
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A18  Ḥarb b.  
Umayya  
Ṣafiyya bt. Ḥazn  ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa; 
Hilāl  
Non-Quraysh  121  
A19  Ḥarb b.  
Umayya  
Woman of Banū 
Tamīm  
Tamīm  Non-Quraysh  121  
A20  Ḥarb b.  
Umayya  
Fākhita bt. ʿĀmir 
b. Muʿattab  
Thaqīf  Non-Quraysh  121  
A21  Ḥarb b.  
Umayya  
Umm Qattāl bt. 
ʿAbd al-Ḥārith b. 
Zuhra   
Quraysh; Zuhra  Non-lineal 
Quraysh  
121  
A22  ʿAmr b.  
Umayya  
Umm Qattāl bt. 
ʿAbd al-Ḥārith b. 
Zuhra  
Quraysh; Zuhra  Non-lineal 
Quraysh  
135  
A23  Abū ʿAmr b.  
Umayya  
Āmina bt. Abān  ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa  Non-Quraysh  135  
A24  Abū ʿAmr b.  
Umayya  
Raīṭa bt.  
Ḥuwayrith  
Thaqīf; Jusham  Non-Quraysh  135  
A25  Rabīʿa b.  
Ḥabīb b. 
ʿAbd Shams  
Umm Sakn bt. 
Ẓālim b.  
Munqidh  
Khuzāʿa  Non-Quraysh  147  
A26  Samra b.  
Ḥabīb b. 








A27  Samra b.  
Ḥabīb b. 
ʿAbd Shams  
Bint Ḥāritha b. 
Qays   
Kināna; Ghanam 
b. Malik  
Non-Quraysh;   150  
A28  Ḥārith b.  
Umayya  
Zaynab bt.  







Shams (2)  
151  
A29  Ḥārith b.  
Umayya  
A woman of  
Thaqīf  
Thaqīf  Non-Quraysh  151  
A30  Abū al-ʿĀṣ  
b. Nawfal b. 
ʿAbd Shams  
Fāṭima bt. Abī  
Wahb  





A31  ʿUtba b. 
Rabīʿa b. 
ʿAbd Shams  
Ṣafiyya bt.  
Umayya  
Sulaym288  Non-Quraysh  153  
A32  ʿUtba b. 
Rabīʿa b. 
ʿAbd Shams  
Khanās bt. 
Mālik b.  
Muḍarrib  
Quraysh; ʿĀmir b. 




A33  ʿUtba b. 
Rabīʿa b. 
ʿAbd Shams  
Umm Ṣafwān 
bt. Ṣafwān b. 
Umayya  
Kināna   Non-Quraysh  153  
A34  ʿUtba b. 
Rabīʿa b. 
ʿAbd Shams  
Bint Zuhayr al-
Dawsī  
Azd; Daws   Non-Quraysh  153  
A35  Shayba b.  
Rabīʿa b. 
ʿAbd Shams  
Fāriʿa bt. Ḥarb b. 
Umayya  
Quraysh; ʿAbd 




Shams (2)  
155  
A36  Shayba b.  
Rabīʿa b. 
ʿAbd Shams  
Umm Shārik bt.  
Waqdān  
Quraysh; ʿĀmir b. 
Luʾayy; Ḥisl  
Non-lineal 
Quraysh   
155  
A37  Rabīʿ b. ʿAbd 
al-ʿUzza b.  
ʿAbd Shams  
Hāla bt.  
Khuwaylid b. 
Asad b. ʿAbd 
alʿUzza  
Quraysh; Asad  Lineal Quraysh; 
connected  
through Quṣayy  
(4)  
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A38  ʿĀṣ b.  
Umayya b. 
ʿAbd Shams  
Raīṭa bt. Biyāʿ  Kināna; Layth290  Non-Quraysh   173  
A39  Abū al-ʿĪṣ b. 
Umayya b. 
ʿAbd Shams  
Arwā bt. Asīd b.  
ʿAmr  
Thaqīf  Non-Quraysh  187  
A40  Muṭʿim b. 
ʿAdī b.  
Nawfal b. 
ʿAbd Manāf  
Umm Jamīl bt. 
Shaʿba  
Quraysh; Mālik; 




                                                 
288 Not stated in the Nasab Quraysh, but the genealogy is the same as that of Hāshim’s mother (see 
Varisco, “Metaphors and sacred history,” 146).  
289 Muḍarrib’s genealogy does not appear in the Nasab Quraysh, but can be found on page 400 of the 
Muḥabbar. His grandfather ʿAmr b. Ḥujayr appears on Nasab Quraysh, 434.  
290 Affiliation not stated in the Nasab Quraysh, but see Ibn al-Kalbī’s Jamharat al-nasab, 129, where the 
same genealogy appears on line 6.  
291 Shaʿba appears on the Nasab Quraysh, 422-423.  
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A41  Khiyār b. 
ʿAdī b.  
Nawfal b. 
ʿAbd Manāf  
Umm Anās bt. 
Umayya (or ʿAbd 
Umayya)  
b. ʿAbd Shams  
Quraysh; ʿAbd 




Manāf (3)  
201  
A42  Khiyār b. 
ʿAdī b.  
Nawfal b. 
ʿAbd Manāf  
Umm Fākhita bt. 
ʿAbbās b. ʿĀmir  
Sulaym; Mālik b. 
ʿAwf b. Imru 
alQays   
Non-Quraysh  201  
A43  Ṭarīf b. ʿAmr 
b. Nawfal b. 
ʿAbd Manāf  
Ṣafiyya bt.  
ʿUbayd Allāh b. 
Bijād  
Kināna   Non-Quraysh  203  
A44  Qaraẓa b. 
ʿAbd ʿAmr 
b. Nawfal b. 
ʿAbd Manāf 
Fāṭima bt. ʿUtba  









A45  Ḥārith b. 
ʿĀmir b. 
Nawfal b. 
ʿAbd Manāf  
Bint ʿIyāḍ b. 
Rāfiʿ  
Khuzāʿa  Non-Quraysh  204  
A46  Ḥārith b. 
ʿĀmir b. 
Nawfal b. 
ʿAbd Manāf  
Durra bt. Abū 
Lahab b. ʿAbd 
al-Muṭṭalib  
Quraysh; Hāshim  Lineal Quraysh; 
connected 
through ʿAbd 
Manāf (3)  
204  
A47  Ḥārith b. 
ʿĀmir b. 
Nawfal b. 
ʿAbd Manāf  
Umāma bt.  
Khalīfa b.  
Nuʿmān  
Bakr b. Wāʾil  Non-Quraysh  204  
A48  Umayya b.  
Ḥārith b. 









A49  Hāshim b.  
Ḥārith b. 
Asad b. ʿAbd 
al-ʿUzzā  
Arwā bt. Ḥārith 
b. ʿAbd al-ʿUzzā  
Quraysh; ʿAbd al-
Dār   
Lineal Quraysh; 
connected  





A50  Aswad b.  
Muṭṭalib b. 
Asad b. ʿAbd 
al-ʿUzzā  
Arwā bt.  
Ḥudhayfa b. 
Hishām b. Saʿīd 
b. Sahm  
Quraysh; Sahm  Non-lineal 
Quraysh  
218  
A51  Aswad b.  
Muṭṭalib b. 
Asad b. ʿAbd 
al-ʿUzzā  
Fākhita bt. ʿĀmir 
b. Qurṭ  
ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa; 
Qushayr   
Non-Quraysh  218  
A52  Nawfal b. 
Khuwaylid 
b. Asad b. 
ʿAbd al-
ʿUzzā  
Furayʿa bt. ʿAdī 
b. Nawfal b. 
ʿAbd Manāf  
Quraysh; Nawfal   Lineal Quraysh; 
connected  
through Quṣayy  
(4)  
230  
A53  Ḥizām b. 
Khuwaylid 




Zuhayr b. Ḥārith 
b. Asad  
Quraysh; Asad  Lineal Quraysh; 
connected 
through Asad (2)  
231  
A54  ʿAwwām b. 
Khuwaylid 
b. Asad b. 
ʿAbd al-
ʿUzzā  
Umm Khayr bt.  
Mālik b. 
ʿUmayla b. 










The spousal choices by tribal affiliation break down as follows:  
  
Table 6.2: Breakdown of marriages by major groupings for pre-Islamic cohort  
  
Wife’s tribal affiliation  Number  Proportion 
of total  
All wives of known tribal affiliation  53  
Non-Quraysh  23 43.40% 
Non-lineal Quraysh  14 26.42% 





Cohort Two: prominent early Muslims  
  
This table incorporates the childbearing marriages of Muḥammad, the first four caliphs 
plus four men who were reputedly appointed to the shūra established by the caliph ʿUmar 
to select his successor from amongst their number. These latter eight men were all early 





As Table 6.1 above, with the following changes:  
  
Degree of separation: Intra-Quraysh marriages in this table will be described as “Lineal” 
or “Non-lineal”. For the descendants of Quṣayy any marriage with another descendant of 
Quṣayy will be considered lineal; all others are non-lineal. For the individuals not 
descended from Quṣayy, a non-lineal marriage is one that crosses their established 
Qurashī clans; for Abū Bakr and Ṭalha this is outside Taym b. Murra, for ʿUmar it is 
outside ʿ Adī b. Kaʿb, and for Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās and ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān it is outside Zuhra.  
  
Other notes:  
  
Concubinage is more common for this group, though still a relatively minor practice; only 
ʿAlī and ʿUmar are listed as having had children through anonymous umm walads. These 
relationships are not included in the table. There are additionally two instances of men 
having children with named women of slave origin who are not referred to as being umm 
walads in the Nasab Quraysh; these are Muḥammad with Māriya, and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 




Table 6.3: Marriages of Muḥammad and early Muslim converts (Cohort Two)  
 
Ref  Husband 
name  





B1  Muḥammad b.  
ʿAbd Allāh  
Māriya al-
Qibtiyya  
Egyptian slave  Non-Arab  21  
B2  Muḥammad b.  
ʿAbd Allāh  
Khadīja bt.  
Khuwaylid b. 
Asad  




Quṣayy (5)  
21  











B4  ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib  Khawla bt. Jaʿfar  Bakr b. Wāʾil; 




B5  ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib  Umm Ḥabīb bt. 
Rabīʿa 
Taghlib b. Wāʾil,   Non-Quraysh 40  
B6  ʿAlī b. Abī 
Ṭālib  
Umm al-Banīn 
bt. Ḥizām b. 
Khālid  
ʿĀmir b. 
Ṣaʿṣaʿa; Kilāb b. 




B7  ʿAlī b. Abī 
Ṭālib  
Layla bt. Masʿūd  Tamīm;  
Nahshal b. 










Anmār   
Non- 
Quraysh   
40  
B9  ʿAlī b. Abī 
Ṭālib  
Umm Saʿīd bt.  
ʿUrwa  
Thaqīf  Non- 
Quraysh  
40  
B10  ʿUthmān b.  
ʿAffān  













B11  ʿUthmān b.  
ʿAffān  







B12  ʿUthmān b.  
ʿAffān  
Umm ʿAmr bt. 
Jundab  
Azd; Daws   Non- 
Quraysh  
104  









B14  ʿUthmān b.  
ʿAffān  
Umm al-Banīn 
bt. ʿUyayna  
Ghaṭafān;  
Dhubyān;  




B15  ʿUthmān b.  
ʿAffān  
Ramla bt. 
Shayba b. Rabīʿa 







ʿAbd Shams  
(4)  
104  




Kalb  Non- 
Quraysh   
104  
B17  Zubayr b. 
ʿAwwām  
Asmā bt. Abī 
Bakr  
Quraysh; Taym 




B18  Zubayr b. 
ʿAwwām  
Rabāb bt. Unayf  Kalb  Non- 
Quraysh   
236  
B19  Zubayr b. 
ʿAwwām 
Umm Khālid bt. 
Khālid b. Saʿīd b. 









B20  Zubayr b. 
ʿAwwām  
Zaynab bt. Bishr  Bakr b. Wāʾil; 
Qays b.  




B21  Zubayr b. 
ʿAwwām  
Umm Kulthūm  
bt. ʿUqba b. Abī 
Muʿayṭ b. Abī 
ʿAmr b. Umayya 
b. ʿAbd Shams 









Quṣayy (5)  
236  
                                                 
292 EI2, s.v. “ʿUtba b. Ghazwān” (C.E. Bosworth).  
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B22  Zubayr b. 
ʿAwwām  
Ḥilāl bt. Qays b.  
Nawfal  
Asad b.  
Khuzayma;  
‘brother’ tribe 





B23  Saʿd b. Abī  
Waqqās  
Māriya bt. Qays 
b. Maʿdī Karib  
Kinda  Non- 
Quraysh  
264  
B24  Saʿd b. Abī  
Waqqās  
Woman of  
Bahrāʾ  
Quḍāʿa; Bahrāʾ  Non- 
Quraysh  
264  
B25  Saʿd b. Abī  
Waqqās  
Umm Ḥakīm bt.  
Qārṭ b. Khālid293  
Kināna; Ḥārith 




B26  ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b.  
ʿAwf  
Umm Kulthūm 
bt. ʿUtba b. 







B27  ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b.  
ʿAwf  
Bint Shayba b.  







B28  ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b.  
ʿAwf  
Umm Kulthūm  
bt. ʿUqba   
Quraysh;  
Umayya b. 




B29  ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b.  
ʿAwf  
Baḥriyya bt. 
Hāniʾ   





B30  ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b.  
ʿAwf 
Sahla bt. Suhayl 







B31  ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b.  
ʿAwf  
Umm Ḥakīm b.  
Qārṭ  
Kināna; Ḥārith 




B32  ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b.  
ʿAwf  
Woman of ʿAbd 
al-Ashhal  
Aws; Nabīt; 




B33  ʿAbd al- 




Kalb  Non- 
Quraysh  
266  
                                                 
293 Her full genealogy is given in the Nasab Quraysh, 267.  
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B34  ʿAbd al- 




Tamīm294  Non- 
Quraysh  
266  
B35  ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b.  
ʿAwf  
Majd bt. Zayd  Ḥimyār; Yaḥṣub 




B36  ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b.  
ʿAwf  
Ghazāl bt. Kisrā  Persian   Non-Arab  266  
B37  ʿAbd al- 




Thaqīf  Non- 
Quraysh  
266  
B38  Abū Bakr al-
Ṣiddīq  
Qutayla bt. 
[ʿAbd] al-ʿUzzā  
b. Abd Asʿad b.  
Naṣr b. Mālik b.  
Ḥisl b. ʿĀmir b. 
Luʾayy  
Quraysh; ʿĀmir; 




B39  Abū Bakr al-
Ṣiddīq  
Umm Rūmān bt. 
ʿĀmir  
Kināna; Mālik  Non- 
Quraysh  
275  




Anmār of  
Qaḥṭān;  








Khazraj; Ḥārith   Non- 
Quraysh   
275  
B42  Ṭalḥa b. 
ʿUbayd Allāh 




Non-Quraysh 281  
B43  Ṭalḥa b.  
ʿUbayd Allāh  
Khawla bt.  
Qaʿqāʿ b. Zurāra  
Tamīm  Non- 
Quraysh  
281  
B44  Ṭalḥa b.  
ʿUbayd Allāh  
Umm Abān bt. 
ʿUtba b. Rabīʿa 






                                                 
294 Her tribal affiliation is not given in the Nasab Quraysh but can be found in Ahmed’s Religious Elite, 
76.  
295 Subdivision provided in Ahmed’s Religious Elite, 61.  
296 See EI2, s.v. “Asmāʾ” (Charles Pellat).  
297 Sister of Muḥammad (and Zayd’s) wife Zaynab. See EQ, s.v. “Wives of the Prophet” (Barbara 
Stowasser) and Ibn al-Kalbī, Jamharat al-nasab, 186.  
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B45  Ṭalḥa b.  
ʿUbayd Allāh  
Umm Ḥārith bt.  
Qusāma b.  
Ḥanẓala  
Ṭayy; Mālik b. 




B46  Ṭalḥa b.  
ʿUbayd Allāh  
Umm Kulthūm  
bt. Abī Bakr al-
Ṣiddīq  
Quraysh; Taym 
b. Murra  
Lineal 
Quraysh ʿAmr 
b. Kaʿb  
(3)  
281  
B47  Ṭalḥa b.  
ʿUbayd Allāh  















B49  ʿUmar b. 
Khaṭṭāb  
Umm Kulthūm  







B50  ʿUmar b. 
Khaṭṭāb  
Umm Kulthūm  
bt. Jarwal  
Khuzāʿa  Non- 
Quraysh  
348  
B51  ʿUmar b. 
Khaṭṭāb  
Jamīla bt. Thābit  Aws; ʿAmr b.  




B52  ʿUmar b. 
Khaṭṭāb  
ʿĀtika bt. Zayd 
b. ʿAmr b. 
Nufayl  






Nufayl (2)  
348  
B53  ʿUmar b. 
Khaṭṭāb  









B54  ʿUmar b. 
Khaṭṭāb  










                                                 
298 See Ahmed, The Religious Elite, 92, note 450.  
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Table 6.4: Breakdown of marriages by major groupings for early Islamic cohort  
  
Wife’s tribal affiliation  Number  Proportion 
of total  
All Arab wives of known tribal affiliation  52  
Non-Quraysh  33 63.46% 
Non-lineal Quraysh  11 21.15% 
Lineal Quraysh  8 15.39% 
  
Cohort Three: The Umayyad caliphs and their sons  
  
This final cohort consists of the child-bearing marriages of those men that made it to the 
political summit of Islamic society during the Umayyad period. The inclusion of the sons 
of caliphs as well as the caliphs themselves is in part an attempt to equalise the size of 
this cohort with the other two, but equally importantly it reflects the fact that relatives 
would have had a great deal of power over the marriage choices of their children.299   
  
This cohort presents two primary complications. First, it spans four generations rather 
than one, so each marriage will have to be identified accordingly. The second 
complication is that of concubinage. Children produced by concubines rarely appeared in 
the previous two cohorts, but in this group over 40% of the recorded children are produced 






                                                 
299 There are numerous examples in anthropological and sociological research, but for the context of this 
period see Kecia Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard 





This table utilises the terminology and format of those above with the following minor 
changes:  
  
1) Tribal affiliation of the wife is given in a slightly different format in order to 
reflect the alignments of the conquest and post-conquest era milieus. Where a 
marriage is exogamous, the wider tribal loyalties of the wife’s clan are provided 
(e.g. northern, Kalb etc.).300 Where marriages are endogamous, greater detail is 
provided for the families of the Quraysh into which they married.   
  
2) The generation of the husband has been included. This will allow us to analyse 
changes in marriage behaviour by generation.  
  
3) If the father is a caliph, this is mentioned in parentheses following his name.  
  
4) Entries are ordered by generation and then alphabetically by name of husband 








                                                 
300 The most significant of these was the emergence of ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ affiliations. See Patricia  
Crone, “Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad period political parties?” Der Islam 71 (1994): 1-57; 
Gerald Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2000), 36 ff.; and the links 
made by Bashear between the messianic connotations of the term yamāniyya, the battle of Marj Rāhiṭ and 
the tribal conflicts of the Umayyad era (Suliman Bashear, “Yemen in Early Islam an Examination of 
NonTribal Traditions,” Arabica 36, no. 3 (1989): 361).  
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Table 6.5: Marriages of Umayyad caliphs and their sons (Cohort Three)  
 
Ref  Husband 
name   
Gen. of 
husband  






C1  Marwān b.  
Ḥakam  
(caliph)  
6  ʿĀʾisha bt.  
Muʿāwiya b. 
al-Mughīra  





link to Abū 
al-ʿĀṣ (2)  
160  
C2  Marwān b.  
Ḥakam  
(caliph)  







C3  Marwān b.  
Ḥakam  
(caliph)  




Kilāb b.  
Rabīʿa301  
Non-Quraysh  161  
C4  Marwān b.  
Ḥakam  
(caliph)  
6  Umm Abān  
bt. ʿUthmān 





link to Abū 
al-ʿĀṣ (2)  
161  
C5  Marwān b.  
Ḥakam  
(caliph)  
6  Zaynab bt. 







C6  Muʿāwiyah b.  
Abī Sufyān  
(caliph)  







C7  Muʿāwiyah b.  
Abī Sufyān  
(caliph)  
6  Fākhita bt. 
Qaraẓa  
Quraysh  Lineal  
Quraysh; 
link to ʿAbd 
Manāf b.  
Quṣayy (5)  
128  
C8  Muʿāwiyah b.  
Abī Sufyān  
(caliph)  
6  Kanūd bt. 
Qaraẓa  
 Quraysh  Lineal  
Quraysh; 
link to ʿAbd 
Manāf b.  
Quṣayy (5)  
128  
                                                 




C9  Abān b.  
Marwān b.  
Ḥakam  














C10  ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 
b. Marwān  
7  Umm ʿAbd  
Allāh bt. 




Quraysh   
168  
C11  ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 
b. Marwān  









C12  ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 
b. Marwān  








link to   
Umayya (4)  
168-169  
C13  ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 
b. Marwān   
7  Umm ʿĀṣim 









C14  ʿAbd Allāh b. 
Muʿāwiyah  
7  Ammat al-
Ḥamīd bt. 
ʿAbd Allāh  




Shams   
Lineal  
Quraysh; 
link to ʿAbd 
Shams (5)  
132  
C15  ʿAbd al-Malik 
b. Marwān  
(caliph)  
7  Umm Walīd  







C16  ʿAbd al-Malik 
b. Marwān  
(caliph)  
7  ʿĀtika bt.  






link to  
Umayya (4)  
163  
C17  ʿAbd al-Malik 
b. Marwān  
(caliph)  
7  Umm  









C18  ʿAbd al-Malik 
b. Marwān  
(caliph)  
7  ʿĀʾisha bt.  
Mūsā b.  
Ṭalḥa  
Quraysh; 





C19  ʿAbd al-Malik 
b. Marwān  
(caliph)  
7  Umm Ayyūb 
bt. ʿAmr b. 






link to Abū 
al-ʿĀṣ (3)  
164  
C20  ʿAbd al-Malik 
b. Marwān  
(caliph)  
7  Umm  







C21  Bishr b.  
Marwān b.  
Ḥakam  








C22  Bishr b.  
Marwān b.  
Ḥakam  
7  Umm  
Ḥakīm bt.  
Muḥammad 
b. ʿUmāra b. 
ʿUqba b. Abī 
Muʿayṭ b.  






link to  
Umayya (4)  
169  
C23  Bishr b.  
Marwān b.  
Ḥakam   












C24  Muḥammad  
b. Marwān b. 
Ḥakam  
7  Umm  
Jumayl bt.  
ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b. 
Zayd b.  
Khaṭṭāb  
Quraysh; 




                                                 
302 This affiliation is not explicitly stated by al-Zubayrī but is based on her ancestor’s name “Ḥiṣn b. 
Ḥudayfa”, which is the same as that given for ʿUyayna b. Ḥiṣn b. Ḥudhayfa (see EI2, s.v. “ʿUyayna b. 
Ḥiṣn” (Michael Lecker)).  
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C25  Muḥammad  
b. Marwān b. 
Ḥakam   
7  Bint Yazīd b. 
ʿAbd Allāh  
b. Shayba b. 
Rabīʿa b. 
ʿAbd Shams  
Quraysh; 
ʿAbd 
Shams   
Lineal  
Quraysh; 
link to ʿAbd 
Shams (5)  
169  
C26  Yazīd b.  
Muʿāwiya  
(caliph)  
7  Umm  
Hāshim b.  






link to ʿAbd 
Shams (5)  
128  
C27  Yazīd b.  
Muʿāwiya  
(caliph)  
7  Umm  
Kulthūm bt. 
ʿAbd Allāh  







link to ʿAbd 
Shams (5)  
129  
C28  ʿAbd Allāh b. 
ʿAbd al-Malik 
b. Marwān  
8  Ruqayya bt. 
ʿAbd Allāh  





link to ʿAbd 
Shams (6)  
132  
C29  ʿAbd Allāh b.  
Yazīd b.  
Muʿāwiya  







C30  ʿAbd Allāh b.  
Yazīd b.  
Muʿāwiya  







link to  
Umayya (5)  
131  
C31  ʿAbd Allāh b.  
Yazīd b.  
Muʿāwiya  
8  ʿĀtika bt. 










C32  ʿAbd Allāh b.  
Yazīd b.  
Muʿāwiya  
8  Umm  
Kulthūm bt. 
ʿAnbasa b. 





link to Abū 
Sufyān (3)  
132  
C33  ʿAbd Allāh b.  
Yazīd b.  
Muʿāwiya  
8  Umm Mūsā  
b. ʿAmr b. 





link to  




C34  ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b.  
Yazīd b.  
Muʿāwiya  
8  Maryam bt.  





link to  
Umayya (5)  
181  
C35  Bakkār b.  
ʿAbd al-Malik  
8  Azza bt. 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 








link to Abū 
al-ʿĀṣ (4)  
116  
C36  Hishām b. 
ʿAbd al-Malik 
b. Marwān  
(caliph)  
8  Ruqayya bt. 
ʿAbd Allāh 






link to Abū 
al-ʿĀṣ (4)  
115  
C37  Hishām b. 
ʿAbd al-Malik 
b. Marwān  
(caliph)  
8  Umm  
Ḥakīm bt.  
Yaḥyā b.  
Ḥakam b.  





link to  
Ḥakam (3)  
167  
C38  Hishām b. 
ʿAbd al-Malik 
b. Marwān  
(caliph)  
8  ʿAbda bt. 
Aswār (ʿAbd 
Allāh) b.  






link to  
Umayya (5)  
167  
C39  Hishām b. 
ʿAbd al-Malik 
b. Marwān  
(caliph)  
8  Umm  









link to Abū 
al-ʿĀṣ (4)  
167-168  
C40  Khālid b.  
Yazīd b.  
Muʿāwiya  






link to  
Umayya (5)  
130  
C41  Sulaymān b. 
ʿAbd al-Malik  
(caliph)  
8  Umm Abān 
bt. Aban b. 
Ḥakam b.  





link to  




C42  Sulaymān b. 
ʿAbd al-Malik  
(caliph)  
8  Umm Yazīd  
bt. ʿAbd 
Allāh b.  






link to  
Umayya (5)  
165-166  
C43  Sulaymān b. 
ʿAbd al-Malik 
(caliph)  
8  ʿĀʾisha bt. 
ʿAbd Allāh 






link to Abū 
al-ʿĀṣ (4)  
166  
C44  Sulaymān b. 
ʿAbd al-Malik 
(caliph)  







link to  
Umayya (5)  
166  
C45  ʿUmar b. ʿAbd 
al-ʿAzīz b.  
Marwān  
(caliph)  







link to  
Marwān (2)  
165  
C46  ʿUmar b. ʿAbd 
al-ʿAzīz b.  
Marwān  
(caliph)  











C47  Walīd b. ʿAbd 
al-Malik 
(caliph)  
8  Umm al- 
Banīn bt. 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 





link to  
Marwān (2)  
165  
C48  Walīd b. ʿAbd 
al-Malik 
(caliph)  
8  Umm ʿAbd  
Allāh bt. 







link to Abū 
al-ʿĀṣ (4)  
165  
C49  Yazīd b. ʿAbd 
al-Malik 
(caliph)  
8  Umm al- 








                                                 
303 This tribal affiliation is not explicitly stated by al-Zubayrī, but it is based on the correlation between 
her genealogy and that of Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf (her uncle).  
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C50  Yazīd b. ʿAbd 
al-Malik 
(caliph)  
8  Saʿda304 bt. 







link to Abū 
al-ʿĀṣ (4)  
167  
C51  ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 
b. Walīd b. 
ʿAbd al-Malik   
9  Maymūna 
bt. ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān  
Quraysh; 
Taym b.  
Murra  
Non-lineal 
Quraysh   
165  
C52  Bishr b. Walīd 
b. ʿAbd al-
Malik  
9  Umm ʿAbd  
Allāh bt. 







link to  
Ḥakam (4)  
172  
C53  Muʿāwiya b.  
Hishām b.  
ʿAbd al-Malik   
9  Umm ʿAbd  
Allāh bt. 





link to  
Ḥakam (4)  
168  
C54  ʿUmar b. 
Walīd b. ʿAbd 
al-Malik  
9  Umm ʿAbd  
Allāh bt. 
Ḥabīb b.  
Ḥakam b.  





link to  
Ḥakam (4)  
172  
C55  Walīd b. Yazīd 
b. ʿAbd al-
Malik (caliph)  






link to  
Umayya (6)  
167  
C56  Walīd b. Yazīd 
b. ʿAbd al-
Malik (caliph)  
9  Umm ʿAbd  









link to Abū 






                                                 
304 On page 115 of the Nasab Quraysh (in ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr’s section) ‘Saʿda’ appears as ‘Umm 
Saʿīda’ – the fact that they refer to the same person is apparent from their identical genealogies and names 
of their children.  
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Table 6.6: Breakdown of marriages by major groupings for Umayyad caliphs 
and their sons  
  
Wife’s tribal affiliation  Number  Proportion 
of total  
All wives of known tribal affiliation  56  
Non-Quraysh  8 14.29% 
Non-lineal Quraysh (non-Umayyad 
descendants of Quṣayy)  
11 (17) 19.64% 
(30.36%) 
Lineal Quraysh (only Umayyads)  37 (31) 66.07% 
(55.36%) 
  
The additional figures in parentheses provided here are to indicate marriages to other 
descendants of Umayya as opposed to descendants of Quṣayy.   
  
Concluding remarks  
  
The primary purpose of this chapter was to show the workings of the methodology in 
order for other scholars to check the conclusions drawn from the analysis of these 
datasets. This is in contrast to certain other prosopographical studies where a great deal 
of underlying information is hidden behind a handful of headline figures and graphs. Also, 
by providing the datasets in the format above, it means they can also be exploited by other 
scholars who wish to carry out their own research using related approaches.  
  
Finally, this chapter has forced us to think about non-trivial issues like tribal identity and 
group affiliation in new ways. There is no room here for an open-ended discussion of 
where ‘tribe’ ends and ‘race’ begins (for example), and though this is certainly an 
interesting subject it does not help us a great deal here. In the tables above we have instead 
been forced to think about identity far more narrowly; we need a definitive answer on a 
woman’s tribal affiliation or else she cannot be included in the database. This is often 
challenging and will provoke some debate. Nonetheless, the ensuing chapters will show 
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that with a little thought and ingenuity we can apply overcome these difficulties and show 
how this data can be used in the study of early Islamic history.  









In this chapter it will be shown that the marriage behaviour of early, prominent Muslims 
contrasted starkly with the marriage behaviour of their fathers; they married into the 
Quraysh far less frequently and drew wives from a far greater geographic region. As with 
our study of concubinage, these findings concur with some elements of the traditional 
historical narrative, yet cannot be reconciled with others.   
  
In terms of concurrence the decrease in numbers of marriages to Qurashī women is a sign 
of the ostracisation of the first Muslims by their fellow tribespeople. Likewise, the 
increased geographic dispersal of the tribal origins of the spouses is most likely a result 
of the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula. But this latter point forces us to reconsider the 
marriage behaviour of the Quraysh in the pre-Islamic era; the geographic range of these 
marriages is so limited that we have to radically reassess our sources and secondary 
studies when they describe the status of the tribe as they were for much of Muḥammad’s 
lifetime.  
  
This chapter consists of two principal parts. After a brief discussion of 
exogamy/endogamy, in Section One of this chapter we will aim to present the data as 
plainly as possible with little in the way of adding secondary sources or speculative 
approaches. Section Two of the chapter will be more discursive, and will suggest some 
of the more radical ways in which the trends found within the marriage data can be 
interpreted. Through all this we will gain a better understanding of social change in Late 
Antique Arabia and a more nuanced understanding of what exogamy/endogamy can mean 




Exogamy and endogamy within the Arabian tribes  
  
Before we focus on the first two cohorts we will compare all three in order to gain a 
preliminary understanding of the longer-term trends related to exogamy/endogamy. A 
side-by-side comparison of the three groups is provided in the table below:  
  
Table 7.1: Comparison of (non-concubine) marriage patterns of the three 
cohorts  
  
Wife’s tribal affiliation  Proportion of 
Cohort One 
marriages 









Non-Quraysh  43.40% 63.46% 14.29% 
Non-lineal Quraysh 
(nonUmayyad descendants 
of Quṣayy)  
26.42% 21.15% 19.64% 
(30.36%) 
Lineal Quraysh (Umayyads)  30.19% 15.39% 66.07% 
(55.36%) 
  
The marriage type that fluctuates the least between the cohorts is the category of unions 
made with the non-lineal Quraysh.305 The proportions of marriages of this type do not 
vary drastically between the different groups; the difference between Cohorts One, Two 
and Three is a difference of just three marriages, or five if we consider the Umayyads as 
constituting their own lineage (this is the figure in parentheses).   
  
Far more changeable are the other two categories. This indicates a two-way link; when a 
male member of a cohort marries a woman from within his lineage this is at the expense 
of a marriage to a non-Quraysh woman (and vice-versa). Hence the Umayyads were 
                                                 
305 As discussed in the previous chapter, these are marriages outside the relevant Qurashī sub-group (e.g. 
the marriage of a Makhzūmī to an ʿAlid).  
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taking other Umayyads for brides not at the expense of Qurashī clans like Makhzūm and 
Sahm but at the expense of the non-Qurashī Kalb and Thaqīf.   
  
Looking at Cohorts One and Two we see that the first Muslims married very differently 
to their fathers; their marriages to Qurashī women of their own lineage group collapsed 
to half the previous amount with the slack taken up by marriages to non-Qurashī women 
(the number of marriages of this type increases by almost 50%).306 Also interesting is the 
fact that there were only four child-bearing marriages to daughters of other members of 
the cohort.307 This is clearly a group that liked to marry out.  
  
The Umayyads of the third cohort swing the opposite way. The number of marriages to 
non-Qurashī women falls dramatically; the eight marriages they make to outside Arab 
tribes are far fewer than we would expect to find based on the marriage behaviour of their 
relatives living in the early- and pre-Islamic periods. But we should not be too quick to 
label this group as highly endogamous – recall that this same group was taking foreign 
women of slave origin (i.e. making the most exogamous marriages possible) in far greater 
numbers than the other cohorts.308  
  
The next stage is to formulate arguments as to why these cohorts differ in the way they 
marry. In this chapter (which will compare the pre-Islamic cohort with the Prophetic) we 
will show that explanations for some of these differences can be found within the 
traditional historical sources. What we learn from this will be developed in the next 
chapter where we consider the marriages of the Umayyad caliphs and their sons.   
  
  
                                                 
306 This is not an effect of incorporating groups who are not descended from Quṣayy; looking at only 
Muḥammad, ʿAlī, ʿUthmān and Zubayr we still find that the majority of marriages are to non-Qurashīs. 
307 This latter observation is clearly something that requires further investigation; until now studies on 
marriage have tended to emphasise the large number of marriage connections between the early Muslims 
– perhaps we should consider the possibility that they made surprisingly few such marriages. 
308 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight. 
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Section One: Statistical analysis of the marriages of Cohorts One and 
Two  
  
Our starting point is the following table, which illustrates the differences between the 
marriages of the two groups:  
  
Table 7.2: Comparison of marriage patterns between pre-Islamic and early 
Islamic cohorts  
  





Non-Quraysh  43.40% 63.46% 
Non-lineal Quraysh   26.42% 21.15% 
Lineal Quraysh   30.19% 15.39% 
Total marriages  53 52 
  
As noted above, the main difference between the two groups is that the early Muslims 
married outside the Quraysh far more frequently than the men of the pre-Islamic society 
they were born into, and that these exogamous unions came at the expense of marriages 
that previously occurred between them and women of their respective lineages.  
  
There is also evidence that conversion changed the nature of endogamous marriage. We 
can see this when we compare the degree of separation between the husband and his wife, 
expressed as a figure indicating the number of generations between him and his common 
paternal ancestor with his wife (so ʿAlī’s marriage to Fāṭima is listed as a “2” because 
ʿAlī is two generations away from ʿAbd Muṭṭalib, who is his nearest common link with 






Table 7.3: Degree of separation between marriage partners measured over 
time  
  
Degree of separation 
(in generations)  
Number of 
occurrences in 





2 7 2 
3 4 1 
4 5 4 
5 (3)309 4 
Total  16 (19) 8 
Average  2.88 (3.21) 3.88 
  
  
Caution should be applied to any conclusions drawn from this; we are dealing with very 
small groups of people here. Nonetheless, it is clear that the trend towards exogamy seen 
in the wider marriage behaviour is replicated within the lineal marriages. The preIslamic 
cohort made seven marriages to women with whom they were connected through a 
paternal grandfather; these would be to first cousins or the daughters of first cousins. The 
number of marriages of this type is drastically reduced in the Islamic era. Another 
indicator of this change is the figure in the bottom row of the table which gives the average 
generational distance between a husband and his common ancestor with his wife. Even 
when including the Banū Zuhra (see note 309) we see that there is a significant difference 
between the average distance in the Islamic and pre-Islamic era.310  
                                                 
309 This is the figure for the number of marriages between this cohort and the Banū Zuhra, who were 
descended from Quṣayy’s only child-producing brother. The reason for this inclusion is that the cohort of 
early Muslims came a generation later than the earlier cohort, and therefore had an extra generation’s 
worth of marriage partners. By including the Banū Zuhra we can equalise our analysis when considering 
endogamy/exogamy by generational distancing.  
310 The significance can be seen if we note that in order for the two figures to be reconciled, the pre-
Islamic Quraysh would have to reduce their marriages to first cousins by four and increase their marriages 
to Zuhra by the same amount in order to match the exogamy of the early Muslims. Alternatively, the 
Muslims could reduce their marriages to women separated by four and five generations to zero and 
increase the marriages to women separated by two and three generations by the corresponding amount in 
order to approach the endogamy rate of their fathers’ generation.   
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The trend towards exogamy can also be found when we look closer at the origins of the 
non-Qurashī women the two groups of men married. This table details the number of 
marriages the pre-Islamic cohort made to various Arab tribes alongside the number of 
marriages made by the Prophetic-era cohort into the same tribes:  
  
Table 7.4: Number of exogamous marriages of pre-Islamic and early Islamic 
cohorts by tribe  
  
Tribe  Pre-Islamic 
cohort   
Early Islamic 
cohort   
Kināna  5 3 
Thaqīf  5 2 
ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa  4 1 
Khuzāʿa  2 1 
Sulaym  2 0 
Aws  1 3 
Daws  1 1 
Hudhayl  1 0 
Bakr b. Wāʾil  1 3 
Tamīm  1 3 
Other  16 
Total  23 17 
   
  
It is clear from this that there is a dramatic change in marriage patterns between the two 
cohorts. The pre-Islamic group make 18 of their 23 non-Quraysh marriages into just five 
tribes yet these same five tribes account for only seven of the Prophetic cohort’s 33 
exogamous marriages. The later cohort also married into groups that the Quraysh of their 
fathers’ generation had been less keen on. In the table above we see that the group married 
into Bakr b. Wāʾil, Aws and Tamīm three times each; in the early generations these tribes 




Another indicator of change is the number of marriages to new tribes made by the 
generation of the Prophet; absent from the table above are the 16 marriages made to tribes 
that the earlier cohort had never married into (marked in the ‘Other’ row). The most 
frequently married of these new tribes include Kalb (three marriages), Qaḥtān, Ghatafān 
and Asad b. Khuzayma (two marriages each). For all the problems with assigning tribal 
affiliation at this level, it is clear that the Quraysh of Muḥammad’s time were spreading 
their marriages out to a far greater extent than their fathers.  
  
We get strikingly similar results when we approach the issue of exogamy/endogamy 
geographically rather than genealogically. The image below is a map of the distribution 
of the Arab tribes during the seventh century taken from Margoliouth’s Mohammed and 
the Rise of Islam:311  
   
  
                                                 
311 The map is a fold out at the back of the 1905 edition. D. S. Margoliouth, Mohammed and the Rise of 
Islam, (New York: Putnam, 1905).  
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Map One: Map of Arabia in the 7th Century CE, from Margoliouth’s  




In terms of the accuracy of the map, it is true that the information on the geographic 
locations of the tribes is drawn from the traditional historical narratives. But, as with 
genealogy, we have grounds for believing that geographical locations of tribes are less 
susceptible to manipulation than anecdotes and ḥadīths. As Donner has suggested, the 
geography of the ‘battle days’ could be a useful resource for historians because even if 
the battle itself is non-historical, the location would have to be a plausible one and relate 
to the location where the descendants of the tribes resided at the time of telling.312 In 
addition to this, the veracity of the geography is also boosted by the corroboration of 
                                                 
312 Fred Donner, “The Bakr B. Wāʾil Tribes and Politics in Northeastern Arabia on the Eve of Islam,” 
Studia Islamica 51 (1980): 14-15.  
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contemporary epigraphy which alludes to at least one of the main tribes that the Quraysh 
are recorded as having married into – and possibly up to three.313  
  
Our next map shows how the origins of the marriage partners Quraysh of the preProphetic 
era were distributed graphically. The tribe names have been removed (for clarity) and 
every time a tribe has contributed a bride to the Quraysh, this has been marked with a star 
placed on the location Margoliouth put the tribe name.  
 
Map Two: Geographic distribution of tribal origins of non-Qurashī women marrying 
into pre-Islamic cohort  
 
                                                 
313 The tribe in question is the ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa who are mentioned in the Murayghān inscription of 552 
AD. The events the inscription describes took place in the middle of the sixth century and the inscription 
locates them in the Ḥijāz (Meir Kister, “The Campaign of Huluban: A New Light on the Expedition of 
Abraha,” Le Museon 78 (1965): 425-436); the fourth generation descendants of Quṣayy produced children 
with four women from this tribe. The other possible reference to a local tribe is more complex; this is the 
appearance in Greek sources of the “Kinaidokolpites” who have been linked to both Kināna and Kalb b. 
Rabīʿa b. ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa (along with other theories). For an extensive recent discussion of the 
complexities of this latter term see M.D. Bukharin, “Towards the Earliest History of Kinda,” Arabian 
Archaeology and Epigraphy 20, no.1 (2009): 64-80.  
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Almost all the marriages they carried out were with tribes living within 200 miles 
of Mecca. Only two marriages involved tribes placed far outside this range; one to 
a woman of Bakr b. Wāʾil and another to a woman of Tamīm (A19 and A47), both 
from tribes living on the western shore of the Persian Gulf. This gives us a good 
measure of the geographical horizons of the Qurashīs on the eve of Islam  
  
When we repeat this process for the early Islamic marriages we see a marked difference:  
  
Map Three: Geographic distribution of tribal origins of non-Qurashī women 







The geographical spread of marriages for Cohort Two is enormous, representing almost 
all inhabited regions of the Arabian Peninsula314 and extending into Iraq and the Syrian 
Desert. Once again, we see that the underlying characteristic of this generation315 is its 
exogamy. This generation not only married outside the Quraysh significantly more often 
than the pre-Islamic cohort, but when it did so it was to women from a far greater 
geographical range.   
 
Explanations – marriages of the early Muslims  
  
These findings indicate that the early Muslims were more likely to marry exogamously 
than members of the non-Muslim society they grew up in. This tendency towards 
exogamy is not only evident in absolute terms of whether their wives were Quraysh or 
non-Quraysh, it is also evident within these categories. When the early Muslims married 
lineal Qurashī women they did so with women to whom they were more distantly related; 
when they married non-Qurashī women they did so with women from a greater 
geographical range.  
  
In terms of the marriage patterns of the early Muslims in general, and their exogamy in 
particular, this fits with what we know from the outside sources. First, it appears to be a 
result of the ostracisation of the early Muslims from the wider Quraysh; this reduced their 
chances of finding marriage partners from within this group meaning that they had to look 
further afield. According to the Kalmijn framework of inquiry this is an example of a 
change in marriage behaviour affected by social forces. Similarly, the ideology of Islam 
meant they were less beholden to existing tribal divisions and may have been more open 
to unions considered unthinkable before their conversion. Finally, many of these men 
lived after the conquest of Arabia; as such, they were able to marry outside the confines 
                                                 
314 Except Oman – this will be addressed below.  
315 For reference, the older members of this generation were born around 570 and the last of them died in 
the 660s.  
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of the Ḥijāz. This latter reason is structural – the conquests brought the men into contact 
with a wider group of women and this facilitated their marriages to the outside groups.   
  
The only major area of the peninsula that the Prophetic cohort did not marry into is Oman, 
and Crone notes that this is the only region whose markets the pre-Islamic Quraysh did 
not visit.316 There is also evidence of a cultural and material divide between the eastern 
third of the peninsula and the remainder in pre-Islamic times.317 This indicates two things: 
first, the success of the Islamic project meant an intensification of existing relationships 
rather than a complete break with the past for the first Muslims; second that the 
methodology is sound - the absence of Omani markets in the traditional narratives of the 




Qurashī marriage behaviour as recorded in the Nasab Qurasyh may also confirm another 
theory relating to marriage changes caused by the arrival of Islam. Stern has argued that 
Islam introduced polygamy into what was previously a largely monogamous society and 
the data appear to agree with this;318 the 54 child-bearing marriages of Cohort One were 
conducted by 34 men while the 54 marriages and unions of Cohort Two were conducted 
by just nine men. While this is a dramatic increase in the number of marriages per man, 
we should be aware of a possible historiographical reason for this; the older generation 
may have been producing children from similarly large numbers of women, but later 
genealogists did not feel that these children were worth recording in the same detail as 
those of Cohort Two.  
  
                                                 
316 Patricia Crone, Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 
152, note 25.   
317 M.C.A. MacDonald, “Reflections on the Linguistic Map of Pre-Islamic Arabia,” Arabian Archaeology 
and Epigraphy 11 (2000): 38-40.  
318 Gertrude Henrietta Stern, Marriage in Early Islam, (London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1939), 81.  
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Since the publication of Stern’s book there has been a significant amount of sociological 
research on the reasons why some societies are polygamous and why others are 
monogamous.319 It becomes quickly apparent from reading this literature however that 
the more data a researcher has on a society’s economic, social, political and 
environmental structures, the more reasons can be suggested for explaining its monogamy 
or polygamy. It has been observed that monogamous societies are less common than 
polygamous ones (about 15% of the total number of historically recorded societies) and 
these monogamous societies are found in both the most marginal conditions (where the 
smallest distinctions in status and wealth between men are exhibited) and also in the 
largest and most successful of ancient civilizations (which exhibited the largest 
distinctions in status).320 In the Islamic case, the Arabs seem to have gone from being a 
marginal society to the masters of an empire and somehow acquired polygamy on the 
way.  
  
Conclusions to numerical/geographical analysis of Cohorts One and 
Two  
  
Stern aside, the marriage patterns of the early Muslims confirm many elements of the 
traditional historical narrative. The arrival of Islam coincides with a dramatic alteration 
in the patterns of marriages for those who converted to the new faith early and would go 
on to lead the community after the death of Muḥammad. Not only this, the nature of the 
change is in line with what we would expect from the traditional historical sources. In 
terms of social change, the ostracisation of the early Muslim community combined with 
their pan-tribal ideology would have led to the greater levels of exogamy we see in the 
tables above. In terms of structural change, the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula and the 
                                                 
319 For overviews see Douglas R. White and Michael L. Burton, “Causes of Polygyny: Ecology, 
Economy, Kinship, and Warfare,” American Anthropologist 90, no. 4 (1988): 871–887; and Stephen K. 
Sanderson, “Explaining Monogamy and Polygyny in Human Societies: Comment on Kanazawa and 
Still,” Social Forces 80, no. 1 (2001): 329–335.  
320 Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, and Peter J Richerson, “The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage,” 
Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society Of London. Series B, Biological Sciences 367, no. 1589 
(2012): 659.  
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Near East would have brought them into contact with a far greater range of tribes than 
their forefathers who dominated only Mecca and possibly its hinterland.  
  
By locating the marriages geographically we can also effectively counter some of the 
more extreme revisionist theories on Islamic origins. In her Meccan Trade, Crone’s 
scepticism of the narrative of Islamic origins leads her to suggest that the pre-Islamic 
Quraysh were not based at Mecca at all but located much farther north, or that the tribe 
was split between one group at Mecca and the other at the northern base, or that the tribe 
was dispersed all over the peninsula.321 The marriage distribution as indicated on the 
maps challenges all three theories; the marriages of the pre-Islamic Quraysh are 
concentrated in the region of Mecca and the high degree of endogamy within the tribe 
precludes the notion that they were geographically split in two camps. And, although the 
first Muslims certainly married women from all over the peninsula, we should not forget 
that over a third of their marriages were with other Qurashīs; when it comes to marriage, 
the only centre of gravity in both cohorts is a location in the central Ḥijāz. It should also 
be recalled that this counter-argument to Crone’s theories is built on the relatively solid 
(by the standards of early Islamic history) foundations of geography and genealogy using 
a prosopographical approach advocated by Crone herself.  
  
Finally, the comparison shows once again that our data and methodology are on a sound 
footing. Within the traditional narrative sources, there is an identified bias towards tribes 
that had settled around the main urban centres that supported intellectual circles, such as 
Baṣra and Kūfa.322 The tribes identified in table 5.4 above are not these tribes; they are 
tribes local to Mecca who in many cases did not play a significant role in the conquests 
                                                 
321 Crone, Meccan Trade, 162–165. Crone is not the only one to promote the theory of a non-Meccan  
Islamic origin story, but unlike Gerald Hawting (in The Idea of Idolatry) and John Wansbrough (The 
Sectarian Milieu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) Crone is to be preferred because she actually 
provides some concrete suggestions on where Islam might have emerged if not Mecca.   
322 Michael Lecker, “Pre-Islamic Arabia,” in The New Cambridge Histoy of Islam vol. 1, ed. Chase 
Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 153-154.  
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or the post-conquest milieu. The genealogical literature seems to have resisted the 
distortions of later historians – at least with regard to maternal data.  
  
Hopefully by now scholars of the sceptical persuasion can see that the child-bearing data 
preserved in the Nasab Quraysh (and most likely early nasab works in general) should 
be treated more like primary evidence. It bears more similarities in this regard with the  
Qurʾān and the Constitution of Medina than it does with the bulk of ḥadīth and sīra 
material. In other words these are complicated sources, but uniquely useful for the work 
of positivist historians.  
 
Section Two: Discursive approaches to the analysis of Cohorts One and 
Two  
  
In the second section of Chapter Seven we will reassess relevant elements of the 
secondary literature along with a number of the more familiar historical sources such as 
al-Ṭabarī’s Taʾrīkh. The purpose of this is to show that the findings of Section One of this 
chapter can help us decide between narratives that currently have equal weight. While the 
result can only be described as being a sketch of a full literature review it will nonetheless 
show how prosopography is capable of provoking new discussions and suggesting new 
avenues of inquiry.   
  
Our remarks will primarily concern the status of the pre-Islamic Quraysh on which there 
are broadly speaking two narratives. On the one side we have a narrative that tends to 
emphasise two features of the pre-Islamic Quraysh; that they were the pre-eminent tribe 
of Arabia (and recognised as such) and that they had a far-flung trading empire that 
extended to Byzantium, Iran, Yemen and Abyssinia. This is the image provided by the 
majority of the traditional narrative sources and it is supported to a lesser or greater degree 
by a large number of modern scholars.323 On the other side there is a counternarrative that 
                                                 
323 Henri Lammens La Mecque à la veille de l’hégire (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1924); W.  
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regards the reported importance of the Quraysh in the pre-Islamic era as being grossly 
overstated in the majority of the traditional sources, and in reality the Quraysh were far 
more parochial an entity than these sources lead us to believe. This is the opinion of a 
smaller number of modern scholars, who can be typically characterised as being 
revisionists.324  
  
In the following section it will be argued that by taking all the elements of our 
prosopographical findings together we end up with an argument that overwhelmingly 
supports the revisionist position. The grounds for this will be laid out below by looking 
at three inter-related themes where the parochiality of the Quraysh is evident. The first 
theme is that of their political horizons; it is argued that the limited geographic 
distribution of the marriages is a good indicator that their political purview did not extend 
more than a week’s travel any direction from Mecca. The second theme concerns their 
relationships with the surrounding tribes. Here it is shown that the role of the Quraysh as 
custodians of a shrine indicates that they were superior to the geographically dispersed 
tribes that encircled them. But this was a relationship of mutual dependency; the Quraysh 
still needed these tribes in order to survive. Not only this, they were also inferior in status 
to the tribes who controlled nearby towns. The final theme is that of the economy of 
Mecca. In this latter discussion, it will be shown that the Quraysh tribe’s very survival at 
the settlement depended on a fine balance of power mediated through trade and religion.  
  
The discussion will conclude with an alternative narrative for the rise of Islam that 
combines these themes. This new narrative is one that emphasises the precarious nature 
of Qurashī existence before and during the lifetime of the Prophet. Unlike the masters of 
                                                 
Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953); Muhammad Shaban  
Islamic History, A New Interpretation, vol.1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); and Fred 
Donner “Mecca’s Food Supplies and Muhammad’s Boycott,” Journal of the Economic and Social 
History of the Orient 20, no. 3 (1977): 249-266. All are identified and have their inter-relationship 
discussed by Crone in Meccan Trade page 3. For further discussion of the revisionist position on Meccan 
trade see the response in Serjeant, “Meccan Trade and Flawed Polemics”; Crone’s response to Serjeant 
(“Serjeant and Meccan Trade,” Arabica 39 (1992): 216-240); and Róbert Simon, Meccan Trade and 
Islam (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989), esp. 21 ff.  
324 In mind here are the works of Patricia Crone, Michael Cook and Gerald Hawting. 
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an international trading empire as some scholars would have us believe, the Quraysh that 
emerge from this analysis constituted a tribe that struggled to raise itself above the status 
of the surrounding peoples of the central Ḥijāz, who were custodians of a minor shrine, 
and were ultimately extremely vulnerable to any group who could upset the balance of 
regional power in its favour.  
  
Marriage and status in pre-Islamic Mecca  
  
Turning first to the supposed international connections of the pre-Islamic Quraysh, we 
see that the geographic distribution illustrated in Map Two indicates that in marriage 
terms the geographic horizons of the tribe did not even extend to the northern and southern 
limits of the Ḥijāz. If the marriage behaviour of a particular group is a reflection of its 
relationship with outsiders – and all through this thesis the indicators say that this is the 
case – then from the map we can only conclude that the most important relationships of 
the Quraysh in this period were with the tribes in their immediate surroundings. Based on 
the geographic data alone we cannot conclude that the Quraysh enjoyed relationships of 
any similar intensity with the peoples outside Arabia, or even with the Arab tribes that 
abutted these peoples. It is only with the early Islamic period that we see a marriage 
distribution pattern that matches the status of a widely recognised tribe of trans-peninsular 
importance.  
  
In terms of the pre-Islamic Quraysh being recognised as an elite amongst the Arab tribes, 
the marriage behaviour is also unsupportive. This can be seen in the geographic 
distribution; the only tribes willing to hand over daughters to Qurashī men are those living 
near Mecca – it follows therefore that it was only the tribes near Mecca that saw any value 
in developing closer relations with the Quraysh. But it is more apparent in the relative 
levels of exogamy and endogamy. Returning to the caliphal Umayyad marriage behaviour 
in Table 7.1, we see that their status as an elite meant that they shunned connections with 
Arabs they considered ‘outsiders’ (only eight of 56 marriages were to non-Qurashī 
women); it also meant fewer marriages to non-Umayyad Qurashīs. In their place came 
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non-Arab women (the concubines) and paternal cousins. Their pre-Islamic forbears could 
not do this, so although the sources often insinuate that the pre-Islamic Quraysh enjoyed 
an Umayyad-like pre-eminence over the Arab tribes of the peninsula in the jāhilī era, this 
was clearly not the case.  
  
Furthermore, the degree of endogamy exhibited by the pre-Islamic Quraysh correlates 
remarkably well with some more recent studies on Arab marriage patterns. In the 1960s, 
Richard Randolph and Allan Coult used the novel means of a computer to analyse the 
marriages of a Hawaashleh Bedouin subgroup; these had been recorded by Randolph in 
the Israeli part of the Negev desert earlier in the decade.325 This group of around 350 
individuals recalled 150 marriages. For our purposes, we are only interested in the 
marriages made by the men of this sub-group, of which there are 119. Of these marriages, 
61 were carried out with other members of the subgroup.  This subgroup is defined as 
those people descended from a founder figure who came between four and eight 
generations prior to the generation of the living. This is equivalent to the combined lineal 
and non-lineal Quraysh when looking at the marriages of our pre-Islamic cohort.  
  
Based on these figures, we find that the level of endogamy (marriages amongst the 
subgroup as a proportion of total marriages) amongst the Hawaashleh Bedouin of the mid-
twentieth century was 51.26%. The equivalent level of Quraysh endogamy for the pre-
Islamic cohort of the sixth century was 56.61%. For the first Muslims it dropped to 
36.44%, but for the Umayyads it shot up to 85.71% (and this is not taking into account 
the large numbers of concubines of the Umayyads, something the Hawaashleh did not 
have access to). Hence the pre-Islamic Meccans were exhibiting a level of endogamy 
comparable to the marginalised Bedouin living a few hundred miles north of them 1,400 
years later.   
  
                                                 
325 Richard R. Randolph and Allan D. Coult, “A Computer Analysis of Bedouin Marriage,” Southwestern 
Journal of Anthropology 24, no. 1 (1968): 83–99.  
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In addition to this the Quraysh did something in this period that they tried to avoid in later 
times, which was to marry their own daughters off to non-Qurashī tribes. Ibn Iṣḥāq 
informs us that one of the leaders of Thaqīf who turned down Muḥammad’s message in 
the pre-Hijra period was married to a Qurashī woman of Jumaḥ.326 Later on, when the 
Thaqafī town of Ṭāʾif was besieged, Abu Sufyān b. Ḥarb and Mughīra b. Shuʿba went in 
to appeal to the Qurashī wives of Thaqīf to leave – they are named as Āmina bt. Abī 
Sufyān and Firāsiya bt. Suwayd b. ʿAmr b. Thaʿlaba (both women produced sons by their 
non-Qurashī husbands). 327  The Nasab Quraysh records other tribes with whom the 
Quraysh married their women in the pre-Islamic period; Kurayz b. Rabīʿa b. Ḥabīb 
married his daughter to a Ḥaḍramī, and his grand-daughter (Kayissa bt. Ḥārith b. Kurayz) 
married Musaylima al-Kadhāb of the Banū Ḥanīfa.328 Two daughters of Abū alʿĀṣ b. 
Umayya are also recorded as having made child-bearing marriages into Thaqīf.329 Even 
the Banū Hāshim provided daughters to other tribes; ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib’s daughter 
(Muḥammad’s aunt) married Jaḥsh b. Riʿāb of Asad b. Khuzayma in a union which 
produced a number of children, including a daughter who married Muḥammad’s onetime 
adopted son Zayd and later the Prophet himself.330  
  
In later generations, exogamous marriages of Qurashī women appear to have been 
drastically curtailed. The Nasab Quraysh does not record a single exogamous marriage 
for any daughter of an Umayyad caliph, and there is evidence that the Umayyads went so 
far as to prevent marriages from other Qurashī clans to outsiders. The Umayyads 
reproached ʿAbd Allāh b. Jaʿfar b. Abī Ṭālib for marrying one of his daughters to al-
Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf – despite the fact that this man was an invaluable governor and of the 
very same Thaqīf tribe the Umayyads had given daughters to a couple of generations 
                                                 
326 Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra al-nabawiyya, 1:419 (translated in Muḥammad Ibn Iṣḥāq, The Life of Muhammad, 
5th ed. (Lahore: Pakistan Branch, Oxford University Press, 1978), 192).   
327 Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra al-nabawiyya, 2:483-484 (translated in Ibn Iṣḥāq, The Life of Muhammad, 589-
590); al-Wāqidī, Kitāb al-Maghāzī, ed. Marsden Jones (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 929 
(translated in al-Wāqidī, The Life of Muḥammad: al-Wāqidī’s Kitāb al-Maghāzī, translated by Rizwi 
Faizer, Amal Ismail and AbdulKader Tayob (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2011), 455). 
328 Al-Zubayri, Nasab Quraysh, 18–20. 
329 Al-Zubayri, Nasab Quraysh, 101. 
330 Al-Zubayri, Nasab Quraysh, 19. 
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before.331 The avoidance of marriages of this type seems to have even permeated the 
Nasab Quraysh itself. An illustration of this is the fact that three identifiable332 Qurashī 
women who made exogamous marriages as recorded in a section of Ibn Ḥabīb’s al-
Munammaq do not appear at all in al-Zubayrī’s work. This may be because as a work of 
genealogy it is not interested in familial lines that leave the Quraysh, but we should note 
that the daughters in question are not even mentioned alongside their brothers.333  
                                                                                                                                                 
The issue of daughter marriage is not one that can be addressed in a truly prosopographical 
fashion at this stage; the current database consists only of childbearing marriages of 
Qurashī men, not women. A comprehensive database of all personages recorded in the 
Nasab Quraysh is hence a desideratum, though given the indications that the work is 
being coy about female Qurashī exogamy it will have to be supplemented with data from 
other sources.   
  
As a preliminary to this, we can make use of a table that appears in the appendix of an 
unpublished PhD thesis by Rasheed Hosein.334 This table draws on multiple historical 
sources and records over a hundred unions between Qurashīs and Thaqafīs that took place 
between 530 and 750 CE. As this is unpublished research it is unfair to be critical of 
Rasheed’s table, or to place too much reliance on it, but nonetheless it provides us with 
some useful early indicators. The table shows that of the 25 childbearing unions where a 
Qurashī woman married a Thaqafī man, only two occurred after the sixth generation 
                                                 
331 Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 1:124, referring to al-ʿIqd. 
332 In that their fathers can be identified. 
333 Muḥammad Ibn Ḥabīb, al-Munammaq fī akhbār Quraysh (Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al 
ʿUthmāniyya, 1964), 301-324. The women are Ṣafiyya bt. Abī Ṭalḥa of ʿAbd al-Dār b. Quṣayy who 
married Ḥajjāj b. ʿAlāṭ of Bahz of Banū Sulaym b. Manṣūr producing a son called Maʿraḍ (al-
Munammaq, 306; father appears in the Nasab Quraysh, 251, but she does not appear amongst his 
children); a daughter of Aswad b. ʿAwf of Zuhra  who married ʿAbd Allāh b. Yazīd of Azd - a tribe with 
whom it is stated there was no alliance (al-Munammaq, 307; father appears in the Nasab Quraysh, 273, 
but the daughter is not listed amongst his children); and a daughter of ʿUbayd Allāh b. ʿUthmān (sister of 
Ṭalḥa) who married ʿAlqama b. Waqqāṣ of Layth (al-Munammaq, 310; father and sons appear  in the 
Nasab Quraysh, 280, she does not). This last marriage took place in the Islamic era. 
334 Rasheed Hosein, Tribal Alliance Formations and Power Structures in the Jāhilīyah and Early Islamic 




(using the generational system employed in this thesis). The Generation 6 exogamous 
daughter marriages would have been organised by the men of the fifth generation; in other 
words the early Muslim men who we know married exogamously themselves. This type 
of marriage is not found amongst the marriage records of the daughters of the Umayyad 
caliphs in the Nasab Quraysh.  
  
These exogamous daughter marriages of the Quraysh have attracted a degree of scholarly 
interest. Landau-Tasseron has argued that exogamous marriages of Qurashī daughters 
were only ever conducted with tribes with whom the Quraysh were in a formal alliance, 
and this was due to the “special status of this tribe at that time.”335 The problem is that 
some sources explicitly state that the tribe receiving a Qurashī daughter was not an ally. 
In response to this, she points out that these claims of non-alliance are contradicted in 
other sources. Her explanation for the discrepancies is that those who denied the 
allegiances were attempting to Islamise the jāhilī history of Muḥammad’s clan. In this 
case, by reducing the number of allies of the Quraysh, historians hoped to make it appear 
as though the pre-Islamic tribe pre-empted the ḥadīth declaring that “there should be no 
alliance in Islam.” But this cuts both ways; it could be that the alliances themselves are 
the fabrication of some later historians in order to explain why the Quraysh frequently 
gave away their daughters to non-Qurashī tribes – a most uncommon act at the time these 
histories were being written down. By making these tribes allies the exogamous marriages 
become endogamous.336 This is a better explanation for the resulting confusion in the 
sources with regard to who was and who was not an ally (a confusion also noted by 
Kister)337 than Landau-Tasseron’s, where she blames a lack of data.  
  
                                                 
335 Ella Landau-Tasseron, “The Status of Allies in Pre-Islamic and Early Islamic Arabian Society,” 
Islamic Law and Society 13, no. 1 (2006): 9–10. 
336 Landau-Tasseron, “The Status of Allies,” 23.  
337 Kister lists ten variations on which tribes constituted the Ḥums alliance provided by nine different 
authors (in one case the author gives two variation). Meir Kister, “Mecca and Tamīm (Aspects of Their 
Relations),” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 8, no. 2 (1965): 132.  
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Returning to the issue of marriage and the status of the pre-Islamic Quraysh, the situation 
can be summarised thusly. The genealogical tradition tells us that Qurashī men of the 
immediate pre-Islamic era normally married Qurashī women; when they did not, they 
took wives from the region surrounding Mecca. They also gave their daughters in 
marriage to some of these tribes – in particular Thaqīf, though we cannot preclude 
marriages made to other tribes who were not as successful in preserving their genealogical 
traditions. Both these marriage practices were abandoned by the Umayyad caliphs, and 
quite probably by the rest of the Quraysh too. Short of a simpler explanation, exogamy 
was something forced upon the pre-Islamic Quraysh by the circumstances of their 
relatively low status during the late jāhiliyya, and as soon as they could give up the 
practice, they did so. This forces us into a reappraisal of the political milieu of the Quraysh 
immediately before and shortly after the arrival of Islam, with particular attention being 
paid to the tribes that the Quraysh married into with the greatest frequency.  
  
Meccan inter-tribal relations  
  
The data imply that there were two types of inter-tribal relationship enjoyed by the 
Quraysh; one where they were equal or possibly subservient, and another type where they 
were dominant though possibly equal. 338  The marriages where they were equal or 
subservient were those made to the Thaqīf as they also provided this tribe with their own 
women. The tribes which they probably dominated include ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa and Kināna 
from whom they accepted women but rarely offered their own in return. Understanding 
these two types of relationship forms the crux of what follows.  
  
                                                 
338 A similar dynamic has also been observed by Teresa Bernheimer with regard to the marriages of the 
ʿAlids. In this case, the ʿAlids are shown to take brides from the Makhzūm branch of the Quraysh but not 
give any in return; this implies a position of relative ʿAlid strength. The opposite is the case with regard to 
the marriages carried out between the ʿAlids and the ʿAbbāsids, thus indicating a position of relative ʿAlid 
weakness (“Genealogy, Marriage and the Drawing of Boundaries,” 81-87). There are additional caveats 
with our prosopography of the pre-Islamic period however; as the non-Qurashī groups did not preserve 
their genealogies there is still a possibility that they were taking Qurashī brides but these are not recorded.  
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The Thaqīf stand out amongst local tribes because – like the Quraysh - they were largely 
concentrated in a single town, in their case Ṭāʾif.339 Ṭāʾif and Mecca were comparable in 
that they both operated as centres of gravity for the surrounding villages and transhumant 
tribes,340 and both cities were associated with trade and both had cultic centres important 
to the surrounding tribes. A passage in the Qurʾān also suggests that residents of these 
towns seem to have considered themselves to be more favoured in God’s eyes than the 
more geographically dispersed tribes that surrounded them; hence in Q 43.31 where the 
unbelievers pose the question: “Why was this Qurʾān not sent down to a distinguished 
man, from either of the two cities?” (the exegetes explain the two cities as being Mecca 
and Ṭāʾif).341   
  
But there was one major difference between the two towns. Ṭāʾif was a walled agricultural 
settlement, which not only meant it could supply home-grown goods for the surrounding 
tribes (it still supplies fruit to Mecca) but also meant it could withstand a siege.342 Mecca 
had neither agriculture nor a wall; its indefensibility is highlighted by the fact that it 
surrendered to Muḥammad without a fight and that the Muslim leadership did not remain 
there after the victory. Ṭāʾif on the other hand held out for some time against the same 
man and army before surrendering on generous terms.343 We should recall that before the 
Hijra it was to Ṭāʾif that Muḥammad first went to proselytise when remaining in Mecca 
was no longer possible. Only after his failure in this nearby city did he go to Yathrib – 
another large, defensible, agricultural settlement in the Ḥijāz.  
  
                                                 
339 The marriage of the Qurashī woman to Musaylima mentioned above also fits this mould; the Banū 
Ḥanīfa were concentrated in the town of Hajr.  
340 According to Ibn Iṣḥāq, Muḥammad only broke the siege of Ṭāʾif by wooing the surrounding tribes 
(2:492); his success in this strategy is cited as the reason for their surrender (2:537-538). From Ibn 
Hishām, al-Sīra al-nabawiyya (translated in Ibn Isḥāq, The Life of Muhammad, 594 and 614).   
341 Ibn Iṣḥāq states that the ideal candidates for prophecy suggested by Muḥammad’s audience were 
Walīd b. Mughīra b. ʿAbd Allāh of Makhzūm, Abū Masʿūd ʿAmr b. ʿUmayr b. ʿAwf of Thaqīf, or ʿUrwa 
b. Masʿūd b. Muʿattib of Thaqīf (Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra al-nabawiyya, 1:361(translated in Ibn Iṣḥāq’s The 
Life of Muḥammad, 164)).  
342 EI2, s.v. “T h aḳīf” (Michael Lecker).  




The lack of agriculture at Mecca meant that its survival depended on other sources – most 
probably religion and trade. In terms of the former, the shrine of the Kaʿba and the nearby 
pilgrimage destinations were exploited in the form of the local religion of the Ḥums, 
observers of which included the Quraysh and – according to most sources – ʿĀmir b. 
Ṣaʿṣaʿa, Kināna, Thaqīf and Khuzāʿa.344 Correspondingly, the bulk of the exogamous 
marriages made by the Quraysh were with members of these tribes (see Table 7.4 above). 
The relationship between the Quraysh and three of these tribes (the exception being 
Thaqīf) was one of superiority; this is seen in the absence of Qurashī female exogamy 
and the fact that they were in charge of the cultic centre to which these tribes made 
pilgrimage.345 The cult they administered had much in common with other forms of 
religious observance that existed in the Arabian peninsula (and much in common with 
Islam); prohibitions on certain food stuffs, marriage taboos, observance of sacred months 
and pilgrimage.346 One narrative explains that the taboos themselves had been established 
by the Quraysh around the time of the birth of Muḥammad.347   
  
This is interesting because newly created taboos are a means of affirming bonds; by 
agreeing to change old taboos or accept new ones, groups and individuals make a highly 
visible gesture indicating their commitment to the authority who instituted the rule 
change.348 Similarly, breaking a newly instituted taboo is a way of indicating a refusal to 
acknowledge that authority. The battle over who gets the authority to decide on taboos 
forms some of the backdrop to the formulation of the Qurʾān; verses such as Q 2:189 (“It 
                                                 
344 Kister, “Mecca and Tamīm,” 132 ff. The inclusion of Thaqīf is questionable based on the indications 
of their parity or superiority in relations with the Meccans and the fact that they administered their own 
shrine-based cult; their presence in some of the lists of the Ḥums may indicate an attempt by later authors 
to explain the evidence of the imbalance in power as preserved in other sources (especially in relation to 
marriage).  
345 See Munt, Sacred History, 150, and discussion on ḥarams below.  
346 Crone, Meccan Trade, 190, note 104.   
347 Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra al-nabawiyya, 1:199 (translated in Ibn Isḥāq, The Life of Muhammad, 87).  
348 For examples from anthropological observation see Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966). As she puts it in her introduction: “...rituals of purity and impurity 
create unity in experience. So far from being aberrations from the central project of religion, they are 
positive contributions to atonement. By their means, symbolic patterns are worked out and publicly 
displayed. Within these patterns disparate elements are related and disparate experience is given meaning” 
(pp. 2-3).   
210  
  
is not piety to enter houses from their rear”) should be seen in political terms as much as 
religious ones.  
  
In terms of the link between economy and religion, it is difficult to say how much money 
the Quraysh made from their religious activities. The shrines of southern Arabia do seem 
to have been associated with profits,349 and some of the taboo rituals would have had the 
effect of generating money from pilgrims (such as a ban on bringing in food stuffs and 
forcing some of the pilgrims to circumambulate the Kaʿba in specially purchased 
garments).350 But it is not inconceivable that these profit-seeking activities were part of a 
later trope that emphasised the money-obsessed practices of the preIslamic Quraysh. It is 
also possible that the devotional functions of the shrine at Mecca were run at a loss which 
was justified in terms of the value earned through prestige and authority (the Hajj to 
Mecca today costs the Saudi Arabian government more than it earns from the pilgrims).351  
  
Meccan trade  
  
There is far less ambiguity surrounding the other major activity of the Quraysh – their 
role as traders. The form and nature of this trade has been hotly contested over recent 
decades, but the sources are unanimous in saying their primary export commodity was 
leather. In terms of imports, these are most likely to have been basic luxuries that could 
not otherwise be obtained locally.352 As for the extent of the trade network, the marriage 
data support Crone’s contention that “Meccan trade was thus a trade generated by Arab 
needs, not by the commercial appetites of the surrounding empires, and it is as traders 
operating in Arabia rather than beyond its borders that the Meccans should be seen”; in 
                                                 
349 EQ, s.v. “South Arabia, Religions in Pre-Islamic” (Christian Robin).  
350 Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra al-nabawiyya, 1:199 (translated in Ibn Isḥāq, The Life of Muhammad, 87).  
351 Joy McCorriston, Pilgrimage and Household, 31.  
352 Crone suggests grain and flour (“Quraysh and the Roman army: making sense of the Meccan leather 
trade,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 70, no.1 (2007): 64).  
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the same work she goes on to say that Meccan trade should be seen solely as a West 
Arabian phenomenon.353 All this concurs with the marriage data above.  
  
Crone has revised her opinion somewhat in a more recent paper where she recognises that 
the demand of the Roman army for leather means that Arabian trade may have been far 
more lucrative than she first thought.354 But despite this, there is nothing in the sources to 
suggest that this turned the Quraysh into a uniquely powerful tribe – though they traded 
in leather they did not have a monopoly on it and instead acted as middlemen. 
Additionally, the Quraysh had a choke point, which was the vulnerability of their 
caravans.  
  
It was this vulnerability that directly led to them losing control of Mecca to the Muslims 
based in Medina. Crone is right to find it inexplicable that the masters of a supposed 
“Meccan Commonwealth” should surrender to Muḥammad’s blockade (conducted by 
what she crudely terms “a nest of robbers”); the Muslims stopped only three caravans in 
five or six years according to Ibn Iṣḥāq.355 This is indeed a paradox if we follow the 
traditional characterization of Meccan trade. But if the Quraysh led a marginal existence, 
then the loss of these three caravans would have been a catastrophe. Not only would they 
have lost status amongst the surrounding tribes (especially if payment for the goods was 
only made at the conclusion of a successful trade mission),356 their loss of profits would 
have meant they could not buy the food produced by the villages of these same tribes. 
The result is confirmation of Donner’s observation that while in the traditional sources 
the blockaded Quraysh “are generally represented as being worried about their profits and 
their prestige,” there is a body of material within the sources (and possibly also within the 
Qurʾān) that the blockade caused real suffering and starvation.357   
  
                                                 
353 Crone, Meccan Trade, 151-153.  
354 Crone, “Quraysh and the Roman army.”  
355 Crone, Meccan Trade, 165.  
356 This is the arrangement suggested by Crone, Meccan Trade, 205 ff.  
357 Fred Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 249-266.   
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This latter point indicates that Mecca could not survive as a cultic centre alone. According 
to a report from Ibn al-Kalbī, in an earlier period of famine the Quraysh responded to the 
food shortage by buying grain from Jurash and Tabāla in the south;358 the fact that they 
could not repeat this trick as a response to Muḥammad’s disruption of the northern 
caravan route is evidence that they were short of cash. Trade was hence a necessity for 
the Quraysh - Mecca could not survive as a standalone cultic centre in the pre-Islamic 
period for any great length of time without the support of the surrounding non-Qurashī 
tribes.  
  
This ‘parochial Quraysh’ argument also helps resolve the issue of the target audience of 
the Qurʾān. In another paper, Crone has highlighted the numerous passages in the Qurʾān 
that refer to agriculture and fishing which far outnumber the references to trade.359 This 
is indeed peculiar if the target audience of Muḥammad’s message were the Quraysh of 
Mecca, who were traders and not farmers, and did not live near the sea. But perhaps the 
Quraysh were not the only intended audience of Muḥammad’s message. It is just as likely 
that Muḥammad proselytised to the peoples upon whom the Quraysh were dependant; the 
surrounding villagers and fishermen who provisioned a town that could not produce its 
own food.  
  
The story of the Quraysh in Late Antiquity is therefore the story of how a small group of 
people navigated a complicated set of relationships between towns, villages and nomads. 
As town-dwellers, the Quraysh presumably did not see the tribes that inhabited the 
hinterland as their equals, but at the same time they understood that their survival in 
Mecca depended on good relations with them. The Quraysh maintained their preeminence 
amongst these tribes by providing them with the goods and spiritual services they could 
not provide for themselves. This interdependency was compounded by the lack of 
                                                 
358 Ibn Ḥabīb, al-Munammaq, 262.  
359 Patricia Crone, “How Did the Quranic Pagans Make a living?” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies 68, no. 3 (2005): 387-399.  
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agriculture in Mecca which meant that the town’s custodians relied on religion and trade 
to a far greater extent than other major settlements of the Ḥijāz such as Ṭāʾif and Yathrib.  
  
Reframing the narrative of early Islamic origins  
  
Seen in this light, we must prefer a narrative that highlights the marginality of Quraysh 
existence rather than one that emphasises its peninsular pre-eminence. Creating such a 
narrative is long overdue, but to do such a thing even using a small range of sources is far 
beyond the constraints of this thesis. Instead, the following will provide a sketch of the 
rise of Islam that will combine the marriage data with the elements of the Qurʾān and the 
less disputed elements of the historiographical tradition that emphasise the parochiality 
of Muḥammad’s life. It in no way aims to be a comprehensive explanation behind every 
Qurʾānic sūra or historical paradox; the purpose here is to see the ways in which the 
marriage data and the parochial narrative might contribute to future research.  
  
At the geographic centre of the Quraysh’s world was the Kaʿba. The Kaʿba was a 
physically unremarkable shrine for much of Muḥammad’s life (if not all of it); both 
alAzraqī (d. 834) and Ibn Iṣḥāq describe it as being an enclosure of unmortared stones 
with no roof. In Ibn Iṣḥāq’s description this construction was slightly higher than a man’s 
height,360 and according to al-Azraqī the covering was draped over only one side.361 
When thinking of the Kaʿba at this time we should therefore picture sites like the 
sanctuary of Jabal al-Lawdh (as Robin does)362 rather than the more magnificent structure 
that stands there today.  
  
                                                 
360 Francis E. Peters, Mecca: A Literary History of the Muslim Holy Land (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 23.   
361 F. E. Peters, The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 9-14.  
362 EQ, s.v. “South Arabia, Religions in Pre-Islamic” (Christian Robin).   
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This shrine in turn was surrounded by a small settlement of mud houses (Muʿāwiya was 
supposedly the first person to build using bricks),364 forming a town unrecorded in any 
pre-Islamic source. The settlement was not particularly old; discarding al-Ṭabarī’s 
chronology, if Quṣayy established it five generations before Muḥammad’s conquest then 
the earliest houses were built in the 480s - less than a century before many of the first 
Muslims were born. It was also prone to periodic damage from the floods that swept 
through every few years.365 The settlement was ill-equipped to withstand a siege366 and 
the Quraysh could only maintain their suzerainty over it by having good relations with 
the villagers and nomads of the tribes that surrounded them; they especially needed good 
                                                 
363 Christian Robin and Jean-François Breton, “Le sanctuaire préislamique du Ğabal al-Lawḍ (Nord 
Yemen),” Comptes rendus de l’Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (1982): 600.  
364 Peters, Mecca, 23, 32.  
365 Peters, Mecca, 23-24. 
366 We note that in Ibn Iṣḥāq’s account of the Abyssinian attack on the town, ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib’s response 
to the invading army is to take the Quraysh into the surrounding mountains and entrust its defence to 




relations with the wealthier town of Ṭāʾif. They did this through administering a local 
religious cult of the Ḥums, through marriage and through trade; in terms of the latter most 
probably exporting leather produced by the non-Qurashī tribes and importing “necessities 
and petty luxuries” from the peripheries of the Ḥijāz.367 In none of these cases did they 
have anything like a monopoly; the surrounding tribes could satisfy both their material 
and religious needs using non-Meccan alternatives.  
  
The formal mechanism by which this relationship was managed was through the politico-
religious institution of the Ḥums. The tribes of the Ḥums would demonstrate their 
allegiance to the Quraysh by undertaking pilgrimages to the shrine of the Kaʿba and also 
by observing their unique taboos. But there was no non-divine third party stopping these 
surrounding tribes from switching their loyalties to other shrines and middlemen and 
thereby returning the Quraysh to the dispersed lower-class existence of the pre-Quṣayy 
era (which is what reportedly happened to the Baghīd of Ghatafān when they tried to 
establish their own ḥaram without the necessary support of the surrounding tribes).368   
  
Muḥammad’s message was initially driven by a concern that his people would soon lose 
the divine favour that he believed underpinned the survival of the Quraysh at Mecca. The 
polytheism of his tribe was angering a jealous god whose worshippers had in recent 
centuries become majorities in Syria, Egypt, Abyssinia and (to a lesser extent) Yemen – 
four of the five principal population centres that surrounded the Ḥijāz. Politically too this 
God seemed to be in the ascendant; Muḥammad’s birth coincided with an army of 
Abyssinian monotheists taking a military excursion in the Ḥijāz in response to pagan 
insolence, and the first of Muḥammad’s revelations coincided with the battle of Dhū Qār 
where the Christian tribe of Bakr b. Wāʾil (a tribe who also counted the bishop of Najrān 
                                                 
367 This is Crone’s reference to the type of goods brought in by traders of the region in the colonial period. 
Crone, Meccan Trade, 150. These may have included grain and flour (“Quraysh and the Roman Army,” 
64); Peters (Mecca, 33) suggests textiles and oil. 
368 Meir Kister “Mecca and the Tribes of Arabia,” in Studies in Islamic History and Civilization, ed. M. 
Sharon (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 44 ff.  
216  
  
in Yemen as one of their own)369 defeated the Sasanians - the only regional power that 
did not worship this god.   
  
While Muḥammad’s mission was at first a personal one, it soon became his duty to warn 
all the Quraysh of the consequences of not worshipping this God alone. But the message 
was not well-received. The leading families of the Quraysh could not accept the message 
because in doing so they would have to accept authority from a man who came from an 
insignificant branch of their family, a man whom the genealogical literature tells us had 
no brothers, no biological sons, no living parents and whose line was soon to die out. Nor 
could they let him continue delivering his message like some local eccentric; by insulting 
the gods of the tribes who supported the Quraysh he risked upsetting the delicate balance 
of power that allowed them to remain at Mecca.  
  
These tensions must have been exacerbated when Muḥammad took the message to the 
tribes who surrounded Mecca. These were most likely the tribes the Quraysh are recorded 
as having married into and inhabited the region highlighted in Map Two above.370 Given 
that the Quraysh needed to eat but could not provide food themselves, these tribes must 
have counted amongst their number significant numbers of farmers.371  When addressing 
these settled tribesmen, the familiar message of divine anger remained, but added to it 
were references to the non-Meccan world they inhabited, a world of seafaring and 
farming. If the primary objects of his missionary activity were the main tribes that 
provisioned Mecca, they were probably only a few days travel away; this is based on a 
reference in Ibn al-Kalbī where a drought (jahd) meant they had to import grain from 
                                                 
369 Donner, “The Bakr b. Wāʾil,” 26.  
370 Ibn Iṣḥāq lists Kinda, Banū ʿAbd Allāh of Kalb, Banū Ḥanīfa, ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa and Banū ʿAbd al- 
Ashhal as the tribes proselytised to (Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra al-nabawiyya, 1:423-427 (translated in Ibn  
Isḥāq, The Life of Muhammad, 194–197)). With the exception of ʿAmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa, this list does not tally 
very closely to the marriage or geographic data indicating that it is somewhat polemical. See also Crone, 
Meccan Trade, 175.  
371 R. B. Serjeant, “Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam: Misconceptions and Flawed Polemics,” Journal 
of the American Oriental Society 110, no. 3 (1990): 474. Refs to Ibn al-Kalbī speaking of Tabāla and 
Bishā provisioning Mecca with grain (both located in northern ʿAsīr, eight days travel from Mecca). 
Additionally, the disparaging remarks about the aʿrāb in the Qurʾān indicate that it was the settled 
villagers who provisioned the Quraysh who were of primary interest rather than the nomads.  
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Jurash and Tabālah.372 As the latter is estimated by Serjeant to by eight days travel from 
Mecca, the farms that ordinarily supplied the Quraysh would most likely have been closer 
to Mecca than this.373 But here too Muḥammad was unsuccessful in breaking the Meccan 
stranglehold on their spiritual lives.  
  
Eventually remaining at Mecca became untenable for the Prophet and his followers. He 
tried delivering his message to the nearby town of Ṭāʾif, which had its own shrine that 
attracted pilgrims from the surrounding tribes, but with no greater luck. Things changed 
however when he moved to another settlement of the Ḥijāz – Yathrib. The contemporary 
political situation in this town is difficult to discern from the sources,374 but religiously 
we have less of a problem – there are no records of the town having a sacred space such 
as a ḥaram or a ḥimā before the arrival of Muḥammad, yet one is mentioned in the 
Constitution of Medina. 375  One theory is that Muḥammad was responsible for 
establishing this ḥaram (not Abraham as stated in most Islamic sources), and in doing this 
he was replicating a model familiar to Buss and Mecca; a central shrine from which 
radiated a web of influence reaching into the surrounding tribes.376   
 
In addition to this some elements of the cult of Ḥums were retained, such as forbidden 
degrees of marriage and taboo food stuffs. Just as effective were demands to abandon 
other taboos377 – by doing this the tribes made a powerful statement of their loyalty to the 
new regime. In terms of the reception of the message, the absence of a previous ḥaram 
and the lack of unity in Yathrib in comparison to Mecca and Ṭāʾif (the settlement was 
                                                 
372 Ibn Ḥabīb, Kitāb al-Munammaq, 262.  
373 Serjeant, “Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam,” 474.  
374 Crone, Meccan Trade, 217–218.  
375 Munt, Sacred History, 173; Arjomand, “The Constitution of Medina,” 569.  
376 For a survey of how this network may work based on twentieth century observation, see R.B. Serjeant,  
“Haram and Hawtah: The Sacred Enclave in Arabia,” in Mélanges Taha Husain (Cairo: Dar al-Maʿārif, 
1962): 47-52. Munt (Sacred History, 178) agrees with Serjeant to a point, also noting that these powerful 
outside tribes are not mentioned in the Constitution of Medina. The inclusion of minor settled tribes in 
this document (also mentioned by Munt) indicates that the relationships outlined within it are not the sum 
total of all the relationships established by Muḥammad during the Medinan period, but should be seen as 
a snapshot of the state of his relationships at the time the agreement was made.  
377 E.g. the Medinan sūra Q 2:189 “It is not piety to enter houses from their rear.” 
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spread over 25 square miles and divided into tribal cantonments) meant that the Muslims 
could gradually win over a critical mass of the population. It should also be noted that the 
most significant group of Medinans who could not accept the message of Muḥammad 
were the Jewish tribes who exhibited the most Ḥums-like characteristics in terms of their 
group solidarity through taboo observation. Those that did not convert were eventually 
expelled or killed.   
  
Muḥammad had been thus far unsuccessful in undermining the religious pillar of Mecca’s 
existence, but once established in Yathrib he had an opportunity to destabilise its second 
pillar – trade. It is unclear as to whether or not Muḥammad intended to do this the moment 
he set out from Mecca; Chabbi notes that “interest in Mecca...seemed to have diminished 
during the first part of the exile of Muḥammad to Medina.”378 As for the change in qibla 
direction to make it face Mecca, while elements of the story are debated, most agree that 
this took place some time after the emigration.379 This too would indicate that Mecca was 
not of primary concern to the Emigrants in the early days of their Medinan residence.  
  
But regardless of whether or not they emigrated with the intention to recapture Mecca, 
the Emigrants must have been aware of the value and vulnerability of the Meccan 
caravans. With no loyalties to their old tribe and a young, recently uprooted community 
to provide for, attacks were inevitable. After seven attempts and 18 months they 
successfully captured a caravan at Nakhla which led to an escalation of confrontation 
between the Meccans and the Muslims.   
  
An important component of this conflict was the series attempts by both sides aimed at 
undermining the opposition’s support base. The Meccans were alleged to have made 
secret deals with the tribes of Yathrib in order to upset the balance of power enshrined in 
the Constitution of Medina; in particular they courted the Jews who - partly for 
theological reasons - had become increasingly alienated from the Muslim project in the 
                                                 
378 EQ, s.v. “Mecca” (J. Chabbi). 
379 EQ, s.v. “Qibla” (Richard Kimber).  
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years since Muḥammad’s arrival. Muḥammad responded by expelling the tribes of 
Medina whom he could not trust while simultaneously disrupting the balance of power in 
the Meccan littoral through his trade strangulation strategy.   
  
Muḥammad prevailed because he could play the divide-and-conquer game better than his 
opponents. This was partly due to factors of unquantifiable value such as his coherent 
religious message and personal skills as a political strategist. But it was also due to the 
precariousness of Meccan existence relative to that of the neighbouring towns. Unable to 
guarantee the safety of the goods entrusted to them for sale in foreign markets, the 
Quraysh at Mecca suddenly found that both pillars of their existence in their inhospitable 
valley had been removed; tribes were unwilling to trade with such unreliable couriers or 
pay homage to a shrine whose custodians clearly enjoyed little divine favour. But unlike 
Muḥammad in Medina, or the Thaqīf at Ṭāʾif, the Quraysh could not survive by falling 
back on agriculture while waiting for the storm to pass. After defeat at the Battle of the 
Ditch in 627 the Qurashīs of Mecca soon starved and then capitulated. The momentum 
from this victory was carried by the Muslims to the rest of the Ḥijāz and following 




The marriage data we have for the pre-Islamic Quraysh has provided us with a starting 
point for a long overdue reformulation of Muḥammad’s world. The parochiality of their 
marriage distribution in both genealogical and geographic terms has led us to question 
three elements of their pre-Islamic status that appear to lesser or greater extents in both 
the traditional narratives and much modern scholarship; these are the political horizons 
of the Quraysh, their status amongst the Arabs and the status of Mecca.  
  
In terms of the first, it is clear from multiple sources that that any political influence 
enjoyed by the Quraysh extended only to the central parts of the Ḥijāz. This fact has been 
clouded by popular stories found in the traditional narrative, for example; Muḥammad’s 
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great-grandfather Hāshim getting a right of free travel from the Byzantine emperor 
himself; the international routes Hāshim’s brothers traded along; the warm reception by 
the Christian Negus of Abyssinia of the emigrant Muslims; the gift of the slave girls given 
to Muḥammad by the Christian Muqawqis of Alexandria; and the letters of invitation 
Muḥammad sent to the rulers of the surrounding empires. But in reality, neither the sīra 
of Muḥammad nor the Qurʾān demonstrate any real concern for international politics. The 
Qurʾān names only one group of non-Arabian contemporaries (Rūm);380 as for the sīra 
material, aside from the questionable examples given above, the only major events of 
Muḥammad’s life with a non-peninsular connection concern Abyssinia. Where they 
speak of politics, the bulk of the sīra and Qurʾānic material relate to tribes of the central 
Ḥijāz.  
  
Revising the conventional model in favour of something more parochial is not to say that 
the Quraysh were ignorant of trends in the outside world; the strict monotheism that 
sprang up and established itself in the Ḥijāz is evidence enough of that. Instead it is a call 
to be more nuanced about the ways the tribe looked outwards. Their primary concerns 
would have been their relationships with the surrounding tribes upon whom they 
depended to maintain their settled existence around the otherwise inhospitable shrine of 
the Kaʿba. Their secondary concerns were their relationships with other nearby towns – 
particularly Ṭāʾif. Any concerns with the non-Ḥijāzī world would have been tertiary at 
best.   
  
The second trope - that the pre-Islamic Quraysh were superior to the surrounding tribes - 
appears repeatedly in the sources, and in Ibn Iṣḥāq’s version of events originated with the 
miraculous defence of Mecca from attackers thus establishing the group as a chosen 
people.381 But this is not supported by the marriage behaviour or indeed elements of the 
sīra material; the Meccan Quraysh were after all overthrown by a relatively small-scale 
                                                 
380 Admittedly, the only Ḥijāzī tribe mentioned are the Quraysh, but nonetheless the world of the Qurʾān 
is very clearly a Ḥijāzī tribal one, not an international imperial one.  
381 Ibn Hishām, al-Ṣīrat al-nabawiyya, 1:52 (translated in Ibn Isḥāq, The Life of Muhammad, 28).  
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uprising based in a town over 200 miles away. The ‘ennoblement’ of the Quraysh in many 
of the extant reports is clearly a by-product of the historiographical context of the 
narrative traditions. This serves a rhetorical purpose; by making the Quraysh look 
powerful it makes Muḥammad’s achievements look all the greater. The exaggeration may 
also have been an attempt to appeal to the audience; we should not forget that the 
historians operated in a political environment that was entirely dominated by descendants 
of Quraysh. These descendants insisted on their suzerainty over the nonQuraysh tribes 
who made up their armies in the Umayyad era, and this may have been reason enough for 
historians to emphasise the continuity of this arrangement by claiming it existed in the 
jāhiliyya.   
  
The final element of discord in the accounts is the role of Mecca. The assumed regional 
dominance of this town382 has already been recognised by Crone as being incongruous 
with much that is in the sources; it was not a significant market town or a major site of 
pilgrimage. But there is no reason to go as far as she does and question its very existence. 
The parochial Quraysh model would say that Mecca was of some regional relevance and 
supported some of the spiritual needs of some of the local tribes. The fact that it lacked a 
significant market was unimportant as there were others in the region which the Meccans 
could easily get to (which were probably the mawāsim we are told Muḥammad preached 
at).   
  
The discrepancies in the historical sources regarding Mecca are best understood by 
appreciating the changes the town underwent in the first decades of Islam. After the  
Muslim conquest, the Kaʿba was rebuilt and enlarged, houses were made of brick and 
stone, irrigation was constructed, defences were erected and the pilgrimage became an 
enormous state affair. Even though the pre-Islamic image of Mecca as being a collection 
of mud-brick houses surrounding a low, unmortared, roofless enclosure is one preserved 
                                                 
382 Ibn Hishām, al-Ṣīrat al-nabawiyya, 1:45 (translated in Ibn Isḥāq, The Life of Muhammad, 23). In this 
report, all Arabs assume that the target of Abraha's invasion was the Kaʿba, and they were all anxious 
over its fate.  
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in some of the sources, the implications of this – that neither Mecca nor the Quraysh were 
of any great prior significance – are not followed through in the most commonly told 
narratives of Islamic origins.   
  
When retelling this story, the Muslim historians urbanised Muḥammad, ennobled the 
Quraysh and internationalised Mecca. In other words, they did exactly what we would 
expect them to, which is place the rise of Islam in their own context. An alternative story 
of Muḥammad as a member of an unremarkable tribe and a resident of a minor shrine 
preaching primarily to farmers may not have been unthinkable to historians in later 
centuries but it was probably unprofitable, and when compared to the competing 
preIslamic narratives of the peoples they conquered possibly a little embarrassing. 
Luckily for us, this reshaping of history did not extend to the marriage behaviour 
preserved in the nasab tradition; it is here that we see the Quraysh as they were at the 








The arrival of Islam changed the nature of Qurashī marriage for good. This was not due 
to any particular religious tenets (apart from polygamy, perhaps) but a result first of the 
ostracisation of the early Muslims from the Quraysh and also the conquests.   
  
In this chapter we will see how Qurashī marriage behaviour changed again – this time due 
to the effects of imperial power on the Umayyad caliphs and their sons (Cohort Three). 
As with the previous cohorts, the changes here are also due to the twin factors of social 
pressure and structural opportunity. In terms of social pressure, the Umayyad caliphs 
found themselves increasingly ostracised from the rest of the Quraysh thanks to the 
inevitable alienation of illustrious lineages who challenged their authority (principally the 
Zubayrids and ʿAlids). They also may have been reticent about marrying into less 
belligerent noble groups for fear of bolstering the latter’s political strength at their 
expense, in addition to concerns over the split loyalties of the wives.383 As for structural 
change, the increasing number of children born to concubines was a result of the 
conquests of the period which brought non-Arab slave women right into the heart of the 
Qurashī family.  
  
This chapter will begin by accounting for the children of this cohort that were born to 
concubines. It will be shown that the wider Qurashī trend of increasing numbers of hajīns 
is mirrored amongst the caliphal Umayyads but in a more exaggerated fashion; the first 
generation was less likely to have concubine children than average, the later generations 
more likely. With these exogamous unions accounted for, we then move to the unions 
between the cohort and Arab women. This will reveal a trend of everincreasing 
endogamy. The final part of chapter will explain this simultaneous increase in both 
                                                 
383 Abbott, “Women and the State in Early Islam,” 353-354.  
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endogamy and exogamy as being a symptom of other changes; namely the transition of 





Concubinage was not a major factor in the discussion of the two earlier cohorts as 
concubines produced very few of their children, but here they must be treated as a 
preliminary prior to any wider discussion on exogamy and endogamy.   
  
The Nasab Quraysh contains the parental information on 23 Umayyad caliphs and their 
sons who are listed as having produced 181 children, 76 of whom were born of 
concubines. There is no sense in comparing this figure to the overall Qurashī average; as 
demonstrated in Chapter Four we know that the rate of concubinage changes over time. 
In order to account for this moving average we will weight each generation in terms of 
the concubine children we would expect to see produced based on the Qurashī average, 
and compare this to the number of children the cohort actually produced through slave 
women. This is demonstrated in the following tables:  
  
Table 8.1: Changing maternal statuses of the children of Umayyad caliphs and 
sons compared to Qurashī generational average  
  
  
Generation  Total Umayyad 
children as 
recorded in the  
Nasab Quraysh  
Qurashī average for 





children based on 
Qurashī average  
6 21 26.88% 5.65 
7 54 35.56% 19.20 
8 79 42.12% 33.27 
9 27 38.12% 10.29 
Total:  181  68.41 
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Table 8.2: Comparison of maternal statuses of the children of Umayyad caliphs 
and sons compared to Qurashī generationally weighted average  
  
  Expected figures based on 
Qurashī average  
Actual figures as recorded 
in the Nasab Quraysh  





The Umayyad caliphs and their sons therefore produced a higher than average number of 
children through concubines, though not dramatically so.  
  
We can drill further into this data by looking at it generationally, as demonstrated in the 
following table. For reference, Muʿāwiya and Marwān I are of the sixth generation, ʿAbd 
al-Malik is of the seventh and the dynasty ends with Marwān II who is of the eighth 
generation.   
  















6 21 2 9.52% 29.46% 
7 54 22 40.74% 34.70% 
8 79 36 45.57% 37.50% 
9 27 16 59.26% 36.70% 
  
  
By doing this we can reveal that the numbers of Umayyads born to concubines is 
depressed by the records of the sixth generation; had these two men not been included 
then 46.25% of the cohort children would have been produced through concubines against 
a weighted Qurashī average of 39.23%. This generation is odd also because it consists of 
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only two fathers; Muʿāwiya and Marwān I, and as such the small sample size may be 
affecting our results. Despite this caveat, the overall trend of the data is in keeping with 
the values revealed in the earlier chapters on concubinage; numbers of children born to 
concubines start low and increase over the course of the first Islamic century.  
  
Exogamy and endogamy of the caliphal Umayyads  
  
With concubinage accounted for, we can now move to the marriages made by the caliphs 
to Arab women. Unlike the other two cohorts, the caliphal Umayyad cohort lends itself 
well to diachronic study as it spans a century. The following table breaks the data down 
across the four generations that comprise the cohort:  
  
Table 8.4: Origins of child-bearing Arab wives of Umayyad caliphs and their 
sons  
  
Generation  Non-Quraysh 
wives  
Non-Umayyad 




6 3 3 2 8 
7 3 12 4 19 
8 2 1 20 23 
9 0 1 5 6 
  
The database of 56 marriages indicates that there is a significant move towards 
endogamous unions over the course of the first Islamic century. Generation 6 – which 
comprises the marriages of the caliphs Muʿāwiya (r. 661-680) and Marwān I (r. 684-685) 
– is marked by the widest spread of marriages. Their eight marriages are balanced 
between three different groups in roughly equal proportions, though it should be noted 
that two of the non-Umayyad Quraysh marriages were to female descendants of ʿAbd 
Shams (Umayya’s father). As we have seen, these two caliphs were not keen on 
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concubines either; children born by them through concubines account for only two of 
their 21 offspring.384  
  
In Generation 7 – this is the generation of Yazīd I (r. 680-683) and ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 685-
705) – there is a shift in behaviour. Although there are far more marriages in this 
generation, there is no increase at all in the number of marriages to women from outside 
the Quraysh. The men of this generation are instead turning to women within the Quraysh, 
in particular the non-Umayyad clans. Again, many of these non-Umayyad Qurashī 
marriages are to descendants of ʿAbd Shams, but we also see a number made to families 
linked with earlier caliphs such as ʿAdī b. Kaʿb (for ‘Umar) and Taym b. Murra (for Abū 
Bakr). Somewhat unsurprisingly there are no child-bearing marriages at all between these 
men and the descendants of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib – although the Nasab Quraysh does record 
a number of Umayyad marriages with this family that did not produce children.385  
  
The eighth and ninth generations (who account for the caliphs reigning between the years 
705 and 750) see the most dramatic change in marriage behaviour. Of the 29 marriages 
in this period, only two are to women outside the Quraysh, and a further two to non-
Umayyad Qurashī women. The predominant form of Umayyad marriage in this period is 
to other descendants of Umayya. Recalling our investigation earlier in the chapter, we 
note that these two generations are also remarkable in terms of the large numbers of 
children they are producing through concubines culminating in nearly 60% of Generation 




                                                 
384 This is admittedly a small sample, but when we also incorporate the 11 marriages made by the brothers 
of these two men we come to the same conclusion (the data for this are provided in Appendix Two).  
385 I have found three marriages of this type (Umayyad man, ‘Alid woman) in the Nasab Quraysh. See Al-
Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik to Nafīsa bt. Zayd b. Ḥasan b. ʿAlī (page 32); Muʿāwiya b. Marwān b. al-Ḥakam 
to Ramla bt. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (page 45); and Abū Bakr b. ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān to Fāṭima bt. 





The data reveal two trends; increasing concubinage at the expense of marriage, and 
increasing endogamy. In terms of the first trend, concubinage was peripheral though 
existent in the generation of Muʿāwiya and Marwān I (where they produced only two of 
20 children), and exploded in popularity in the following generation with over 40% of 
children being born to slave women (figures from Table 8.3 above). This is the generation 
of ʿAbd al-Malik and Yazīd I whose reigns began in the 680s. This confirms the 
conclusions drawn from Chapters Four and Five which argued that the evidence for the 
popularity of concubines as partners – and possibly the acceptability of their children as 
full members of the Quraysh – was not a practice that emerged at a late stage in the 
Umayyad period but established itself early on.  
  
It is harder to tell whether or not the caliphs were marrying fewer free women over the 
course of the Umayyad period. The data ostensibly indicate that this was the case; the 
caliphs of Generations Six and Seven had an average of four wives each; the next 
generation had just under three wives each while the ninth generation produced only one 
caliph who had more than one wife. Using the whole cohort we find the proportion of 
wives to husbands goes down from 4.00, to 2.71, to 2.3 to 1.2. We can also note that not 
long after the ʿ Abbāsid takeover of the caliphate marriages to free women became a rarity. 
But small sample sizes and historiographical concerns mean that we cannot be as sure of 
this as some of our other findings.   
  
Despite this, our main point stands; the later Umayyads were less likely to make dynastic 
marriages than the founding Umayyads. Instead of marrying tribal princesses and women 
from non-Umayyad Qurashī scions, the leading Umayyads turned to their cousins and 
concubines. Something fundamental was clearly happening to Muslim society that was 




From tribes to empire  
  
The first Umayyads married more like the pre-Islamic Quraysh of Cohort One than the 
early Muslims of Cohort Two; they split the number of wives between non-Quraysh, non-
lineal Quraysh and lineal Quraysh roughly evenly, and they are not particularly fond of 
concubines. It is suggested here that this is a reflection of a relatively egalitarian polity 
that would have been familiar to their pre-Islamic Ḥijāzī forbears. Marriage in this 
environment was an important component of affirming and creating bonds between 
groups who co-operated through mutual agreement.   
  
Muʿāwiya, for instance, had no army which owed him primary loyalty and as a result of 
this Humphreys argues he was forced to develop personal ties with the tribes of Syria.386 
This was not ideal as these tribesmen still maintained existing loyalties to their clans 
which clashed with their loyalties to the caliph; as Landau-Tasseron concisely puts it, this 
left them with “considerations other than doing their jobs properly.” 387  The next 
generation of caliphs and their governors had less tolerance for this. As argued by 
‘Athamina, ʿAbd al-Malik’s generals recruited non-Arab militias and explicitly justified 
this policy in terms of them being a counterweight to the tribal armies that the state had 
relied on in the past.388 This relationship is distinctly non-tribal; the militias would not 
have understood their ties to each other and to their paymasters in terms of biology but in 
terms of personaly loyalties based on effective leadership and regular payment.  
  
This transition from tribal organization to empire was epitomised by Marwān II, the last 
Umayyad caliph. Marwān II was himself the son of a slave woman, and learned his 
gubernatorial skills on the Caucasian frontier. Rather than rely on tribal armies and an 
                                                 
386 R. Stephen Humphreys, Mu’awiya Ibn Abi Sufyan: from Arabia to Empire, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 
63.   
387 Ella Landau-Tasseron, “From tribal society to centralized polity: an interpretation of events and 
anecdotes in the formative period of Islam,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 24 (2000): 202-203.  
388 Khalil ‘Athamina, “Non-Arab Regiments and Private Militias During the Umayyad Period,” Arabica 
45, no. 3 (1998): 375 
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extended web of family connections he recruited non-tribal forces from the Islamic 
frontiers; these included the Ṣaqāliba (freed Slavic slaves) and the Qīqāniyya (from 
Sind).389 As long as he could pay and manage them on the battlefield he could ensure 
their loyalty; he did not have to marry them just to prevent them from revolting. In his 
background, his army and also his attempt to move the capital eastward we see many of 
the precursors to the ʿAbbāsid court, and had it not been for the revolution brewing in 




The findings of this chapter tie together all the various strands of this thesis. The fact that 
the trends in the data once again correlate with historical events as recorded in the 
traditional narrative vindicates the contention that the marriage data preserved in the 
Nasab Quraysh represent an accurate reflection of Late Antique relationships; it also 
shows that these data can be organized generationally. The connection between marriage 
behavior and social change suggested in the second part of the thesis has also been upheld; 
whether it is through their status or tribal affiliation, the mothers of the Quraysh 
consistently provide compelling indications of wider structural and ideological changes.  
  
Looking more closely at the Umayyad marriages we showed that the rising numbers of 
concubine children along with the increase in cousin marriage and the emergence of the 
hajīn caliph are all inter-related symptoms of one cause - the transition the Islamic polity 
was undergoing in this period. The first Muslim conquerors brought with them an 
organisational system that was an expansion their existing tribal practice in that it was 
largely egalitarian, based on fair distribution of income and held together by a complex 
network of personal ties which included marriage. In this environment, the better 
connected a person was, the more likely he would be to succeed.  
  
                                                 
389 ‘Athamina, “Non-Arab Regiments,” 373.  
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Pace Goldziher et al., this is what held the hajīn back during much of the Umayyad period 
and not discrimination; his lack of maternal relatives handicapped his chances in an 
environment where familial connections were the currency of political success. 
Fortunately for him, as the links between the caliphs and their agents of coercion changed 
from ones reliant on familial solidarity to ones linked to sinecures and wealth, the canny 
hajīn who aspired to the caliphate found himself increasingly favourablyplaced when 
challenging a well-connected but incompetent incumbent. Marwān II did not appear as 
the first effective hajīn caliph thanks to the efforts of those who were restoring ‘true 
Islam’ (as alleged by Goldziher), but because a newly non-tribal political environment 
valued organisational nous over family connections.390  
  
This theory appeals because it ties together far more evidential strands than the prior 
explanations. There is no need for circular reasoning to justify the use of the highly 
questionable anecdotal traditions or to make the assumption that the hajīns are broadly 
similar to the mawlās. Instead we rely on the far clearer evidence for the changing nature 
of the Arab armies; the increase in popularity of concubinage; and the increase in numbers 
of cousins being married. Ultimately we should prefer an explanation for the rise of the 
concubine that rests on the structural changes for which we have proof rather than 
purported attitudinal changes about which we can only speculate.  
  
     
                                                 
390 This also correlates well with the structural changes detailed in Crone’s Slaves on Horses which uses 





This thesis has developed an array of prosopographical tools that have expanded our 
historiographical and historical knowledge of early Islam. In terms of the former, the 
collation and analysis of large amounts of data have told us that the Nasab Quraysh is an 
outstanding work of genealogical memory and is part of a literary tradition unique to the 
Arabs. The statistical approach has also been able to suggest ways in which al-Zubayrī’s 
work was transmitted and the extent to which its putative author was actually responsible 
for its contents.   
  
In terms of historical study, quantitative approaches have delivered some equally 
substantive findings. The history of the pre-Islamic Ḥijāz is often considered to be beyond 
the scope of credible historical scholarship due to the complete lack of primary sources. 
The analysis above has shown that this is not true; although recorded centuries after the 
relationships they describe, the marriage data preserved in the genealogical literature are 
accurate enough to enable us to suggest a historical narrative for this very period. The 
result of this has been to show the Quraysh to be far more minor a tribe than often 
suggested and far more concerned with the politics of the central Ḥijāz than the wider 
Near East.  
  
Prosopography has also proven useful when applied to the Umayyad period. Here too we 
did not expect to be able to recover a social history of the Muslims as they adapted to the 
demands of imperial government and the emergence of what would become the normative 
elements of their faith. But in the graphs and tables above we have seen for the first time 
the rate at which concubinage was adopted; we have also been able to suggest what the 
attitudes of the Quraysh to the products of these unions may have been. It was argued that 
the emergence of concubinage as a form of marriage was evidence of both the ingenuity 
of the Arab conquerors in their formulation of normative Islam and evidence for the 
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gradual erosion of the social bonds that had existed between the tribes of the pre-conquest 
era.  
  
The simplicity of this summary betrays the complexity of interwoven methodologies that 
have been detailed above. For this reason, before we move to our concluding remarks on 
the challenges presented by prosopographical approaches, we will explore in a little more 
detail the five most important discoveries of this thesis.   
  
1. The nasab tradition contains extractable primary information  
  
The nasab tradition is not like the traditional narrative sources of Islamic historiography. 
With the latter sources, while most scholars will agree that there is some useable 
information within them, there is no straightforward means of extracting it. The veracity 
of each individual khabar must be argued comprehensively and even here there is no 
guarantee that a consensus will emerge that this argumentation is convincing.  
  
With the nasab literature we do not have this problem; for certain categories of 
information the data are consistent and accurate. Establishing this began with a hunch 
predicated on the observations of anthropologists who reported a lack of disputes found 
between tribal informants in certain fields of genealogical memory. This was further 
supported by evidence from the field of legal psychology that indicated the quality of a 
person’s memory is directly linked to the type of experience that the person is being asked 
to recall.  
  
The hypothesis that the nasab literature may be relatively consistent received further 
support when we cross-checked the information preserved in a number of nasab works 
and historiographies. The results also showed that the differences between the works were 
ones of scale rather than detail; they did not repeatedly contradict each other in the manner 




Most important however has been the correlation between our quantitative findings and 
the traditional historical narratives; we have seen this in the graphs illustrating the rising 
numbers of concubine mothers and the changing geographical distribution of marriages 
in the first half of the seventh century. This latter point is particularly pertinent because 
the marginality of the Quraysh was played down by many historians and the fact that the 
marriage data appear to contradict the more popular reports in this regard is evidence that 
nasabs passed through two centuries of historical revision in better condition than the 
traditional narrative sources. This is a good indication that the nasab data are an accurate 
reflection of relationships as they actually occurred.   
  
The nasab tradition – at least as far as mothers are concerned – should therefore take its 
place alongside the Qurʾān and the Constitution of Medina as our only primary sources 
for the time of Muḥammad. These are certainly complicated sources, and certainly not 
free of some distortion, but they are of a completely different character to the ostensibly 
eye-witness accounts that populate the hadīth and khabar corpuses.  
  
At the same time, it must be emphasised that we cannot say that the nasab literature as a 
whole should be considered akin to a primary source; it is only when we apply the specific 
methodologies outlined above that we can make this claim. So although we can now be 
quite confident of the accuracy of the maternal data in the nasab tradition, this is not proof 
that any other data category within the tradition is accurate. Additionally, we cannot say 
that any individual marriage can be considered accurate; these marriages are only usable 
sources for historical research when studied en masse – that is to say, when studied 
prosopographically.  
  
2. Exogamy and endogamy are measurable  
  
This thesis is the first large-scale attempt to treat early Islamic endogamy and exogamy 
in a statistically meaningful way. Its conclusions have given us three important 
contributions. First, we can now discuss exogamy and endogamy in a far more nuanced 
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fashion as we have a better understanding of where a particular marriage fits in with wider 
patterns of marriage behaviour. This is preferable to earlier appearances of 
exogamy/endogamy in the secondary literature were it is reduced to being a discursive 
starting point.391 Second, it has given us some base lines for comparison; we can do more 
than just observe that a family made mostly endogamous marriages (for example), but we 
can say whether this represents a relatively large number of marriages, or a small number, 
or whether this figure changed over time. Finally, it has shown that there is a fast-moving 
interplay between exogamy and social change. Numbers of concubines rise, the 
geographic origins of wives change, and cousins become more or less popular as marriage 
partners.   
  
To take one application of this approach, we can turn to Bernheimer’s paper on the 
marriages of the ʿAlid family. This is an excellent prosopography, but it becomes 
problematic when she wishes to discuss whether the ʿAlids married out or not.392 She 
argues that the ʿAlids married “to a large extent endogamously” (page 81), but also notes 
that there is no way of knowing whether or not they did this to a greater or lesser extent 
than other leading Muslim families because this has not been investigated (note 30). By 
careful argumentation, she does not allow this to affect her overall conclusion, but the 
lacuna is obvious. Thanks to this thesis, the gap has been filled; scholars like Bernheimer 
are now not only permitted confidence in the marital records and the tools required to 
extract these data, but are also provided with statistics from some other cohorts to provide 




                                                 
391 A lot of secondary literature on marriage behaviour is guilty of this; a typical example is Meir Kister’s  
“On the Wife of the Goldsmith from Fadak and Her Progeny: a Study in Jāhilī Genealogical Traditions,” 
Le Muséon 92 (1979): 321-330, where a single marriage between a Kalbī tribesman and a Jewish slave 
woman is taken as evidence for the declining power of Jewish agricultural settlements.  
392 Bernheimer, “Genealogy, marriage.”  
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3. The Quraysh were a minor Arabian tribe before the arrival of Islam  
  
The geographic dispersal of Qurashī marriages in the pre-Islamic period reinforces 
something that a number of scholars have long suspected; the importance of the Quraysh 
in the jāhiliyya was grossly inflated by later historians. This tribe were not widely 
respected as the masters of peninsular or even Ḥijāzī trade; they were middlemen 
dependant on their ability to navigate the highly fickle and fluid networks of tribal 
relations that existed in the immediate vicinity of Mecca.  
  
Mecca was not a particularly important shrine or town; it was probably not even a 
particularly old shrine or town. The Kaʿba itself was a roofless enclosure of no great 
height, constructed of unmortared rocks which housed still more rocks that were 
worshipped. The Quraysh had not been in charge of this shrine for very long before the 
birth of Muḥammad, and given the ecology of the location they faced constant threats of 
eviction. Only through close and happy relations with the surrounding tribes of herdsmen 
and farmers could they hope to survive at Mecca; without the support of these people they 
would have had no means of making money and using it to provision themselves.  
  
This image of pre-Islamic Mecca is not one reliant on the nasab data or prosopographical 
approaches; many scholars have pointed out that the reports used to construct this 
narrative of the parochial Quraysh are preserved in the same traditional sources used by 
those who have argued for the eminence of the tribe in the pre-Islamic era. The 
contribution of this thesis is instead to resolve a stalemate. Previously we were faced by 
two sets of contradictory reports; one set which could be used to emphasise Qurashī 
dominance, and another that emphasised its parochiality. In the absence of any outside 
sources there was no real way to decide between the two. But if the nasab data are indeed 
primary evidence of social relationships, then they decisively come down on the side of 




4. The adoption of concubinage was early, rapid and widespread  
  
The prosopographical approach to maternal data has allowed us to say something new 
about concubinage. Previous studies of the phenomenon in the Islamic context have been 
stymied by the fact that they could not look beyond the anecdotal traditions. The result is 
the Goldziher argument described above. Because it uses predominantly anecdotal 
sources, and because these anecdotal sources are so scant, it is forced to combine the 
study of the hajīn with the study of other Muslim outsiders who enjoyed a more extensive 
historiographical presence (typically the mawlās). This is justified by saying that the 
anecdotal traditions along with the prosopography of caliphal mothers indicate that the 
mawlās and the hajīns had a lot in common before the ʿAbbāsid Revolution.  
  
The problem with this approach was the circularity of the argument used to date the 
traditions; anti-hajīn anecdotes were placed in the first century of Islam because they 
reflected the feelings of the majority of Muslims in that period, while pro-hajīn traditions 
were dated to the ʿAbbāsid period as this was an era of more enlightened attitudes. This 
meant that the Goldziher argument was forced to rely solely on the one piece of 
uncontroversial evidence to the hand; the late emergence of the hajīn caliph.  
  
But by looking at the changing nature of marriages conducted by Umayyad caliphs and 
their sons we saw that there were structural reasons as to why the hajīn could not become 
caliph - principally his lack of tribal links through a mother. Once these structural 
elements were removed (through a decreasing prevalence of tribal structures at the heart 
of the Islamic state), the ruler with a slave mother became a familiar feature of Islamic 
courts. Additionally, we saw that Qurashī hajīns were very common in the early Umayyad 
period; this is not good evidence for a widely held taboo against procreation with slave 
women as argued by Goldziher et al. There was also little evidence that the hajīns were 
barred from marrying Quraysh women because of their status. None of these points could 
have been made had we simply applied familiar analytical approaches to the traditional 
historical sources.  
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5. The methodologies have a wide range of future applications  
  
The focus of this investigation was the nasab tradition, but the methodologies used here 
can be profitably applied to many other sources. Before this research, taking all the 
marriage data out of Ibn Saʿd’s al-Ṭabaqāt (for instance) would have represented an 
immense undertaking; it would also have been an extremely risky one seeing as there are 
no guarantees that it could produce useable results. But now that we have an established 
methodology and some findings for a relatively large sample of early Muslims, we not 
only know that it is specifically the maternal information in the Ṭabaqāt that is potentially 
of interest, we also have a relatively large sample from our existing study to which we 
can compare any subsequent findings.   
  
Another potential extension is to the other categories of non-anecdotal data in the 
historical traditions such as administrative and religious posts. This is a very different 
type of information to maternal relationships, so our initial approach would have to be 
much the same as it has been for this project; i.e. beginning with a wide-ranging 
taxonomic strategy at the start before honing in on promising types of information within 
individual sources. Once this is done we would be in a position to incorporate the findings 
of this present study as it represents the only significant piece of research concerned with 
social change in Late Antique Arabia that is not based on the anecdotal traditions. The 
generational dating system may be particularly useful in studies of this sort.  
  
Final remarks  
  
We finish on a note of caution – prosopography is not easy. The methodological 
approaches used above were not logical and obvious at the outset of this project, but are 
actually the result of an enormous amount of trial and error. From the very beginning, this 
research project has had to simultaneously address three problematic issues regarding the 
data: which data categories to select; should this extracted data be considered accurate; 
and can this data generate compelling results. Because of the nature of these demands, it 
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was impossible to satisfy one without addressing the others; the result was a circular 
process of improvement by increment. This dynamic is worth explaining.  
  
We began with the first of these difficulties which was establishing which data category 
within the nasab tradition (and in which source) was most likely to generate compelling 
results. As the translated passage in the first chapter showed, there is an enormous amount 
of information within these nasab works, and any other category of data (appointments, 
geographic origins, battle participation etc.) could equally have been the focus of an 
extended investigation. A number of false starts and a great deal of taxonomic stamp-
collecting had to happen before we could begin to consider maternal origin as a field 
likely to yield results.  
  
Once some preliminary databases had been created (these were based on the Makhzūm 
and Zubayrid sub-groups), there was little sense in expanding the database without first 
being able to argue that the data were accurate reflections of historical accounts rather 
than historiography only. This comprises the second set of challenges; addressing the 
concerns of the source-critical modern scholars. This was initially done through a survey 
of the anthropological literature concerning the nature of genealogical memory. This 
survey gave us some grounds for believing that genealogical memory could indeed be 
preserved accurately. But before we could expand this survey in the manner shown in 
Chapters One, Two and Three we had be confident in the capacity of the database to 
provide results that would be of interest to historians of early Islam.  
  
This formed the third level of problems - could the data be used to resolve questions 
regarding the traditional narratives of Islamic origins? There would be no sense in 
compiling large datasets and investing research time in establishing their veracity if it 
could not be shown how they aided the study of Islamic history. Fortunately, the 
preliminary databases hinted that with concubinage there was evidence of an evolving 
dynamic that aligned with some parts of the secondary literature but contradicted others.  
Based on these early indications, we were in a position to return to the previous two issues 
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– collecting the data and establishing its veracity. The most time-consuming element of 
this involved the expansion of the database to cover all the maternal relationships listed 
in the Nasab Quraysh. We then moved on to the second difficulty, which meant a further 
development of our justifications for believing the maternal data to be accurate, as well 
as arguing a case for its representativeness of the nasab tradition as a whole. Only at this 
stage could we return to the third area and begin to further develop arguments of what 
this data could potentially tell us. It became clear at this point that the issue of 
concubinage could not be divorced from marriage in general. This meant that the database 
had to be expanded to include the tribal origins of the Arab wives; this was done for the 
three cohorts featured in Chapter Six. All of this taken together meant we were able to 
correlate our findings with the traditional narrative sources. This fed back into the first 
two issues as it justified our belief in the accuracy of the nasab data and the efficacy of 
our methodology.  
  
In order to navigate all this, the methodology was deliberately kept simple and applied to 
a carefully selected group of sources. The result was a gradualist, catholic approach; the 
tools and our understanding of the sources were developed and introduced by stages and 
in parallel. The result was a staggering array of suggested research directions and counter-
narratives that would have been completely hidden to us had we continued to read the 
traditional sources in traditional ways.  
  
It is this ability of prosopography to suggest new narratives that makes it so appealing. 
Despite the debt owed in this work to revisionist historians it must be said that they often 
make themselves vulnerable to the accusation that they exert more effort in questioning 
previous narratives rather than constructing new ones.393 This thesis has aimed to redress 
the imbalance; although we have repeatedly cast aspersions on many long-standing 
elements of the traditional narrative of Islamic origins, at the same time we have 
repeatedly suggested new narratives and new avenues of enquiry. It is this positive quality 
                                                 
393 For example, Patricia Crone begins the conclusion to Meccan Trade with the words: “This is a book in 
which little has been learnt and much unlearnt.” Crone, Meccan Trade, 203.  
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of the prosopographical approach that is perhaps its most attractive feature and as scholars 
delve deeper into the nasab tradition and incorporate more sources of data they will 
continue to add to the sum total of what can be known of early Islamic history.  
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Appendix One - Hajīn marriage 
  
The research in this thesis has established that concubinage was a marriage practice 
adopted early in the Umayyad period. It could still be the case however that the acceptance 
of the product of these unions by the wider Muslim community was a feature of the late 
Umayyad/early ʿAbbāsid eras (as per the Goldziher argument). We can cast doubt on this 
too through an investigation of the marriage patterns of the hajīns.  
  
In terms of marriage behaviour, it must first be noted that the Quraysh were very strict 
when it came to female exogamy.394 As we have seen with Saʿd b. Abī Waqqās, even 
people who were reputedly integrated into the tribe by Muḥammad himself could find 
themselves ostracised in the marriage market. The chapters above have shown that the 
degree to which they practised this strictness varied by tribe and over time (the Umayyad 
princesses never married outside the Umayyad family while other Qurashī factions were 
less strict), but it appears to have been universally agreed that an Arab woman could only 
marry a non-Arab man in exceptional circumstances.395 As such, we would expect the 
hajīns to struggle when marrying Arab women from elite families if they were indeed 
seen as belonging to a lower caste. But the Nasab Quraysh tells us that they often married 
a lot better than Saʿd ever did.  
  
The table below consists of all the Generation 7 hajīn fathers for whom the Nasab 
Quraysh provides marriage records. The seventh generation has been selected as it is our 
first large sample, and the marriages probably took place during the first century of Islam. 
Names and suggested tribal affiliations are provided; where a wife was non-Qurashī this 
is also stated:  
                                                 
394 As outlined in Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 1:124, where he refers to the story ʿAbd Allah b. Jaʿfar being 
reproached by the Umayyad princes for allowing the marriage of his daughter to the non-Qurashī (though 
still elite) Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf. They were later forced to divorce. Ella Landau-Tasseron (“The Status of 
Allies,” 9) makes the same point, though she adds that there were some incidences when daughters were 
given to allies.  
395 Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 1:121.  
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Table 10.1: Marriages to Arab women by the Generation 7 sons of concubines  
  
Name  Spouse name  Spouse tribe  Page ref 
(NQ)  
ʿAmr b. Ḥasan b. ʿAlī 
b. Abī Ṭālib (Alid)  
Ramla bt. ʿAqīl b. Abī 
Ṭālib  
Alid  50 
Ḥusayn b. Ḥasan b.  
ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (Alid)  
Umm Ḥabīb bt. ʿAmr 
b. Ḥasan b. Abī Ṭālib  
Alid  51 
Abū Ḥāshim b.  
Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. 
Abī Ṭālib (Alid)  





Abū Ḥāshim b.  
Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. 
Abī Ṭālib (Alid)  
Fāṭima bt.  
Muḥammad b. ʿUbayd 
Allāh b. ʿAbbās b. 
ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib  
ʿAbbāsid  76 
Abū Ḥāshim b.  
Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. 
Abī Ṭālib (Alid)  
Umm ʿUthmān bt. Abī 
Judayr  
Baliyy of Quḍāʿa, 
non-Quraysh of the 
Anṣār and a hilf of 
the Qurashī ʿAmr b. 
ʿAwf  
76 
Abū Ḥāshim b.  
Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. 
Abī Ṭālib (Alid)  
Umm Ḥārith bt.  
Ḥārith b. Nawfal b.  
Ḥārith b. ʿAbd al-
Muṭṭalib  
Banū Hāshim  76 
Muḥammad b.  
Marwān b. Ḥakam 
(Umayyad)  
Bint Yazīd b. ʿAbd 
Allāh b. Shayba b.  
Rabīʿa b. ʿAbd Shams  
Quraysh  169 
Muḥammad b.  
Marwān b. Ḥakam 
(Umayyad)  
Umm Jamīl bt. ʿAbd 
al-Raḥmān b. Zayd b. 
Khaṭṭāb  
ʿAdī b. Kaʿb  169 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Aṣghar 
b. Wahb b. Zamʿa 
(Banū Asad)  
Karīma bt. Miqdād b.  




ʿĀmir b. ʿAbd Allāh b. 
Zubayr (Zubayrid)  
Qurayba bt. Mundhir 
b. Zubayr  
Zubayrid  243 
ʿUmar b. Muṣʿab b. 
Zubayr (Zubayrid)  
Umm Sulaymān bt.  
Khālid b. Zubayr  
Zubayrid  249-50 
244  
  
Qāsim b.  
Muḥammad b. Abī  
Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (Taym 
b. Murra) 
Qurayba bt. ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān b. Abī Bakr 
al-Ṣiddīq  
Taym b. Murra  279-80 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Aṣghar b. ʿUmar b.  
Khaṭṭāb (ʿAdī b. Kaʿb)  
Bint Qudāma b. 
Maẓʿūn   
Jumaḥ  356 
Al-Yās b. Ṣakhr b. Abī 
Jahm (ʿAdī b. Kaʿb)  
Umm Khālid bt.  
Muḥammad b. Abī 
Jahm)  
ʿAdī b. Kaʿb  373 
  
This cohort conducted 15 marriages, only three of which were with non-Qurashī women. 
There is a certain degree of endogamy in these marriages (they tend to be between 
members of the same tribal sub-section),396 but we should remind ourselves that Saʿd b. 
Abī Waqqās struggled to find a Qurashī wife even within his own supposed tribal 
subsection.397 If the children of Qurashī fathers and concubine mothers did not count as 
full Qurashīs, we would expect them to be treated as unsuitable matches for all Qurashī 
women (including members of their own sub-section) – the table above shows that this is 
clearly not the case.  
  
Having said this, there is evidence that the hajīns did not marry as well as their full-Arab 
brothers. The following tables illustrate that the Generation 7 sons of concubines were 
more likely to produce their own children through concubines, and took far fewer Arab 





                                                 
396 It is clearly a desideratum to be able to find out whether the hajīn were more or less likely to marry 
close relatives than full-Arabs or not. This would require an expansion of the database.  
397 The one marriage he did manage to a woman of this cohort does not appear in the Nasab Quraysh and 




Table 10.2: Marriages of Generation 7 men by maternal status  
  










Men of Arab 
mothers  




14 8 14 17 24 
  
This can be simplified as follows:  
  
  Table 10.3: Marriage patterns of Generation 7 men by maternal status  
  
  Arab wives per 
husband  
Proportion of 
children born to 
concubines  
Men of Arab 
mothers  
1.74 34.12% 




 It should also be noted that the hajīns who appear as children in the sixth generation are 
less likely to appear as fathers in the seventh; only 14.14% of the 99 of the hajīns who 
appear as children in the sixth generation return as fathers in the seventh, compared to 
27.53% of the their full-Arab brothers. Disappearance from the genealogical record is a 
sure sign that they were struggling to match the influence of fellow Qurashīs who had an 
Arab mother.  
  
But this is all a long way from saying that the hajīns were systematically discriminated 
against. As was discussed in Chapter Eight on the subject of Umayyad marriage, the lack 
of an Arab mother may not have carried any significant social stigma, but it would have 
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deprived the men of tribal connections that they would have gained through their maternal 
relations. This would have reduced their chances of gaining wealth or power, and hence 
reduced the chances of them making good marriages and being preserved in the 
genealogical record.  
  
We can also consider the fate of the female hajīns. Ideally, we would analyse their 
marriage behaviour in the same way as with their brothers above, but our database 
currently lacks the necessary information. Instead, we can compare the gender division 
of hajīn children to the gender division of full Arab children. As women only rarely 
appear as historical actors in the Nasab Quraysh, their inclusion is most likely an 
indication that they married well and/or gave birth to prominent figures. If hajīn girls 
were less likely to marry or produce lineages, there should accordingly be less of them.  
The results are presented in the table below:  
  
  Table 10.4: Numbers of female children by maternal status  
  
Number of full Arab children  2396 
Number of full Arab daughters  470 
Number of children born of 
concubines  
542 
Number of daughters born of 
concubines  
140 
Proportion of full Arab 
children that were female  
19.62% 
Proportion of concubine 
children that were female  
25.83% 
  
The figures show that children born of concubines recorded in our database are more 
likely to be female than children born of Arab women. As the genealogical interest in 
women is most likely to be related to their marriage behaviour, we can hypothesise that 
these hajīn girls did not struggle on the marriage market. Quite what this means for their 
status is disputable. On the one hand, if the Qurashī hajīn girl was of lower status than 
247  
  
her full-blooded sister, she may have found it easier to get married as there was a larger 
pool of potential marriage partners (because she would be of lower status to more men). 
But this is as far as we can go without understanding more about the types of men they 
were marrying; whether or not they were cousins for instance, or how powerful they were. 
At this stage all we can say is that there is no conclusive evidence on the relative 
attractiveness of the hajīn women when compared with their full-Arab sisters, and that 
further prosopographical investigation is needed.398  
   
                                                 
398 This avenue of inquiry may prove useful to us in future investigations where we are concerned with the 
network of marriage partners. If it can be shown that the hajīn girl was relatively successful on the 
marriage market it means that when a man was choosing a wife it was specifically her paternal relatives 
whose favour he was interested in cultivating; her maternal relatives were irrelevant. This means we can 




Appendix Two – Marriages of the brothers of Muʿāwiya and 
Marwān I  
  
The marriages of Muʿāwiya and Marwān I are important because they appear to have 
more in common with the marriages of the earlier generations of Quraysh than they do 
with the later Umayyads; they take very few concubines and seem to marry quite 
exogamously. But the small size of the sample is clearly problematic – these two men 
could be outliers and not representative of wider trends.  
  
To address this concern this appendix will collate the marriage data for the brothers of the 
two men. The table below provides a summary of this information as recorded in the 
Nasab Quraysh:  
    
  Table 11.1: Marriages of the brothers of Muʿāwiya and Marwān I  
  
  
Ref  Husband 
name   
Gen. of 
husband  





D1  ʿAnbasa b. Abī 
Sufyān  






to Quṣayy  
134  
D2  Muḥammad b.  
Abī Sufyān  
6  Umm  
ʿUthmān bt.  
Usayd b.  




Non-Quraysh  134  
D3  Ḥārith b.  
Ḥakam   





b. Kaʿb  
Non-Quraysh  170  
D4  Ḥārith b.  
Ḥakam   
6  Bint Dhuʾayb 
b. Ḥalḥala  
Khuzāʾa  Non-Quraysh  170  
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D5  Ḥārith b.  
Ḥakam   
6  ʿĀʾisha bt. 






to Abū al-ʿĀṣ b. 
Umayya (2)   
170  
D6  ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b.  
Ḥakam  
6  Umm Qāsim  





to Abū al-ʿĀṣ b. 
Umayya (2)  
171  
D7  Abān b. 
Ḥakam   







to Umayya (3)  
171  
D8  Yaḥyā b.  
Ḥakam  
6  Umm  
Kulthūm bt.  
Muḥammad  
b. Rabīʿa b. 





Quraysh; link  
to ʿAbd Manāf  
(5)  
171  
D9  Yaḥyā b.  
Ḥakam  
6  Umm  
Sulaymān bt. 
ʿĀmir  
Unknown  Unknown  171  
D10  Yaḥyā b.  
Ḥakam  
6  Zaynab bt.  
ʿAbd al- 
Raḥmān b. 





Quraysh; link  
to ʿAbd Manāf  
(5)  
172  
D11  Ḥabīb b.  
Ḥakam  
6  Maryam bt. 
ʿAbd Allāh  
Anṣār; Aws; 
Ḥāritha  
Non-Quraysh  172-3  
  
  
This shows that the 11 marriages of these seven men are not dissimilar from the marriages 
made by their brothers who became caliphs. Of the marriages to women with known tribal 
affiliations, four of them are to non-Qurashī women, three are to non-Umayyad Quraysh 
and three to other Umayyads, which reflects a similar distribution to what we saw above 
with Muʿāwiya and Marwān I.   





Arabic sources  
  
Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām. Kitāb al-Nasab. Edited by Maryam Muḥammad Khayr 
al-Dir’. Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1989.  
  
Asqalānī, Shahāb al-Dīn. Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994.  
  
Balādhurī, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā. Ansāb al-ashrāf. Damascus: Dār al-Yaqaẓa, 1997.  
  
Ibn ʿ Abd Rabbihi, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad. Al-ʿIqd al-farīd. Edited by Muḥammad b. Saʿīd 
al-ʿIryān. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Istiqāma, 1940.  
  
Ibn Funduq. Lubāb al-ansāb wa al-alqāb wa al-aʿqāb. Edited by Mahdī Rajāʿī. Qom: 
Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-ʻUẓma al-Marʻashī al-Najafī al-ʻĀmmah, 1410 h. [1990].  
  
Ibn Ḥabīb, Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad. Kitāb al-Muḥabbar. Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʻārif 
al-ʻUthmānīyah, 1942.  
———. Kitāb al-Munammaq fī akhbār Quraysh. Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʻārif 
alʻUthmānīyah, 1964.  
  
Ibn Ḥazm, Abū Muḥammad ʿ Alī. Jamharat ansāb al-ʿArab. Edited by E. Levi-Provencal. 
Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif bi Miṣr, 1948.  
  
Ibn Hishām, ʿAbd al-Sallām Hārūn. Al-Sīra al-nabawiyya. Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1955.  
  
Ibn al-Kalbī, Hishām b. Muḥammad. Kitāb al-Asnām. Cairo: Al-Maṭbaʿa al-ʿAmīrīya, 
1914.   
251  
  
———. Nasab Maʿadd wa al-Yaman al-kabīr. Edited by Nājī Ḥasan. Beirut: ʿĀlim 
alKutub, 2004.  
———. Jamharat al-nasab. Edited by Nājī Ḥasan. Beirut: ʿĀlim al-Kutub, 2010.  
  
Ibn Khaldūn, Walī al-Dīn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān. Kitāb al-ʿIbar wa-diwān. Cairo: Būlāq, 1867.  
———. Al-Muqaddima. Cairo: Dār Nahḍat, 1980.  
  
Ibn al-Nadīm, Muḥammad b. Isḥāq. Al-Fihrist. Cairo: Maktabat al-Tijārīyya al-Kubrā, 
1929.  
  
Ibn Quḍāma al-Maqdisī, Muwaffaq al-Dīn. Al-Tabyīn fī ansāb al-Qurashīyīn. Edited by 
Muḥammad Nāyif al-Dulaymī. Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1988.  
  
Ibn Saʿd, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad. Al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubra. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1985.  
  
Ibn Ṭiqṭaqa. Al-Aṣīlī fī ansāb al-Ṭālibiyyīn. Edited by Mahdī al-Rajāʿī. Qom: Maktabat 
Āyat Allāh al-ʻUẓma al-Marʻashī al-Najafī al-ʻĀmmah, 1374 h. [1997].  
  
Iṣbahānī, Abū al-Faraj. Kitāb al-Aghānī. Cairo: Būlāq, 1867.  
———. Maqātil al-Ṭālibiyyīn. Tehran: Muasasah-i Matbuati-i Ismailiyan, 1970.  
  
Ibshīhī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. Al-Mustaṭraf fī kull fann mustaẓraf. Beirut: Dār alUmam 
l-al-Ṭibāʿa wa-al-Nashr, 1952.   
  
Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī. Taʾrīkh Baghdād. Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanjī, 1931. 
———. al-Kifāya fī ʿIlm al-Riwāya. Hyderabad: Dā irat al-Maʻārif al-ʻUthmānīyah, 
1970.  
  
Maqqārī, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad. Analectes sur l’histoire et la littérature des Arabes 




Sadūsī, Muʿarrif b. ʿAmr. Kitāb hadhf min nasab Quraysh. Edited by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn 
Munajjid. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadīd, 1976.  
  
Samʿānī, ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad. Kitāb al-Ansāb. Hyderabad: Dā’irat al-Maʿārif, 
1962.   
  
Ṭabarī, Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr. Taʾrīkh rusul wa-al-mulūk. Edited by M.J. de 
Goeje. Leiden: Brill, 1879-1901.  
  
Wāqidī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad. Kitāb al-Maghāzī. Edited by Marsden Jones. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1966.   
  
Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn. Taʾrīkh. Edited by Muḥammad Nūr Sayf. Mecca: N/A, 1979.  
  
Zubayr b. Bakkār. Nasab Quraysh wa akhbārihā. Edited by Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir. 
Cairo: Maktabat Dār al-ʿUrūba, 1962.  
  
Zubayrī, Musʿab b. ʿAbd Allah. Kitāb Nasab Quraysh. Edited by E. Levi-Provencal. 
Cairo: Dar al-Maʿārif lil-Tibāʿa wa-al-Nashr, 1953.  
  
Secondary sources and translations  
  
Agha, Salih Said. The Revolution Which Toppled the Umayyads: Neither Arab nor 
ʻAbbāsid. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003.  
  
El-Ali, Saleh. “Muslim Estates in Hidjaz in the First Century A. H.” Journal of the 




 ‘Athamina, Khalil. “Non-Arab Regiments and Private Militias During the Umayyad 
Period.” Arabica 45, no. 3 (1998): 347-378.  
———. “How Did Islam Contribute to Change the Legal Status of Women: The Case of 
the Jawārī or the Female Slaves.” Al-Qantara 28, no. 2 (2007): 383–408.  
  
Abbott, Nabia. “Women and the State in Early Islam.” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 
1, no. 3 (1942): 341–368.  
  
Ahmed, Asad. The Religious Elite of the Early Islamic Hijaz: Five Prosopographical 
Case Studies. Oxford: Linacre College Unit for Prosopographical Research, 2010.  
  
Ali, Kecia. Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard 
University Press, 2010.  
  
Alhaj, I., Mirza Bashir-ud-Din and Mahmud Ahmad. The Holy Quran with English 
Translation and Commentary. Tilford: Islam International Publications Ltd., 
1988.    
  
Arjomand, Saïd. “The Constitution of Medina: A Sociolegal Interpretation of  
Muhammad’s Acts of Foundation of the “Umma”.” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 41, no. 4 (2009): 555-575.  
  
ʻAwtabī, Salamah ibn Muslim. An Early Islamic Family from Oman: al-ʻAwtabī’s 
Account of the Muhallabids. Translated by Martin Hinds. Manchester: University 
of Manchester Press, 1991.  
  
Banaji, Jairus. “Late Antique Legacies and Muslim Economic Expansion.” In Money, 
Power and Politics in Early Islamic Syria, edited by John Haldon, 165-179. 




Barnes, R. H. “Marriage by Capture.” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
5, no. 1 (1999): 57–73.  
  
Bashear, Suliman. “Yemen in Early Islam: an Examination of Non-Tribal Traditions.” 
Arabica 36, no. 3 (1989): 327-361.  
———. Arabs and Others in Early Islam. Princeton: Darwin Press, 1998.  
  
Bell, Duran. “Defining Marriage and Legitimacy.” Current Anthropology 38, no.2 
(1997): 237-352.  
  
Bernheimer, Teresa. “Genealogy, Marriage and the Drawing of Boundaries.” In Sayyids 
and Sharifs in Muslim Societies: the Living Links to the Prophet, edited by Kazuo 
Morimoto, 75-91. Abingdon: Routledge, 2012.  
  
Binbas, Ilker. “Structure and Function of the Genealogical Tree in Islamic 
Historiography.” In Horizons of the World. Festschrift for Đsenbike Togan.  
Edited by Ilker Binbas and Nurten Kılıc-Schubel, 465-544. Istanbul: Ithaki, 2011.  
  
Bohannan, Laura. “A Genealogical Charter.” Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute 22, no. 4 (1952): 301–315.  
  
Borrut, Antoine. Entre mémoire et pouvoir: l’espace syrien sous les derniers Omeyyades 
et les premiers Abbassides. Leiden: Brill, 2011.  
  
Brockelmann, Carl. Geshichte des arabischen Litteratur. Leiden: Brill, 1943.   
  
Brockopp, Jonathan. Early Mālikī Law: Ibn ʻAbd al-Ḥakam and His Major Compendium 




Brown, Peter. The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150-750. London: Thames and Hudson, 
1971. 
 
Bukharin, M.D. “Towards the earliest history of Kinda.” Arabian Archaeology and 
Epigraphy 20, no.1 (2009): 64-80.  
  
Bulliet, Richard. “A Quantitative Approach to Medieval Muslim Biographical 
Dictionaries.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 13, no.2 
(1970): 195-211.  
———. The Patricians of Nishapur: a Study in Medieval Islamic Social History. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.  
———. Conversion to Islam in the Medieval period: an Essay in Quantitative History. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979.  
  
Burton, John. The Collection of the Qurʾān. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977.  
———. The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1990.  
  
Bush, Archie, and Joseph McHugh. “Patterns of Roman Marriage.” Ethnology 14, no. 1 
(1975): 25-45.  
  
Calder, Norman. Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993.  
  
Caskel, Werner. Ǧamharat An-nasab: Das Genealogische Werk Des Hišam Ibn 
Muḥammad al-Kalbī. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966.  
 





Conrad, Lawrence. “The Arabs.” In The Cambridge Ancient History vol. 14, edited by 
Averil Cameron, Bryan Ward-Perkins and Michael Whitby, 678-700. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008.  
  
Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine. “Women, Marriage, and Slavery in Sub-Saharan Africa 
in the Nineteenth Century.” In Women and Slavery: Africa, the Indian Ocean 
World, and the Medieval North Atlantic, edited by Gwyn Campbell, Suzanne 
Myers and Joseph Miller, 63–82. Athens (Ohio): Ohio University Press, 2007.  
  
Cornell, Vincent J. Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism. Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1998.  
  
Crone, Patricia. Slaves on Horses: the Evolution of the Islamic Polity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980.  
———. Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1987.  
———. Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987. 
———. “Serjeant and Meccan Trade.” Arabica 39 (1992): 216-240.  
———. “The First-century Concept of Hiğra.” Arabica 41, no. 3 (1994): 352-387.  
———. “Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad period political parties?” Der Islam 
71 (1994): 1-57.  
———. “How Did the Quranic Pagans Make a Living?” Bulletin of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies 68, no. 3 (2005): 387–399  
———. “Quraysh and the Roman Army: Making Sense of the Meccan Leather Trade.” 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 70, no.1 (2007): 63-88.  
  
Crone, Patricia and Michael Cook. Hagarism: the Making of the Islamic World. 




Crone, Patricia and Martin Hinds. God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First 
Centuries of Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.  
Donner, Fred McGraw. “Mecca’s Food Supplies and Muhammad’s Boycott.” Journal of 
the Economic and Social History of the Orient 20, no. 3 (1977): 249–266.  
———. “The Bakr B. Wā’il Tribes and Politics in Northeastern Arabia on the Eve of 
Islam.” Studia Islamica 51 (1980): 5–38.  
———. “Tribal Settlement in Basra during the First Century A.H.” In Land Tenure and 
Social Transformation in the Middle East, edited by Tarif Khalidi, 97-120. Beirut: 
American University of Beirut, 1984.  
———. Narratives of Islamic Origins. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.  
  
Douglas, Mary. Purity and Danger. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.  
  
Dunbar, Robin “Co-evolution of Neocortex Size, Group Size and Language in Humans.” 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16, no.4 (1993): 681-735.  
  
Duri, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz. The Rise of Historical Writing Among the Arabs. Translated by 
Lawrence Conrad. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.  
  
Ebstein, M. “Shurṭa Chiefs in Baṣra in the Umayyad Period: A Prosopographical Study.” 
Al-Qantara 31, no. 1 (2010): 103–147.  
  
EI2. Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. Leiden: Brill, 1960-2009.  
  
EIr. Encyclopaedia Iranica. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982-present.  
  
EQ. Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān. Leiden: Brill, 2001-2006.  
  
Erben, Michael “Genealogy and Sociology: A Preliminary Set of Statements and 




Evans-Grubbs, Judith. Law and Family in Late Antiquity: The Emperor Constantine’s 
Marriage Legislation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.  
  
Evans-Pritchard, E. “Nuer Time-Reckoning.” Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute 12, no. 2 (1939): 189-216.  
  
Finnegan, Ruth. “A Note on Oral Tradition and Historical Evidence.” History and Theory 
9, no.2 (1970): 195-201.  
  
Foss, Clive. “A Syrian Coinage of Mu’awiya?” Revue Numismatique 158 (2002): 353.  
———. “Muʿāwiya’s State.” In Money, Power and Politics in Early Islamic Syria, edited 
by John Haldon, 75-96. Farnham; Burlington: Ashgate, 2010.  
  
Jeffrey, Arthur. “Ghevond’s Text of the Correspondence Between ʿUmar II and Leo III.” 
Harvard Theological Review 37, no.4 (1944): 269-332.  
  
Ghazzālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad. Marriage and Sexuality in Islam: a Translation of Al-
Ghazālī’s Book on the Etiquette of Marriage from the Iḥyāʾ. Translated by 
Madelain Farah. Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 1984.  
  
Gibb, H.A.R. Studies on the Civilization of Islam. Edited by Stanford J. Shaw and William 
R. Polk. Routledge: London, 1962.  
  
Goitein, S. D. “Slaves and Slavegirls in the Cairo Geniza Records.” Arabica 9, no. 1 
(1962): 1–20.  
  
Goldziher, Ignác. Muslim Studies. Translated by C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern. Chicago: 




Goody, Jack. The Oriental, the Ancient and the Primitive: Systems of Marriage and the 
Family in the Pre-industrial Societies of Eurasia. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990.  
  
Haley, Alex. Roots. New York: Doubleday, 1976.  
  
Harrison, Alwyn. “Behind the Curve: Bulliet and Conversion to Islam in al-Andalus 
Revisited.” Al-Masaq: Islam & the Medieval Mediterranean 24, no. 1 (2012):  
35–51.  
  
Hawting, Gerald. The Idea of Idolatry and the Emergence of Islam. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999.  
———. The First Dynasty of Islam. 2nd edition. London: Routledge, 2000.  
  
Hayase, Yasuko, and Kao-Lee Liaw. “Factors on Polygamy in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Findings Based on the Demographic and Health Surveys.” Developing Economies 
35, no. 3 (1997): 293–327.  
  
Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, and Peter J Richerson. “The Puzzle of Monogamous 
Marriage.” Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society Of London. Series B, 
Biological Sciences 367, no. 1589 (2012): 657–669.  
  
Hibri, Tayeb. Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography: Hārūn al-Rashīd and the Narrative 
of the ʻAbbāsid Caliphate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.  
  
Hinds, Martin. “Review of: Der Dīwān von ’Umar Ibn al-Ḫaṭṭāb: Ein Beitrag Zur  
Frühislamischen Verwaltungsgeschichte. Inaugural Dissertation by GerdRüdiger 
Puin.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 




Hjerrild, Bodil. Studies in Zoroastrian Family Law: a Comparative Analysis Copenhagen: 
Museum Tusculanum Press, 2003.  
  
Hosein, Rasheed. Tribal Alliance Formations and Power Structures in the Jāhilīyah and 
Early Islamic Periods: Quraysh and Thaqīf (530-750 CE). Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, University of Chicago: 2012.  
  
Hoyland, Robert. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. 
London: Routledge, 2001.  
———. “New Documentary Texts and the Early Islamic State.” Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London 69, no. 3 (2006): 395–416.  
———. “Arab Kings, Arab Tribes, Arabic Texts and the Geginnings of Arab Historical 
Memory in Late Roman Epigraphy.” In From Hellenism to Islam: Cultural and 
Linguistic Change in the Roman Near East. Edited by Hannah Cotton et al. 
371401. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
  
Humphries, R. Stephen. Islamic History: a Framework for Inquiry. London: Tauris, 1991.  
———. Muʿawiya Ibn Abi Sufyan: From Arabia to Empire. Oxford: Oneworld, 2006.  
  
Ibn Isḥāq, Muḥammad, Alfred Guillaume, and ʻAbd al-Malik Ibn Hishām. The Life of  
Muhammad : a Translation of Ishāq’s Sīrat Rasūl Allāh. 5th ed. Lahore: Pakistan 
Branch, Oxford University Press, 1978.  
  
Ibn al-Nadīm, Muḥammad b. Isḥāq. The Fihrist: a 10th Century AD Survey of Islamic 
Culture. Translated by Bayard Dodge. Chicago: KAZI Publications, 1998.  
  
Jabali, Fuad. The Companions of the Prophet: a Study of Geographical Distribution and 





Jerusalem Prosopography Project. Accessed May 23, 2013.  
http://micro5.mscc.huji.ac.il:81/JPP/v3/regTou.jsp.  
  
Johns, Jeremy. “Archaeology and the History of Early Islam: The First Seventy Years.” 
Journal of the Economic & Social History of the Orient 46, no. 4 (2003): 411– 
436.  
  
Jones, Rachel K., Julie Fennell, Jenny A. Higgins, and Kelly Blanchard. “Better Than 
Nothing or Savvy Risk-reduction Practice? The Importance of Withdrawal.” 
Contraception 79, no. 6 (2009): 407–410.  
  
Juynboll, G.H.A. Muslim Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.  
  
Kalmijn, Matthijs. “Intermarriage and Homogamy: Causes, Patterns, and Trends.” Annual 
Review of Sociology 24, no. 1 (1998): 395-421.  
———. “Status Homogamy in the United States.” American Journal of Sociology 97, no. 
2 (1991): 496–523.  
  
Kalmijm, Matthijs and Frank van Tubergen. “A Comparative Perspective on 
Intermarriage: Explaining Differences Among National-Origin Groups in the 
United States.” Demography 47, no. 2 (2010): 459–479.  
  
Keats-Rohan, K. S. B. Prosopography Approaches and Applications: a Handbook. 
Oxford: Unit for Prosopographical Research, Linacre College, 2007.  
  
Kennedy, Hugh. “The Financing of the Military in the Early Islamic State.” In The 
Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East, vol.3, edited by Averil Cameron, 361378. 
Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995.  
———. “From Oral Tradition to Written Record in Arabic Genealogy.” Arabica 44, no. 
4 (1997): 531-544.  
262  
  
———. “Syrian Elites From Byzantium to Islam: Survival or Extinction?” In Money, 
Power and Politics in Early Islamic Syria, edited by John Haldon, 181-200. 
Farnham; Burlington: Ashgate, 2010.  
  
Khalidi, Tarif. Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994.  
  
Kister, Meir. “Mecca and Tamīm (Aspects of Their Relations).” Journal of the Economic 
and Social History of the Orient 8, no. 2 (1965): 113–163.  
———. “The Campaign of Huluban: A New Light on the Expedition of Abraha.” Le 
Museon 78 (1965): 425-436.  
———. “Some Reports Concerning Al-Tāʾif.” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 1 
(1979): 1–18.  
———. “On the Wife of the Goldsmith From Fadak and Her Progeny: a Study in Jāhilī 
Genealogical Traditions.” Le Muséon 92 (1979): 321-30  
———. “Mecca and the Tribes of Arabia.” In Studies in Islamic History and  
Civilization, edited by M. Sharon, 33-57. Leiden: Brill, 1986.  
  
Kister, Meir and M. Plessner. “Notes on Caskel’s Ǧamharat An-nasab.” Oriens 25/26 
(1976): 48-68.  
  
Kremer, Alfred. The Orient Under the Caliphs. Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1977.  
  
Kuper, Adam. “Changing the Subject – About Cousin Marriage, Among Other Things.” 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 14, no. 4 (2008): 717–735.  
  
Lammens, Henri. La Mecque à la veille de l’hégire. Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1924.  
  





Landau-Tasseron, Ella. “From Tribal Society to Centralized Polity: an Interpretation of 
Events and Anecdotes in the Formative Period of Islam.” Jerusalem Studies in 
Arabic and Islam 24 (2000): 180-216.  
———. “Adoption, Acknowledgement of Paternity and False Genealogical Claims in 
Arabian and Islamic Societies.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London 66, no. 2 (2003): 169–192.  
———. “The Status of Allies in Pre-Islamic and Early Islamic Arabian Society.” Islamic 
Law and Society 13, no. 1 (2006): 6–32.  
Lecker, Michael. “Biographical Notes of Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī.” Journal of Semitic Studies 
41 (1996): 21-63.  
———. “Tribes in Pre- and Early Islamic Arabia.” In People, Tribes and Society in  
Arabia Around the Time of Muḥammad, edited by Michael Lecker, 1-106. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.  
———. “Pre-Islamic Arabia.” In The New Cambridge Histoy of Islam vol. 1, edited by 
Chase Robinson, 153-170. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  
  
Leder, Stefan. “The Literary Use of the khabar: a Basic Form of Historical Writing.” In 
The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East vol. 1, edited by Averil Cameron and 
Lawrence Conrad, 277-316. Princeton: Darwin Press, 1992.  
  
Lewis, Bernard. Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Enquiry. New York; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.  
  
Loftus, Elizabeth. Eyewitness Testimony. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1996.  
  
MacDonald, M.C.A. “Reflections on the Linguistic Map of Pre-Islamic Arabia.” Arabian 




Mack, Beverly. “Royal Wives in Kano.” In Hausa Women in the Twentieth Century, 
edited by Catherine Coles and Beverley Mack. 109–129. Madison (Wisconsin): 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.  
  
Madelung, Wilfred. The Succession to Muḥammad: a Study of the Early Caliphate. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
  
Margoliouth, D.S. Mohammed and the Rise of Islam. New York: Putnam, 1905.  
  
Matsumura, Shuichi, and Peter Forster. “Generation Time and Effective Population Size 
in Polar Eskimos.” Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 275, 
no. 1642 (2008): 1501–1508.  
  
McCorriston, Joy. Pilgrimage and Household in the Ancient Near East. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011.  
  
McLennan, John Ferguson. Primitive Marriage. Edinburgh: A. and C. Black, 1865.  
  
Meyendorff, John. “Byzantine Views of Islam.” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 18 (1964): 113-
132.  
  
Millar, Fergus. “Hagar, Ishmael, Josephus and the Origins of Islam.” Journal of Jewish 
Studies no. 1 (1993): 23-45.  
 
Mills, Elizabeth and Gary Mills. Elizabeth and Gary Mills, “The Genealogist’s 
Assessment of Alex Haley’s Roots.” National Genealogical Society Quarterly 72, 




Morimoto, Kazuo. “The Formation and Development of the Science of Talibid 
Genealogies in the 10th and 11th Century Middle East.” Oriente Moderno 2 (1999): 
541-570.  
———. “A Preliminary Study on the Diffusion of the Niqāba al-Ṭālibīyīn: Towards an 
Understanding of the Early Dispersal of Sayyids.” In The Influence of Human 
Mobility, edited by Hidemitsu Kuroki, 3-42. London: Kegan Paul, 2003.  
  
Mottahedeh, Roy. “The Shu'ubiyah Controversy and the Social History of Early Islamic 
Iran.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 7, no.2 (1976): 161-182.  
  
Motzki, Harald. “Wal-muhsanatu mina n-nisa'i illa ma malakat aimanukum (Koran 4: 24) 
und die koranische Sexualethik.” Der Islam 63.2 (1986): 192-218.  
———. “The Muṣannaf of ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī as a Source of Authentic Aḥādīth 
of the First Century A. H.” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 50, no. 1 (1991): 1– 
21.  
  
Muheisen, Zeidoun and Ahmad Ajlouni. “A Nabataean inscription from northern Jordan 
survey (Umm al-Jimāl area).” Syria 82 (2005): 167-171.  
  
Muller, Charles. Onomasticon Arabicum-online: a Historical Suvey, 6 August 2012.  
http://onomasticon.irht.cnrs.fr/OA_ProjectHistory.pdf.  
  
Munt, Harry. The Sacred History of Early Islamic Medina. Unpublished PhD dissertation, 
University of Oxford: 2010.  
  
Musil, Alois. The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins. New York: American 




Nast, Heidi. “Islam, Gender, and Slavery in West Africa Circa 1500: a Spatial 
Archaeology of the Kano Palace, Northern Nigeria.” Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 86, no. 1 (1996): 44–77.  
  
Nawas, John. “The Birth of an Elite: Mawālī and Arab ʿUlamāʾ.” Jerusalem Studies in 
Arabic and Islam 31 (2006): 74-91.  
  
Neisser, Ulric. “John Dean’s Memory: a Case Study.” In Memory Observed: 
Remembering in Natural Contexts, edited by Ulric Neisser, 102-115. San 
Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1982.  
  
Norris, H.T. “Shuʿūbiyyah in Arabic literature.” In ʿAbbasid Belles-Lettres edited by Julia 
Ashtiany et al., 31-47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.  
 
Pellat, Charles. “Peut-on connaître le taux de natalité au temps du Prophète? A la  
recherche d’une méthode.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the 
Orient 14, no. 2 (1971): 107-135.  
  
Peters, Emrys. “The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of 
Cyrenaica. Curl Bequest Prize Essay, 1959.” The Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 90, no. 1 (1960): 29–53.  
  
Peters, Francis. The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.  
———. Mecca: A Literary History of the Muslim Holy Land. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994.  
 
Petry, Carl. “Geographic Origins of the Civil Judiciary of Cairo during the Fifteenth 
Century.” Journal of theEconomic and Social History of the Orient 21, no. 1 
(1978): 52-73.  
267  
  
———. “Geographic Origins of Diwan Officials in Cairo during the Fifteenth Century.” 
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 21, no. 2 (1978): 165-
183.  
———. “Geographic Origins of Academicians in Cairo during the Fifteenth Century.” 
Journal of theEconomic and Social History of the Orient 23, nos. 1 and 2 (1978): 
119-141.  
———. “Geographic Origins of Religious Functionaries in Cairo during the Fifteenth 
Century.” Journal of theEconomic and Social History of the Orient 23, no. 2 
(1980): 240-264.  
———. “Travel Patterns of Medieval Notables in the Near East.” Studia Islamica 62 
(1986): 3-87.  
  
Pipes, Daniel. Slave Soldiers and Islam: the Genesis of a Military System. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1981.  
  
Powers, David. Muhammad Is Not the Father of Any of Your Men. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.  
 
Qāḍī, Wadād. “A Documentary Report on Umayyad Stipends Registers (“dīwān al-
ʿaṭāʾ”) in Abū Zurʿa's “tārīkh”.” Quaderni di Studi Arabi 4 (2009): 7-44. 
  
Rabinowitz, Louis. Encyclopaedia Judaica, s.v. “Concubine: in the Talmudic Period and 
the Middle Ages.” Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2007.  
  
Radushev, Evgeni. “The Spread of Islam in the Ottoman Balkans: Revisiting Bulliet’s 
Method on Religious Conversion.” Archív Orientalní 78, no. 4 (2010): 363–384.  
  
Randolph, Richard and Allan Coult, “A Computer Analysis of Bedouin Marriage.” 




Retsö, Jan. The Arabs in Antiquity: Their History From the Assyrians to the Umayyads. 
London; New York: Routledge, 2003.  
  
Robin, Christian and Jean-François Breton. “Le sanctuaire préislamique du Ğabal al- 
Lawḍ (Nord Yemen).” Comptes rendus de l’Academie des Inscriptions et 
BellesLettres (1982): 590-629.  
  
Robinson, Chase. Islamic Historiography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003.  
  
Rosenthal, Franz. A History of Muslim Historiography. Leiden: Brill, 1952.  
  
Ross, Denison. “The Genealogies of Fakhr-ud-dîn, Mubârak Shâh.” In A Volume of 
Oriental Studies Presented to E.G. Browne, edited by Thomas Arnold and 
Reynold Nicholson, 392-413. Cambridge: [s.n.], 1922.  
  
Roth, Martha. Law Collections From Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1995.  
  
Rubin, Uri. “‘Al-Walad li-l-Firāsh’ on the Islamic Campaign Against Zinā’.” Studia 
Islamica 78 (1993): 5–26.  
  
Sanderson, Stephen K. “Explaining Monogamy and Polygyny in Human Societies: 
Comment on Kanazawa and Still.” Social Forces 80, no. 1 (2001): 329–335.  
  
Sandmel, Samuel. “Parallelomania.” Journal of Biblical Literature 81, no. 1 (1962): 1– 
13.  
  





Schneider, Irene. “Freedom and Slavery in Early Islamic Time (1st/7th and 2nd/8th 
centuries).” Al-Qanṭara 28 (2007): 353-382.  
  
Schoeler, Gregor. The Oral and the Written in Early Islam. Oxford: Routledge, 2010.  
———. The Genesis of Literature in Islam: From the Aural to the Read. Translated by 
S.M Toorawa. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.  
  
Serjeant, R. B. “Haram and Hawtah: The Sacred Enclave in Arabia.” In Mélanges Taha 
Husain, edited by Abdurrahman Badawi, 47-52. Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1962.  
———. “Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam: Misconceptions and Flawed Polemics.” 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 110, no. 3 (1990): 472–486.  
  
Sezgin, Fuat. Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums. Leiden: Brill, 1967.   
  
Shaban, Muhammad. Islamic History, A New Interpretation, vol.1. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971.  
  
Shah, A.M. and R.G. Shroff. “The Vahīvancā Bāroṭs of Gujarat: A Caste of Genealogists 
and Mythographers.” The Journal of American Folklore 71 (1958): 246-276.  
  
Simon, Róbert. Meccan Trade and Islam. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989.  
  
Stern, Gertrude. Marriage in Early Islam. London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1939.  
  
Stone, Lawrence. “Prosopography.” Daedalus 100, no. 1 (1971): 46–79.  
  
Szombathy, Zoltan “Genealogy in Medieval Muslim Societies.” Studia Islamica 95 
(2002): 5-35.  
270  
  
———. The Roots of Arabic Genealogy: a Study in Historical Anthropology. Piliscsaba: 
The Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003.  
  
Ṭabarī, Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr. The History of al-Ṭabarī. Edited by Ihsan Abbas. 
Albany: SUNY Press, 1989-2007.  
  
Tulving, Endel. MIT Encyclopaedia of the Cognitivie Sciences, s.v. “Episodic vs. 
Semantic Memory.” Cambridge, Mass,: MIT Press, 1999.  
  
Wansbrough, John. The Sectarian Milieu. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.  
  
Wāqidī, Muḥammad ibn ʻUmar. The Life of Muḥammad: al-Wāqidī’s Kitāb Al-Maghāzī. 
Edited by Rizwi Faizer; translated by Rizwi Faizer, Amal Ismail and Abdul-Kader 
Tayob. Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2011.  
  
Watt, W. Montgomery. Muhammad at Mecca. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953.  
  
White, Douglas R., and Michael L. Burton. “Causes of Polygyny: Ecology, Economy, 
Kinship, and Warfare.” American Anthropologist 90, no. 4 (1988): 871–887.  
  
Young, Walter. Stoning and Hand Amputation: the pre-Islamic Origins of the Ḥadd 
Penalties for Zināa and Sariqa. Unpublished dissertation: 2005.  
  
Zaman, Iftikhar. “Review: The Companions of the Prophet: A Study of Geographical 
Distribution and Political Alignments.” Journal of Islamic Studies 16, no. 1 
(2005): 63–65.  
  
Zaman, Muḥammad. Religion and Politics Under the Early ʿAbbāsids. Leiden: Brill, 
1997.  
  
